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The goal of this thesis is the study of the structure of desire and sexuality in post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema, through the prism of Lacanian psychoanalytic film 
theory. The scholarly literature on Iranian cinema has largely come from fields outside 
film studies and film theory, and almost no studies exist that focus on the question of 
desire and sexuality in Iranian cinema. Deploying a psychoanalytic film theoretical 
perspective, I discuss two distinct movements in Iranian cinema. Part I of the thesis 
focuses on the well-known New Iranian Cinema, where I foreground neglected aspects 
of this movement and consider the formal logic of this movement to revolve around the 
axis between the gaze and voice. I analyze the gaze as the Lacanian object-cause of 
desire in two filmic examples, and demonstrate that contra to the theory that the New 
Iranian Cinema is the locus of 1970s feminist gaze theory, I argue that it is one of the 
exemplary sites of the Lacanian object-gaze and one of the few examples of the cinema 
of desire in the world. I also foreground the voice as an important object of study in the 
New Iranian Cinema for the first time, and link Chion’s concept of the acousmatic voice 
to Lacan’s object-voice as the object-cause of desire, where the voice becomes a love-
object in two filmic examples of the New Iranian Cinema. Then as the final example, I 
analyze a single film foregrounding several motifs such as transgender, and male and 
female homoeroticism through its female protagonists’ forced gender re-signification 
and cross-dressing, where the logic of the Lacanian feminine ‘No’ and feminine 
jouissance become operative. In Part II, I theorize the emergence of a new film 
movement in Iranian cinema that represents a shift away from the conventions of the 
New Iranian Cinema of the 1990s and 2000s and deploys elements of the horror genre 
but with an uncanny dimension that evokes the weird and the eerie. Through a close 
textual analysis, I analyze two respective films that I situate in this new genre bending 
film movement. The first film was analyzed through a Lacanian prism that looks at the 
film’s two-part structure where the first half functions as the world of fantasy and the 
second as the world of desire – where the traumatic Real of desire appears in all its 
nightmarish dimension. The last film was also theorized as an example of the uncanny 
between the weird and the eerie and analyzed through the psychoanalytic notion of the 
return of the repressed, where the chador-clad female vampire represented the return of 
feminine sexuality in the Real, due to its repression in the Islamic Republic or the 
(patriarchal) symbolic order. The common motif that runs through the films of this new 
movement, both at the level of form and content, is the palpable sense of the 
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Iranian Cinema and Psychoanalysis (or Watching Iranian Movies with Lacan) 
 
The Iranian government calls psychoanalysis, the enemy of the state.  
 
– Gohar Homayounpour1 
 
The central question that grounds the inquiry of this thesis is: why couple 
psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema or Iranian cinema and psychoanalysis? What is at 
stake in reading Iranian cinema through the prism of psychoanalytic film theory? At 
first glance, the two seem like an unlikely couple, but as psychoanalytic theory 
reminds us, it is only through probing the gaps, ruptures and fissures in the filmic text 
that the world of unconscious desires reveals itself. The wager of this thesis is that, in 
fact, there is a profound homology between Iranian cinema and psychoanalysis which 
can only be discovered through a short-circuiting reading of the two, where through a 
crossing of wires between them, unexpected sparks and theoretical insights come to 
light, which would otherwise remain unthought. The metaphor of short-circuiting as a 
method of critical reading is provided by Slavoj Žižek: 
 
A short circuit occurs when there is a wrong connection in the network—
wrong, of course, from the standpoint of the smooth functioning of the 
network. Is therefore the shock of short circuiting not one of the best 
metaphors for a critical reading? Is not one of the most effective critical 
procedures to cross wires that do not usually touch: to take a major classic 
(text, author, notion), and read it in a short-circuiting way, through the lens of 
a “minor” author, text, or conceptual apparatus (“minor” should be 
understood here in Deleuze’s sense: not “of lesser quality,” but marginalized, 
disavowed by the hegemonic ideology, or dealing with a “lower,” less 
dignified topic)? If the minor reference is well chosen, such a procedure can 
lead to insights which completely shatter and undermine our common 
perceptions.2  
 
From this perspective, films in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema function as texts 
which when read in a short-circuiting way, through the “minor” conceptual apparatus 
                                                        
1 This is what the Iranian psychoanalyst Gohar Homayounpour says in a talk on her 
book, Doing Psychoanalysis in Tehran, at the Freud Museum in London. 
Homayounpouer goes on to state, “which I think they are right.” See, 
http://podcast.freud.org.uk/e/doing-psychoanalysis-in-tehran/ time: 57:40. Accessed 
online, March 12, 2015. 
2 The first book in the Short-Circut series was by Žižek himself, see Slavoj Žižek, 
The Puppet and the Dwarf: the Perverse Core of Christianity (MIT Press 2003), vii. 
 2 
of Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis (again “minor” in the sense intended by Deleuze 
and Guattari as marginalized, disavowed, but also subversive and revolutionary),3 
completely shatter our common perceptions and conceptions, not only of Iranian 
cinema but of psychoanalysis itself. There is a radical political core inherent to this 
approach, since the crossing of wires between psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema can 
generate a theoretical short circuit that can uncover the unthought in the libidinal 
economy of the ruling ideology. 
As the opening quote from Homayounpour demonstrates, psychoanalysis is 
seen as politically subversive by the hegemonic ideology of the Islamic Republic, 
since it considers psychoanalysis to pose such a threat that it must be deemed an 
enemy of the state. The theoretical question to be asked here is: why should 
psychoanalysis pose such a threat to the Islamic Republic? To put it briefly: the threat 
that psychoanalytic theory poses to the theocratic state lies in the fact that 
psychoanalysis is concerned with what is deemed the terrain of the ruling Shi‘i 
‘ulama (clergy) and fuqaha (jurists), namely desire and sexuality or Eros and 
eroticism. The ruling Shi‘i clerics are concerned with covering over all expressions of 
(sexual) desire, especially feminine desire and female sexuality.4 Indeed, desire and 
                                                        
3 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka Toward a Minor Literature 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986).  
4 This underlying fear and threat of psychoanalysis ascribed to the Islamic Republic’s 
ruling ideology by Homayounpour may be traced back to one of the early ideologues 
of the Iranian Revolution and vehement critics of the Pahlavi regime, namely the 
leftist Islamist, Ali Shariati (1933-1977). Regarding Freud and psychoanalysis 
Shariati writes, “In this new bourgeoisie, [he] armed himself against all moral and 
human values, against all high and ascending manifestations of the human soul and 
called it realism… A prophet of the bourgeoisie, whose religion was sexualism…. 
This prophet was named Freud. His religion was sexuality; his temple, Freudism.” In 
another instance, Shariati blames psychoanalysis for the moral corruption of women, 
“… From Freudism [the bourgeoisie] built a supposedly scientific and humane 
religion. From sexuality they built their place of worship and created a powerful 
servant class. And the first sacrifice on the threshold of this temple was women’s 
human values.” Ali Shariati quoted in Orkideh Behrouzan, Prozak Diaries: 
Psychiatry and Generational Memory in Iran (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2016), 37-38. A history of psychoanalysis in Iran is currently a 
desideratum. The main figure in Iran who has perhaps done most to try and 
rehabilitate psychoanalysis from such blatant misreadings is perhaps the British 
trained psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Mohammad Sanati. See Mohammad Sanati 
and Arash Javanbakht, “Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis in Iran,” Journal of The 
American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry, 34(3), pp. 405-414, 
2006. Available online: 
http://www.mohammadsanati.net/1390/culturepsychoanalysisiran/580. See also, 
 3 
eroticism is the subject of psychoanalysis par excellence, since as Jacques Lacan 
states what, “Freudian thought has placed at the center of our interest in the economy 
of the psyche, [is] namely, Eros and eroticism.”5 In another turn Lacan states, “Desire 
is indeed the essential base, the goal, the aim, and the practice too, of everything that 
is being announced here, in this teaching, on the Freudian message.”6As we shall see 
throughout this thesis, it is in Shi‘i jurisprudence (fiqh) that a whole set of legal 
theories were elaborated in order to delimit or repress the representation of masculine 
and feminine desire and sexuality in relation to the cinema, through the enactment of 
the logic of the veil or the system of modesty (hejab in its broadest sense). In this 
sense, the Islamic Republic and its legal theoretical apparatus was/is concerned with 
the repression of (sexual) desire not just in society, but its articulation in the cinema. 
This is why the historicist approach to sexuality derived from Michel Foucault would 
fail in a proper analysis of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema (and Iranian society 
under the Islamic Republic for that matter), since as Joan Copjec states, 
“[historicism] refuses to believe in repression and proudly professes to be illiterate in 
desire.”7 Indeed, Foucault famously positions himself against what he calls, “the 
repressive hypothesis” (of desire), in psychoanalytic theory.8 In this sense, to read 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, we have to be able to read desire, to know that 
desire is almost always unconscious desire, to recognize that desire is never 
transparent, neither to the subject nor to society or its cultural texts, and that where 
desire is concerned it always requires interpretation.  
This brings me to the question of how we might understand the relationship 
between the psyche and culture, or how universal elements interact with cultural 
                                                        
Nader Barzin, ‘La pscychanalyse en Iran,’ Topique 1, pp. 157-71, 2010. I have dealt 
with some aspects of psychoanalysis in Iran in a forthcoming book chapter, Farshid 
Kazemi, “The Repressed Event of (Shi‘i) Islam: Psychoanalysis, the Trauma of 
Iranian Shi‘ism, and Feminine Revolt,” in Psychoanalytic Islam and Islamic 
Psychoanalysis (London/New York, Routledge, 2018). 
5 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 
VII. Ed. Jaques-Alain Miller, Trans. By Dennis Porter (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 175.  
6 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X. Ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 214.  
7 Joan Copjec, Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists (Cambridge and 
Massachusetts: MIT, 1994) 14.  
8 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 
10-12. 
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particularities. To answer this question we must look at the historical emergence of 
Freudian psychoanalysis itself. Indeed, if Freudian theory, in its original articulation, 
was appropriate to explain a certain cultural matrix and historical milieu in the West 
that relied on a Judeo-Christian ethics of sexual repression and control; then 
similarly, it fits well the structure of Iranian society in the aftermath of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, since Iranian society underwent a total Islamization where 
traditional Islamic ethics of sexual repression and control became operative in the 
wider culture and society. As the German-Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han puts 
it: 
 
Freud’s psychic apparatus is a repressive apparatus of domination and 
compulsion that operates with commands and prohibitions, that subjugates 
and oppresses. Just like disciplinary society, it is full of walls, barriers, 
thresholds, cells, borders, and border posts. Freud’s psychoanalysis is 
therefore possible only in repressive societies, such as the society of 
sovereignty or the disciplinary society, which base their organization on the 
negativity of prohibitions and commands.9 
 
In this precise sense, Freudian psychoanalysis is possible in post-revolutionary 
Iranian society precisely because it is a repressive society, at once a society of 
sovereignty and a disciplinary society (a Shi’i theocratic state operating with an 
Islamic legal code), whose organization is structured on prohibitions and commands. 
This is why a psychoanalytic theoretical method fits well with the structure of the 
psyche operative in post-revolutionary Iranian society and its cinematic production, 
since the interaction of psyche and culture in this formulation is based on repression, 
domination and compulsion. 
My overall purpose in this thesis is to demonstrate that Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalytic film theory, more than any other theoretical framework, is the 
privileged instrument through which we may draw out the structure of desire and 
sexuality operative in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, that would otherwise remain 
repressed or disavowed. This study then stages a mutually productive encounter 
between Iranian cinema and psychoanalytic film theory, which goes beyond the first 
wave psychoanalytic film theory of the 1970s and takes its place along Lacanian 
theorists such as Joan Copjec, Slavoj Žižek and Todd McGowan, who have initiated 
                                                        
9 Byung-Chul Han, Topology of Violence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2018), 23. 
 5 
a new wave of Lacanian film theory. If this thesis may be said to have one central 
aim: it is to argue that in order to properly read post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, we 
must become the interpreter of desires, to “become literate in desire” as Copjec puts 
it, in order to read what is unarticulable in these filmic texts, since it is desire and its 
interpretation10 that is at the nexus of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema and 
psychoanalysis.  
 
Iranian Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories  
 
There is a fortuitous co-incidence in the historical appearance of psychoanalysis and 
Iranian cinema that has hitherto remained undiscovered, the uncovering of which is 
the first step in drawing out the homology between the two through a psychoanalytic 
procedure. The relationship between the historical emergence of psychoanalysis and 
the cinema has long been noted in film theory and by film theorists, with several 
volumes that variously foreground the parallel histories of cinema and 
psychoanalysis.11 It was in 1895 that Freud and Breuer first published their work 
Studies on Hysteria and in the same year the Lumière Brothers screened the magic art 
of moving pictures in Paris to an astonished audience. In a now famous letter to his 
friend Wilehlm Fliess dated June 12, 1900, the significance of this date was 
registered by Freud, “Do you suppose that some day a marble tablet will be placed on 
the house inscribed with these words: ‘In This House, on July 24th, 1895 the secret of 
Dreams was Revealed to Dr Sigm. Freud.’ At the moment there seems little prospect 
of it.”12 However, this ‘secre of dreams’ was not disclosed to the world until Freud’s 
seminal publication, The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900.13 (In a strange twist of 
                                                        
10 Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire: Livre VI, Le Désir et son interprétation, (Paris: 
Editions de la Martinière, 2013).  
11 Janet Bergstrom, ed., Endless Night: Cinema and Psychoanalysis, Parallel 
Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); also in the same volume 
see Stephen Heath, “Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories,” in Endless 
Night, 25–56. 
12 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (I), trans. James Strachey, in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 4, ed. 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1953), 121n.  
13 McGowan rightly observes that the Interpretation of Dreams appeared at the end 
of 1899, but Freud asked his publisher to date the book 1900 to publish the 
manuscript, in order to signal the epochal character of the book. See Todd McGowan. 
 6 
fate, Lacan was also born in the same year on April 13, 1900). It is this book that 
Freud considered, even late in life, to contain the most important discoveries and 
insights of his career, as he states, “It contains, even according to my present-day 
judgment, the most valuable of all the discoveries it has been my good fortune to 
make. Insight such as this falls to one’s lot but once in a lifetime.”14 It is in The 
Interpretation of Dreams that Freud provides his first psychoanalytic theorization of 
the unconscious, and the analysis of dreams, as he states, “The interpretation of 
dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.”15 
It is in dreams and their interpretation therefore that we find a parallel between 
psychoanalysis and the cinema, since the cinema has long been considered as a form 
of public dreaming and a dream factory (an appellation that was first given to 
Hollywood cinema).16  
It was in the same year, in August 18, 1900 (21 Rabi al-Thani 1318) that the 
first cinematic images were captured by an Iranian photographer. These images were 
shot by the Baha’i born Mirza Ebrahim Khan Akassbashi Sani al-Saltaneh (1874-
1915), the court photographer of the Qajar king, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, who 
accompanied the king in his first visit to Europe.17 It was during their visit to France 
whilst seeing the Exposition in Paris earlier in July that Mirza Ebrahim Khan 
Akassbashi was introduced to the ‘Cinématographe.’ The entrance of the 
cinematograph or film technology in Iran was a subversive event during the Qajar 
era, and created an uproar among the Shi‘i ‘ulama (clergy), and was especially 
deemed a threat to the performers of Iran’s religious dramatic art, ta’ziyeh or Shi‘i 
                                                        
Psychoanalytic Film Theory and the Rules of the Game (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2015), 2.  
14 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (II), trans. James Strachey, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 4, ed. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1953), 608. 
15 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (I), trans. James Strachey, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 5, ed. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1953), 608.  
16 Vicky Lebeau, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Play of Shadows (New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2002), 6. 
17 On the life and background of Ebrahim Khan Akassbashi see, Hamid Naficy, A 
Social History of Iranian Cinema Volume 1: The Artisanal Era, 1897-1941 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 44-50; cf. Farrokh Gaffary, “Akkas-Bashi.” 
Encyclopedia Iranica, vol. 1, ed. Ehsan Yarshater, p. 719. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1985. Available Online: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akkas-
basi-ebrahim 
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passion play, such as Shaykh Hassan Shimr, Haji Barak Allah, Akbar Taziyeh Khan, 
Amr Allah Malmoos and Ahmad Marmari.18 The Tekkiyah-ye Dowlat (the Royal 
State Theater) was constructed by Nasir al-Din Shah (1831-1896)19 specifically for 
the purpose of performing the passion plays, and many of these actors (shabih khans) 
orchestrated its performance to devout male Shi‘i audiences, for whom witnessing the 
enactment of the tragic events of Karbala functioned as a form of religious purgation 
or catharsis.20 As Mas’ud Mehrabi states in his history of Iranian cinema: “suddenly 
among the gifts Mozaffar al-Din Shah brought back from his visit to Europe (farang), 
a technology entered Iran that incited the influential voice of Shaykh Hassan Shimr 
and drew his powerful presence in opposition to: The Magic Lantern (cheraq-e 
jadoo)”21 (i.e., the cinema). 
It was after seeing the films at the Paris Exposition that Mozaffar al-Din Shah 
became enamoured with “this magical phenomenon,” the details of which he records 
in his travelogue: 
 
“….[A]t 9:00 P.M. we went to the Exposition and the Festival Hall where 
they were showing cinematographe, which consists of still and motion 
pictures. Then we went to Illusion building ….In this Hall they were showing 
cinematographe. They erected a very large screen in the centre of the Hall, 
turned off all electric lights and projected the picture of cinematography on 
that large screen. It was very interesting to watch. Among the pictures were 
Africans and Arabians traveling with camels in the African desert which was 
very interesting. Other pictures were of the Exposition, the moving street, the 
Seine River and ships crossing the river, people swimming and playing in the 
water and many others which were all very interesting. We instructed Akkas 
Bashi to purchase all kinds of it [cinematographic equipment] and bring it to 
Tehran so God willing he can make some there and show them to our 
servants.”22 
 
                                                        
18 Massoud Mehrabi, Tarikh-e sinema-yi Iran: Az aghaz ta sal-e 1357 (The History of 
Iranian Cinema: From the Beginning to 1979) (Tehran: Film Publication, 1988), 14.  
19 Abbas Amanat, The Pivot of the Universe: Nasir Al-Din Shah Qajar and the 
Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008) 435.  
20 On the ta’ziyeh see Bahram Beyzaie, Namayesh dar Iran [Dram in Iran]. Tehran: 
Roshangaran va motale’at-e zanan, 2001); cf. Peter J. Celkowski ed. Ta‘ziyeh: Ritual 
and Drama in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1979). 
21 Mehrabi, Tarikh-e sinema-yi Iran, 14.  
22 Translation of the travelogue in Ali M. Issari, Cinema in Iran 1900-1979 
(Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1989), 58-59. 
 8 
Hence on the order of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, Akkasbashi purchased two film 
cameras, one a Gaumont, including some film stock and a number of films to bring 
back to Iran.23 Akkasbashi then was responsible for the introduction of film 
technology to Iran, and may be regarded as Iran’s first filmmaker. It was before their 
return to Iran, that Akkasbashi shot this film footage in Belgium while at the Festival 
of Flowers or Flower Parade in Ostend, and recorded the parade in which the Shah 
participated, where a group of (unveiled) women traveling on floats threw flowers 
and bouquets at the king, and he enthusiastically threw flowers back at the them. This 
moment was not only the first images of movement captured on the Iranian 
cinema(tograph), but as Negar Mottahedeh notes, it was during the parade in 1900, 
that there was “an exchange, in effect a movement – a movement of desire between 
the shah and European women, who, unlike women on the streets of Tehran, were 
moving about unveiled.”24 In this way, at the beginning of the introduction of film 
technology into Iran, desire was inscribed and recorded on this technology, whereby 
the “mutual exchange (of glances) on the anticipatory eve of modernity was 
overwritten years later by the veiling of all women from the voyeurism of the gaze 
and the Islamization of desire for the contemporary Iranian screen.”25 Beyond the 
fascination and novelty of movement in the technology of the moving image (i.e., 
cinema), there was the movement of desire. 
At the heart of the Freudian discovery is the theory of the unconscious. The 
Freudian unconscious is not the site of human feelings or emotions, but rather the 
reservoir of desires and drives. In psychoanalysis the unconscious operates under a 
different logic that is incommensurable with the conscious mind, namely the logic of 
desire. Indeed, as McGowan notes, the most significant element that functions as a 
co-incidence between psychoanalysis and the cinema is that “Freud takes an interest 
                                                        
23 Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Volume 1, 44. 
24 Negar Mottahedeh, Representing the Unpresentable: Images of Reform from the 
Qajars to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 2008), 
209. It is interesting that one of the earliest short films made by Akkasbashi in Iran, is 
a film shot of Iranian women wearing their long veils (chador) with their face veils 
(rubandeh or charchoq), which may index his modernist Baha’i views by 
highlighting the status and condition of women in Iran in juxtaposition to their 
unveiled European counterparts as seen and shot by him in his European tours with 
the shah, exemplified by the Flower Parade. See, Mehrdad Zahedian’s Lost Reels 
(Halqehha-ye Gomshodeh, 2004). Film.   
25 Mottahedeh, Representing the Unpresentable, 210.  
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in dreams because they unlock the unconscious and films, which share the structure 
of dreams, carry the same promise.”26 In this way, psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema 
are mutually connected not only because they originate in the same year (1900); but 
more significantly, because psychoanalysis makes its most important discoveries 
through dream analysis, and in this sense it resembles the cinema itself, since “the 
cinema remains a dream factory, a form of public dreaming.”27 But, as McGowan 
notes, there is a fundamental difference between films and dreams, since a dream is 
the product of an individual subject, but a film is not made by a single director but 
through collaboration with hundreds of other individuals.28 Nonetheless, what we 
encounter in films is our collective dreams or nightmares: it is in the cinema where 





Figure 1. Mirza Ebrahim Khan Akkasbashi Sani al-Saltaneh in Europe in 1900 




                                                        
26 McGowan. Psychoanalytic Film Theory, 2.  
27 Ibid, 1. 
28 Ibid, 2.  
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First and Second Wave Psychoanalytic Film Theory  
 
Psychoanalytic film theory may be delineated into two distinctive historical phases or 
waves.29 The primary sources for both of which are the thought of the French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), and secondarily the father of 
psychoanalysis himself, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). The first wave of 
psychoanalytic film theory also called Screen theory – since many of the film 
theorists associated with this wave published their work in the British journal Screen 
– began in the late 1960s and 1970s which emphasized Lacan’s Imaginary order (and 
to a lesser degree the Symbolic order), in Lacan’s ternary orders of psychic 
formation: the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real,30 and was characterized by a 
critique of the operation of ideology and the role of the cinematic apparatus in 
purveying this process. In Anglo-American cinema studies, one of the seminal 
publications was the collective reading of the film Young Mr. Lincoln (1939) by the 
group in the French journal Cahiers du Cinéma (a journal that as we shall see also 
plays a seminal role in relation to psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema as well) that 
was translated in Screen in 1972. It is from this moment onwards that psychoanalytic 
theory became the dominant mode of theorizing cinema, and Screen became the 
foremost anglophone journal of film theory with references to Freud and Lacan as its 
point of departure.  
 
                                                        
29 Here I follow Todd McGowan’s delineation of the two waves of psychoanalytic 
film theory. See Todd McGowan, “Introduction.” In Lacan and Contemporary Film. 
Ed. Todd McGowan and Sheila Kunkle (New York: Other Press, 2004); cf. the 
introduction in The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2007) xi-xxix. 
30 Although Lacan never capitalized the ternery order of the Imaginary, Symbolic, 
and Real in the original French, throughout this thesis all references to Lacan’s orders 
will be capitalized to distinguish them from the ordinary senses of these terms, hence 
Real rather than ‘real.’ However, whenever they appear in quotes from the work of 
other authors, they are left as they are in the original. 
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This first wave of psychoanalytic film theory or Screen theory was distinguished by 
such figures as Jean-Louis Baudry,31 Christian Metz,32 and later Laura Mulvey33 
among others, who deployed the works of Lacan, inflected through the lens of the 
Marxist theorist Louis Althusser’s concept of ideology and interpellation in the 
formation of the subject.34 The first wave of psychoanalytic film theory was based on 
the ideological dimension of the cinematic apparatus and in its analysis of filmic 
reality, as it positioned the spectator as a passive subject, who functioned as a mere 
consumer of images on the screen that interpolated her/him ideologically and thereby 
subjectivized (even subjugated) him/her according to the hegemonic or dominant 
ideology (i.e., Hollywood cinema). The feminist psychoanalytic theory à la the work 
of Laura Mulvey that has also been called feminist gaze theory was an elaboration of 
some of the central elements in Screen theory.35  
In feminist psychoanalytic film theory the work of Mary Ann Doane and Kaja 
Silverman may be considered exemplary, since they both theorize the gaze and the 
voice in novel ways (see especially the chapter on the voice where I engage with their 
work). However, despite the sophisticatation of their theorization of the gaze, they 
both remained within the existing coordinates of the ideological reading of the gaze 
in Screen theory. For example, although Silverman’s understanding of Lacan’s 
concept of the object-gaze is not a misreading, yet she still differeniated her position 
from Lacan by maintaining that images projected by the gaze are “ideological” and 
“culturally generated.” She states, “Although [Lacan’s] Four Fundamental Concepts 
                                                        
31 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus.” 
In Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader. Edited by Philip Rosen, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 286–298; cf. Jean-Louis Baudry, “The 
Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality in Cinema” 
[1975]. In Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology. Philip Rosen. Ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986), 299–318. 
32 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier (London:  
Macmillan Press, 1982). 
33 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” In Film Theory and 
Criticism: Introductory Readings. 5th Ed. Ed. Leo Braudy and Michael Cohen (833–
845) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
34 Althuser states, “Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects… All ideology has 
the function of (which defines it) of ‘constituting concrete indviduals as subjects.” 
See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. B. Brewster (New York: Monthly Review, 
1971), 162.  
35 For a detailed discussion of Laura Mulvey and feminist gaze theory see Chapter 1.  
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does not do so, it seems to me crucial that we insist upon the ideological nature of the 
screen by describing it as that culturally generated image or repertoire of images 
through which subjects not only constituted, but differentiated in relation to class, 
race, sexuality, age, and nationality.”36 In this respect, Silverman remains within the 
logic of first wave of psychoanalytic theory where the screen always already 
functions to ideologically interpellate the viewing subject into various socioculturally 
determined subject positions.  
The break with the first wave of 1970s Lacanian film theory, called by Todd 
McGowan “an Imaginary Lacan”37 due to its emphasis on the Imaginary register – 
also an allusion to its misunderstanding of Lacan by evoking the notion of 
illusion/fiction inhering in Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary – came in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This second wave was spearheaded by two central figures, the first 
of which is Joan Copjec, who in her work Read my Desire, particularly in the essay 
that appeared earlier called “The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the 
Reception of Lacan”, characterized the earlier reception of Lacan in film theory, 
especially Mulvey’s notion of the “male gaze,” as the “‘Foucauldization’ of Lacanian 
theory.”38 The second figure is the philosopher and Lacanian theorist Slavoj Žižek,39 
especially through his intervention in The Fright of Real Tears, which is entirely 
dedicated to rehabilitating Lacanian film theory against its misunderstanding and its 
detractors through an instantiation of its actuality via the cinema of Krzysztof 
Kieślowski.40  
                                                        
36 Kaja Silverman, Male Subjectivity at the Margins (New York: Routledge, 1992), 
150; cf. The Threshold of the Visible World (New York: Routledge, 1996), 125-161. 
For a similar critique of Screen theory and feminist gaze theory, see Henry Krips, 
Fetish: An Erotics of Culture (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999).  
37 McGowan, Lacan and Contemporary Film, xiii.  
38 Joan Copjec, Read my Desire: Lacan against the Historicists (Cambridge and 
Massachusetts: MIT, 1994) 19. See especially chapter 2, pp. 15-38.  
39 Aside from Slavoj Žižek, to some extent the other members of the 
Ljubljana School of Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as Mladen Dolar and Alenka 
Zupančič, belong in the second wave. Dolar and Zupančič often allude to cinema in 
their respective works, but some of their sustained film analysis appears in relation to 
the cinema of Alfred Hitchcock and Ernst Lubitsch. See Everything You Always 
Wanted to Know About Lacan, but Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock, ed. Slavoj Žižek 
(London/New York: Verso, 1992); Lubitsch Can't Wait: A Collection of Ten 
Philosophical Discussions on Ernst Lubitsch's Film Comedy, ed. by Ivana Novak, 
Mladen Dolar, and Jela Krečič (Ljubljana: Slovenian Cinematheque, 2014). 
40 Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski Between Theory and 
Post-Theory (London: BFI Publishing, 2001).  
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In Copjec and Žižek’s work on Lacanian theory there is a shift in the 
emphasis from the register of the Imaginary, to the Symbolic and especially to the 
Real. The Lacanian Real is not synonymous with ‘reality,’ it is a term that goes 
through several stages of development in Lacan’s teaching, but to formulate it in 
“theological” terms: the Lacanian Real is like the theos apophasis, the deus 
obscunditus of negative theology, which cannot be articulated in positive terms; it is 
the failure of signification. As Paul Verhaeghe states apropos Lacan’s concept of the 
Real, a “difference [lies] between knowledge and something beyond knowledge, 
something that belongs to another register, other than the symbolic order....[T]here is 
something that cannot be put into words, something for which words are lacking”41 
For Lacan, “the Real is beyond symbolization,” it is not reducible to the order of the 
signifier (i.e., language). According to Lacan “truth” is different from “mere 
knowledge;” in that “the essential characteristic of truth is that it confronts us with 
the ultimate point where knowledge about desire... can no longer be put into words.... 
This dimension beyond the signifier is the Lacanian real.”42 The Real appears at the 
point where the signifier misfires, at the moment where signification fails to signify 
within the signifying system. 
As important as the first wave of Lacanian film theory was, yet its 
deployment of Lacan was critiqued in this second wave as a “misconception” of 
some of the concepts of Lacan such as the concept of the “gaze” and “apparatus.” As 
Joan Copjec has stated: 
 
Let me first… summarize what I take to be the central misconception of film 
theory: believing itself to be following Lacan, it conceives the screen as 
mirror; in doing so, however, it operates in ignorance of, and at the expense 
of, Lacan's more radical insight, whereby the mirror is conceived as screen… 
This misconception is at the base of film theory's formulation of two concepts 
- the apparatus and the gaze - and of their interrelation….43 
 
                                                        
41 Paul Verhaeghe, Beyond Gender. From Subject to Drive (New York: Other,  
2001) 38. 
42 Ibid, 39.  
43 Copjec, Read my Desire, 15-1 6. For a discussion of the Lacanian gaze, see 
Chapter 1.  
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Indeed, it is one of the signs of the dominance of this early semiotically inflected 
psychoanalytic film theory during this period that in her criticism Copjec simply 
refers to it with the blanket term “film theory”. But the error of film theory that she 
points to is not the error of film theory as we would understand the term today, but 
that of the first wave of psychoanalytic film theory. 
Another critique came from a different quarter in film studies, namely the 
cognitivist school. The first wave psychoanalytic film theory came under severe 
criticism by a band of film studies scholars, largely from the Anglo-American 
tradition, with such figures as David Bordwell and Noël Carroll spearheading the 
attack, through an edited volume of articles called Post-Theory.44 They effectively 
sought to completely collapse the entire edifice of psychoanalytic film theory and its 
pervasive influence in film studies that the first wave of Lacanian film theory 
exerted.45 However, as Copjec and Žižek’s work have shown this first wave of 
Lacanian film theory was based on some misconceptions of Lacanian concepts. In his 
book The Fright of Real Tears, Žižek critiques both first wave psychoanalytic film 
theory and the historicist-cognitivist approach to cinema. For Žižek, the film theory 
of the 1970s and 80s was based on a reading of Lacan that was a reductive reading of 
Lacan’s earlier work on the mirror stage, and in this sense Lacanian film theory 
operated under what he termed, “the case of the missing Lacanians” (e.g., Copjec and 
himself, Zupančič and Dollar). In this sense, Žižek argues that cognitivists (Carol and 
Bordwell et al) were effectively dismantelling a straw man, a caricature of Lacan, 
rather than the Lacanian theoretical edifice as such. Žižek then advances readings on 
Andrei Tarkovsky (Stalker and Nostalghia), Krzysztof Kieślowski (the Three 
Colours Trilogy) and David Lynch (Lost Highway) based on the ‘Real’ Lacanian 
interpretation.  
Similarly Todd McGowan, who himself stands squarely in the second wave of 
psychoanalytic film theory, has stated apropos the above critics of Lacanian film 
theory:  
 
                                                        
44 David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (ed.), Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).  
45 The current hegemonic approach to film studies comes from the analytic-
cognitivist (empiricist, positivist) Anglo-American tradition, and the other from 
continental philosophy, which may be called mainly Deleuzian, with ‘Deleuze’ as its 
master signifier.  
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For… opponents of Lacanian film theory, the theory’s great error lies in its 
attempt to account for everything on the level of theory alone without 
empirical verification… It is my contention, however, that traditional 
Lacanian film theory became a target for these attacks not because of its 
overreliance on purely psychoanalytic concepts, but because of its deviation 
from these concepts, and that, therefore, the proper response to the demise of 
Lacanian film theory is not a defense of its previous claims but rather a return 
to Lacanian concepts themselves in the analysis of the cinema—and with this 
a renewal of the endeavor to theorize the filmic experience.46  
 
According to these criticisms of Lacanian film theory, everything remains only at the 
level of “theory” and has no empirical verification, and that what Lacanian theory 
describes are only ideal spectators that do not exist in reality.47 Such critiques do not 
invalidate my approach to Lacanian theory either, since my deployment of Lacan is 
grounded in particular issues (i.e., desire and sexuality), in which Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory provides important insights that cannot be rivaled with any 
other theoretical framework.48 Indeed, as mentioned above, for Lacan the central 
terrain of psychoanalysis is desire or Eros. Therefore the ultimate goal of second 
wave psychoanalytic film theory, and my own effort here, is a sort of ‘return to 
Lacan,’49 by attending closely to Lacan’s concepts and thereby staging a renewed 
encounter between Lacanian film theory and cinema, and in this instance Iranian 
cinema. A number of works have begun to appear that deploy the theoretical edifice 
of this second wave Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory that demonstrates the 
theoretically productive dimension of this return to Lacan, hence the requiem for the 
departed soul of psychoanalytic film theory was/is, to say the least, premature, since 
Lacanian film theory is standing alive and well beside these happy mourners. Thus, 
my own approach to Lacanian film theory in reading Iranian cinema will be grounded 
more on this second wave rather than the first wave, as I will stage the radical 
disruption of the Real into the Iranian Imaginary and Symbolic operative in the 
Islamic Republic, where desire and sexuality are foregrounded in the register of the 
                                                        
46 McGowan, The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan, 5. 
47 John Mullarkey, Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and the Moving Image 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 58–61. 
48 See also Erfani, Iranian Cinema 94. I am in agreement with Erfani on the use of 
Lacanian theory in this respect. 
49 Lacan famously referred to his own teaching as ‘the return to Freud,’ and in a way 
the second wave psychoanalytic film theory can be called ‘the return to Lacan.’ 
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Real rather then the register of the Imaginary apropos voyeuristic pleasure and 
ideological identification. It is the eruption of the Real of desire in the filmic form 
and narrative, which as we shall see, often destabilizes the censorship codes and 
conventions that regulate Iranian cinema.  
 
Psychoanalytic Film Theory and Iranian Cinema 
 
One of the first Iranian film critics/theorists who employed psychoanalysis in 
his writings on film was the novelist, essayist and film critic Fereydoun Hoveyda 
(1924-2006). The brother of the more famous Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, the prime 
minister of Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (from 1965 to 1977),50 
Hoveyda received his education at Sorbonne University and worked in Paris for 
UNESCO in the 1950s. Whilst living in Paris, Hoveyda became part of the influential 
film critics at Cahiers du cinéma “who developed the politique des auteurs in the 
1950s,”51 and contributed regularly to the film journal from 1955 to 1965. Along his 
famous colleagues who were to become the auteurs of the new wave (La Nouvelle 
Vague) – such as Jean Luc-Godard, François Truffaut and Claude Chabrol, Rohmer, 
and Rivette – Hoveyda was one of the key figures in the elaboration of auteurism in 
Cahiers, particularly in foregrounding the role of mise-en-scene, as seen in his 
celebrated review (published in May 1960) of Nicholas Ray's Party Girl (1958): 
‘What constitutes the essence of cinema is nothing other than mise-en-scene. It is 
through this that everything on the screen is expressed, transforming, as if by magic, 
                                                        
50 Hoveyda was accused of being a Baha’i by the Shi‘ite clergy in order to discredit 
the Pahlavi regime since their father, Habib Allah, had come from a Baha’i family, 
although there is evidence that he had grown distant from the Baha’i faith, and did 
not bring up his children in the religion. In the biography of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, 
The Persian Sphinx, Abbas Milani refers to an account from Fereydoun Hoveyda that 
states, “I was fourteen years old when I first heard the word ‘Baha’i’ and learned 
what it meant from a friend.” See Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir-Abbas 
Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (Mage Publishers, 2000), 47; cf. 
also see, Abbas Milani, “Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. XII, 
Fasc. 5, pp. 543-550. Available online: 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hoveyda-amir-abbas 
51 Robert Lang, “An interview with Fereydoun Hoveyda,” Screen 34:4 Winter 1993, 
p. 392. 
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a screenplay written by someone else and imposed on the director into something 
which is truly the film of an auteur.’”52  
Apropos psychoanalytic theory, from the mid 50s to the mid 60s Hoveyda 
authored 52 articles in total in Cahiers, many of which alluded to Freud and Lacan or 
psychoanalytic concepts. In one particular reference to Lacan, that is relevant for our 
purposes here, Hoveyda also highlights certain resemblances between the 
psychoanalyst and the function of the film critic/theorist. He writes: 
 
In many respects, it [the film critic] resembles that of the psychoanalyst. Does 
he not, in effect, have to reconstruct through the film the discourse of the 
auteur (subject) in its continuity, bring to light the unconscious that underpins 
it and explain the particular way it is articulated? The unconscious is indeed, 
as Lacan would say, marked by a gap; it constitutes as it were the censored 
sequence. But, as in psychoanalysis, the truth can reveal itself; it is written not 
in the ‘visible’ sequence of the images, but elsewhere: in what we call the 
auteur’s ‘technique’, in the choice of actors, in the decors and the way actors 
and objects relate to these decors, in gestures, in dialogue, etc. A film is a 
kind of rebus, a crossword puzzle. Or rather it is a language which sparks off 
a debate, which doesn’t end with the screening of the film but engenders a 
real searching.53 
 
This early reference to Lacan and psychoanalysis by Hoveyda in 1961 is quite 
startling,54 since it prefigured the semiotic inflected first wave Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory which was to be later developed by figures such as Christian 
Metz, especially in his 1965 essay in Cahiers, “On the Impression of Reality in the 
Cinema,”55 and of course later fully developed in “The Imaginary Signifier” 
                                                        
52 Lang, “An interview with Fereydoun Hoveyda,” 392. 
53 Fereydoun Hoveyda: ‘Self-Criticism” (‘Autocritique’, Cahiers du Cinema 126, 
December 1961) in Cahiers du Cinéma Volume 2. 1960-1968: New Wave, New 
Cinema, Re-evaluating Hollywood, ed. Jim Hillier (London: Routledge, 1986), 261.  
54 Jim Hillier writes, “Fereydoun Hoveyda’s 1961 ‘Self-Criticism’, noting the general 
imprecision of critical language, makes manifest the desire to find a more ‘scientific’ 
critical language and gives some sense of this ‘opening up’: his main points of 
reference are Saussure, Merleau-Ponty and the nature of signification in language, 
Marx on literature, Lévi-Strauss and anthropology, Lacan and psychoanalysis. This 
may be a startling array of references for an essay dated 1961, when Cahiers was 
generally reckoned to be thoroughly obsessed with American cinema, authorship and 
mise-en-scene!” See, Cahiers du Cinéma Volume 2. 1960-1968: New Vave, New 
Cinema, Re-evaluating Hollywood, ed. Jim Hillier (London: Routledge, 1986), 226. 
55 See “On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema” in Christian Metz, Film 
Language – A Semiotics of Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).  
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published in Screen in 1975.56 Therefore, from the various references to Lacan and 
psychoanalysis in Hoveyda’s oeuvre during his Cahiers period,57 he may be regarded 
as one of the proto-psychoanalytic film theorist who was among the earliest figures 
that prefigured the advent of first wave of psychoanalytic film theory or Screen 
theory.  
 Although Hoveyda intermittently used psychoanalysis or Lacan in his film 
criticism in general, he never deployed psychoanalytic theory in relation to Iranian 
cinema, since he almost never wrote an analysis of any Iranian films, although he 
does refer to the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami in passing.58 The first sustained and 
insightful engagement between Iranian cinema and psychoanalytic film theory, 
particularly feminist gaze theory, was Negar Mottahedeh’s already classic text, 
Displaced Allegories (2008).59 Mottahedeh’s work is influenced by psychoanalytic 
film theory via Christian Metz’s film semiotics and Laura Mulvey’s critique of the 
male-gaze in her essay, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” both of which are 
seminal figures of first wave psychoanalytic film theory or Screen theory. Since I 
locate my own work in second wave psychoanalytic film theory, I critically engage 
with Mottahedeh’s work in depth in the chapters on the gaze (Chapter 1) and voice 
(Chapter 2).   
Another important figure is the film scholar Hamid Naficy, who although 
does not utilize Lacan often, yet on occasion refers to Lacan and psychoanalytic 
theory. For instance, Naficy states apropos the veil in Iranian cinema that, “the 
concept of the veil as a lure or masquerade can profitably be discussed through 
Lacan’s theories.”60 This concept of the veil as a lure apropos masquerade is more 
                                                        
56 Christian Metz, “The Imaginary Signifier” Screen, Volume 16, Issue 2, 1 July 
1975, Pages 14–76. 
57 In another essay in Cahiers in 1961 Hoveyda refers to Lacan and psychoanalysis, 
while interpreting Jean Rouch’s film Chronique d’un été (1961), See Fereydoun 
Hoveyda: Cinéma vérité, or Fantastic Realism’ (Cinéma vérité ou realism 
fantastique’, Cahiers du Cinema 125, November 1961), in Cahiers du Cinéma 
Volume 2. 1960-1968, 252. 
58 Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Hidden Meaning of Mass Communications: Cinema, 
Books, and Television in the Age of Computers (Westport, Connecticut/London: 
Praeger Publishers, 2000), 27, 71.  
59 Negar Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories: Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).  
60 Naficy, “Veiled vision/powerful presences”, in Life and art: the new Iranian 
cinema, edited by Rosa Issa and Sheila Whitaker (London: British Film Institute, 
1999) 63. 
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related to first wave psychoanalytic theory, indeed Naficy mentions the work of the 
first wave feminist psychoanalytic film theorist Mary Ann Doan in the footnote as an 
example of the use of the veil.61 More recently Naficy has used Lacan’s concept of 
the Imaginary and Symbolic discussing the contradictory logic that emerges from a 
pre-modern “psychosocial configuration” that “produces an apparent contradiction 
between an inner private self and an outer public self… ”62 Naficy considers the 
Lacanian Imaginary and Symbolic to be operative in Iranian cinema and its 
representation of women. As he states: 
 
In Lacanian terms, the interior is the realm of the undifferentiated self, which 
is united with the Imaginary prior to the mirror-stage experience, while the 
exterior is the realm of the Other, where individuals must negotiate their entry 
into the Symbolic. This dual, collective, and hierarchical conception of the 
self produces tensions between individual subjectivity and collective identity 
that are widespread in Iranian cinema and in women’s representation by it.63 
 
Naficy’s reading of the Lacanian Imaginary and Symbolic into the filmic structure of 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema and women’s representation in it are generally 
correct, yet I will demonstrate that in the examples of Iranian films that I analyze 
there is an outburst or eruption of the Lacanian Real that disrupts, transgresses and 
destabilizes the Imaginary in its construction of the subject and in the Symbolic 
order, where the realm of politics and social normativity resides. Here again by 
focusing on the Imaginary and the Symbolic, Naficy’s brief use of Lacan falls under 
first wave psychoanalytic film theory. 
Indeed, when speaking of Lacan in relation to the cinema, Naficy often refers 
to the Lacan of first wave psychoanalytic film theory or Screen theory. For instance, 
in his discussion of the various looks that cinema engenders/produces, he speaks of 
three looks, the first is voyeuristic and derived from Freud, the second is narcissistic 
and derived from Lacan, and third is masochistic, referring to Delueze’s discussion of 
                                                        
61 Naficy states, “For a relevant application of these to cinema see Mary Anne Doane, 
The Desire to Desire: The Women’s Films of the 1940s (Bloomingdale: Indiana 
University, 1987).” 
62 Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Vol. 4, 102. 
63 Ibid, 102. 
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masochism64 to derive the last conception of the look, which he particularly 
associates with post-revolutionary Iranian cinema.65 This reference to Lacan’s 
concept of the look and its relation to cinema is derived from Screen theory, which as 
already discussed has as its point of departure Lacan’s early essay on the mirror stage 
where he developed the imaginary order in which the child’s identification with its 
specular image creates the illusion of wholeness, hence the Lacanian imaginary 
signifying at once both image and illusion.  
Hamid Dabashi has also written that, “Lacan’s distinction among what he 
called the imaginary order, the symbolic order, and the real had always fascinated 
me,”66 and goes on to apply Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary and Symbolic in his 
reading of Kiarostami, where he considers that Kiarostami’s “anarchic imaginary 
disorder” disrupts the symbolic order. However, this is a misreading of Lacan’s 
concept of the Imaginary, and Farhang Erfani rightly corrects Dabashi’s 
misinterpretation and states that, “‘anarchic disorder’ is on the side of the real and not 
the imaginary.”67 Although Dabashi has written a number of books on Iranian 
cinema, his use of Lacan in this instance is based on a misunderstanding of the 
Imaginary for the Real, since it is only the eruption of the Real that can disrupt the 
smooth functioning of the Symbolic order.  
Perhaps the most significant figure to have used Lacan in reading Iranian 
cinema is the Lacanian theorist Joan Copjec. Copjec’s deployment of Lacan in 
reading Kiarostami’s film, Bad ma ra khahad bord (The Wind Will Carry Us, Iran, 
1999), especially through Lacan’s concept of the object-gaze, may be considered to 
be the first serious attempt at deploying Lacanian film theory in reading Iranian films 
by a Lacanian theorist who is one of the founding figures of second wave 
psychoanalytic film theory.68 Copjec’s work is dedicated to the study of Iranian 
cinema through a focus on perhaps the greatest auteur of the New Iranian Cinema, 
                                                        
64 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty & Venus in Furs, trans. Jean 
McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1991).  
65 Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Vol. 4, 107.  
66 Hamid Dabashi, Masters & Masterpieces of Iranian Cinema (Mage Publishers, 
2007), 283.  
67 Farhang Erfani, Iranian Cinema and Philosophy: Shooting Truth (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011) 88. 
68 Joan Copjec, “The Object-Gaze: Shame, Hejab, Cinema,” Filozofski Vestnik 
(Ljubljana), vol. XXVII, no. 2 (2007), 161-83.  
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namely Abbas Kiarostami.69 However, based on the contents of various articles 
published by Copjec on Kiarostami, she has become more engaged with Islamic 
philosophy as a theoretical framework for reading Kiarostami’s cinematic universe, 
where Lacanian theory seems to have taken the theoretical back stage, although it is 
not absent.70 Particularly inspired by the scholarship of the French philosopher and 
Islamo-Iranologist Henry Corbin (1903-1978)71 and his elaboration of the concept 
alam al-mithal or the world of images in Islamicate philosophy and mysticism, 
famously translated by Corbin as ‘the imaginal world’72 (from the Latin mundus 
imaginalis). Copjec’s work on Kiarostami is influenced by this Corbinian inflection, 
which was partially articulated earlier by Negar Mottahedeh in her work, arguing that 
the concept of the imaginal world is operative in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, 
where drawing on the reservoir of Shi‘ite mytho-history (the martyrdom of Imam 
Hosayn) and drama (ta’ziyeh), “the post-Revolutionary film industry in the Islamic 
Republic was to purify these [filmic] technologies and thereby articulate the Iranian 
nation as a this-worldly displacement of an imaginal world – in other words, to create 
a world beyond the commodified image world of Hollywood.”73 In fact, it is possible 
that in one of his lectures in 1974 where Corbin distinguishes between the 
                                                        
69 Joan Copjec’s forthcoming book is on Kiarostami, provisionally titled: “Cloud”: 
Between Paris and Tehran, to be published by MIT Press.  
70 For these studies see, Joan Copjec, “The Fate of the Image in Church History and 
the Modern State,” Politica Comun: A Journal of Thought, vol. 1, no. 2 (Nov. 2012), 
Mexico: 17, Instituto de Estudios Criticos/TAMU/ Aberdeen/ Universita degli Studio 
Salerno; cf. Joan Copjec, “The Censorship of Interiority,” Umbr(a), special issue on 
“Islam,” Spring 2009. Joan Copjec, “Cinema as Thought Experiment: On Movement 
and Movements,” differences (2016) 27 (1): 143-175.  
71 For a critical appraisal of the work of Corbin, see Steven M. Wasserstrom, Religion 
After Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999); also, Vahid Brown, “A Counter-
History of Islam: Ibn ‘Arabi within the Spiritual Topography of Henry Corbin,” 
Journal of Ibn Arabi Society, Volume XXXII, Autumn 2002. For a response to some 
of the critiques of Corbin, see Maria E. Subtelny, “History and Religion: The Fallacy 
of Metaphysical Questions (A Review Article).” Iranian Studies: March 2003, 36(1): 
91-101. Also, Nile Green, ‘Between Heidegger and the Hidden Imam: Reflections on 
Henry Corbin’s Approaches to Mystical Islam’, in M.R. Djalili, A. Monsutti & A. 
Neubauer, Le monde turco-iranien en question, coll. Développements, (Paris, 
Karthala; Genève, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement, 
2008), pp. 247-259. 
72 Joan Copjec, “The Imaginal World and Modern Oblivion: Kiarostami’s Zig-Zag,” 
Filozofski Vestnik, Volume XXXVII, Number 2, 2016, pp. 21–58. 
73 Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories, 8.  
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‘imaginary’ and the ‘imaginal’ he not only wished to distinguish it from the common 
understanding of the term imaginary as “being equivalent to signifying unreal, 
something that is and remains outside of being and existence,” but also from Lacan’s 
already famous formulation of the Imaginary, as both image and illusion.74  
Recently one of the more sustained encounters between second wave 
Lacanian film theory and Iranian cinema, is staged by Farhang Erfani in his book 
Shooting Truth: Philosophy and Iranian Cinema. Erfani uses Lacanian theory to read 
two well-known Iranian films: Abbas Kiarostami’s Nema-ye nazdik (Close-Up, Iran, 
1990), and Marzieh Meshkini’s Ruzi ke zan shodam (The Day I Became a Woman, 
Iran, 2000). Indeed, in his reading of Kiarostami’s Close-Up, Erfani employs Lacan’s 
theory of the gaze and relies on the work of Joan Copjec who had already made “the 
connection between Lacan and Kiarostami…” and as Erfani states Copjec’s “work is 
invaluable for my thesis in this chapter…”75 The second film that Erfani reads via 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is Meshkini’s The Day I Became a Woman, in which 
he uses Lacanian ethics and his concepts of desire and jouissance (enjoyment). 
Erfani’s book consists of an encounter between Iranian Cinema and (Western) 
Philosophy, but it is not clear or self-evident how Lacan as psychoanalyst is 
considered a philosopher. Indeed, Lacan called his teaching “anti-philosophy,” and 
declared, “I rebel, if I can say, against philosophy.”76 Therefore the use of Lacan as a 
“philosopher” requires some justification, which Erfani does not provide. Another 
element that is missing in Erfani’s reading of Iranian films, and distinguishes it from 
my own procedure, is the technical lexicon of film studies that informs my analysis 
of the film form as well as the narrative. Thus, my own theoretical contribution will 
                                                        
74 Henry Corbin, “Mundus Imaginalis or The Imaginary and the Imaginal”, 
(Paris/Teheran) Spring 1972 - Zürich. Available online: 
https://www.amiscorbin.com/bibliographie/mundus-imaginalis-or-the-imaginary-and-
the-imaginal/ 
75 Erfani, Iranian Cinema 88.  
76 Lacan cited in Adrian Johnson, “This Philosophy which is Not One: Jean-Claude 
Milner, Alain Badiou, and Lacanian Antiphilosophy,” S: Journal of the Jan van Eyck 
Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique 3 (2010): 137. For a discussion of the debates 
surrounding the meaning of Lacan’s anti-philosophy and how he may be considered a 
philosopher, Also, Alain Badiou’s seminar on the notion of Lacan as anti-
philosopher, Séminaire Lacan : L’antiphilosophie 3, 1994-1995 (Paris: Fayard, 
2013); cf. Alain Badiou, Lacan: Anti-Philosophy 3, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2018); See also, Justin Clemens, Psychoanalysis is an Antiphilosophy 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2013), especially the introduction. 
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be to stage a mutually productive encounter between Iranian cinema and second wave 
Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory, whereby both can mutually illuminate and 
enrich each other in a short-circuiting way.  
 
Psychoanalysis Iranian Style: Lacanian Desire and Persian Poetics of Desire 
 
Throughout this thesis the Lacanian concept of desire and its various formulations is 
at the center and periphery of every chapter, it is the pivot around which everything 
else turns. I use desire in its psychoanalytic sense as theorized by Lacan, where it is 
inherently unsatisfiable and distinguished from need, which has an object of 
satisfaction (all bodily functions are related to need, but desire is related to the psyche 
and the unconscious). According to Lacan, desire does not have a proper relation to 
an object, but to lack (le manque); it is in the world of language and signification that 
we come to recognize desire, and where desires must be interpreted. In this sense 
desire is never fully articulated and articulable as it is always entangled within the 
play of signifiers, and therefore it is never realized but forever differed, always to be 
satisfied but never satisfiable. It is the structure of lack in human subjectivity that 
gives rise to desire. In this sense, desire is constitutive of being human, since human 
beings are beings of language.  
Now, a theoretical short-circuit is enacted here by conceptually correlating 
Lacanian desire with desire in Persian poetics. This relation of desire to lack that is 
constitutive of human subjectivity has its correlation in Persian poetics in the work of 
the 13th century Iranian Sufi mystic poet Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273).77  In the 
opening exordium of his magnum opus, Masnavi-yi Ma’navi (The Spiritual 
Couplets), often called ney-nameh (the Book of the Reed-Flute), which is said to 
contain the distilled essence of the entire work: 
 
LISTEN To this reed 
play out its plant 
unfold its tale 
of separations: 
 
Ever since they cut me 
                                                        
77 On the life, thought and works of Rumi see Franklin Lewis, Rumi: Past and 
Present, East and West. The Life Teachings and Poetry of Jalâl al-Din Rumi. 
Foreword by Julie Meisami (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007). 
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from my reedy bed, 
my cry 
makes men and women  
weep 
I like to keep my breast 
fretted with loss 
to convey the pain of longing 
All those severed from their roots 
thirst to return to the source.78 
 
The reed-flute is symbolic of the human self (nafs) or soul (rouh), and the reed-bed 
its unknowable origin in the world of the spirit for which it inherently longs. This 
separation is co-extensive with Lacan’s concept of le manque, which has often been 
translated as lack, but it can equally be translated by the word absence, and it is 
absence or lack, that lies at the heart of the Lacanian notion of the subject of desire, 
since desire emerges due to lack according to Lacan, which is constitutive of human 
subjectivity. This logic of lack inhering in being human comes close to the logic of 
the primordial separation of the reed-flute (ney) from its source in the reed-bed 
(neyestan) in Iranian Sufism (tasawuf) as articulated by Rumi here in the Masnavi. It 
is the absence or lack that is constitutive of the reed-flute from this primordial loss of 
the reed-bed, that is at the heart of the reed-flutes lament; its longing and desire 
emerges at this separation, at this absence, at this lack. In psychoanalytic terms, the 
reed-bed functions as the lost object for the subject (reed), it is this primordial lost 
object that the subject seeks to recover, and which gives rise to the desiring subject. 
Lacan states that desire is always “desire for something else,”79 this something else is 
therefore the imagined lost object (later in his teaching Lacan calls the lost object, the 
objet petit a or object-cause of desire). This cutting of the reed-flute from the original 
reed-bed, is what brings the reed-flute into existence and which allows it to articulate 
(through music, sound) its longing, its desire; this stage may be correlated to what 
Lacan calls symbolic castration at the origin of the individual’s or subject’s entry into 
the Symbolic order, which is why, in Lacanian theory, lack and castration are 
effectively synonymous.  
                                                        
78 Rumi: Swallowing the Sun, trans. Franklin Lewis (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 31. 
For another translation see Jalal al-Din Rumi, The Masnavi, Book One, trans. Jawid 
Mojaddedi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4. 
79 Jacques Lacan, Écrits (Paris, Seuil, 1966), 518. 
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 According to Lacan, it is through castration that the subject enters the world 
of language and signifiers – the Symbolic order – and it is here that the subject 
becomes sexed according to the logic of sexual difference, male or female, masculine 
or feminine. This is accomplished through taking up a position with respect to the 
phallus (the masculine position as ‘having the phallus,’ and the feminine position as 
‘being the phallus’). In Lacanian theory sexuation (being sexed) has nothing to do 
with biology (the sexual organs), but the way a subject is positioned in relation to the 
signifier and its lack (the phallus). For Lacan, the phallus is not the anatomical penis, 
but the signifier of desire, which is why there is only an imaginary or symbolic 
phallus.80 It is here that another profound correlation can be drawn between the reed-
flute and the phallus. Michael Glünz has discussed the significance of Lacan in 
classical Persian poetry by establishing a correlation between the sword, the pen and 
the phallus,81 and the reed-flute in Rumi’s Masnavi can be added to this list. The 
relation of the phallus to the reed-flute which is made out of the bamboo reed, and 
from which pens were made in classical Persian culture (and continue to be used in 
Persian calligraphy), establishes the link between the reed and phallus to the world of 
language and signifiers. The Persian word for the reed-pen is qalam (which also 
entered into Arabic), which is related to the Greek word kalamus or calamus and the 
Persian and Arabic kalam and kalameh, which mean ‘word’ are all derived from the 
same root. This is also why the abyssal core of human subjectivity in both Persian 
poesis and Lacanian theory is feminine, since it is in the feminine position that one is 
the phallus, and similarly the words in Persian (borrowed from Arabic) for soul 
(rouh) or self (nafs) are feminine, which is why Annemarie Schimmel’s book on the 
feminine in Islam is called: My Soul is a Woman.82 Finally, it should be recalled that 
the entire field of psychoanalysis is based on the analysis of the psyche, which in the 
original Greek means soul.  
 
  
                                                        
80 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink 
(New York: Norton, 2007), 575-584. 
81 See Michael Glünz, “The Sword, the Pen and the Phallus: Metaphors and Metonymies of 
Male Power and Creativity in Medieval Persian Poetry,” Edebiyat 6 (1995): 223–243. 
82 Annemarie Schimmel, My Soul is a Woman: The Feminine in Islam (London: 
Continuum, 2003). 
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The Interpreter of Desires: The Mystic or Saint, the Analyst, and the Film 
Theorist 
 
In this section I will foreground the significance of the title of my thesis through a 
short-circuiting conjunction of the figures of the mystic or saint, the analyst and the 
film theorist, since what they all have in common is that they are all the Interpreter of 
Desires. In the first tale of Rumi’s Masnavi called, “the tale of the King and the sick 
slave girl,” there is a figure who is linked to the Persian philosopher Ibn Sina, 
variously called “the invisible guest,” “the divine physician,” and “the pure and 
trustworthy one” (1/6, 7, 8), and particularly the “saint” (wali), who is brought by the 
King to heal the slave-girl that he loves but who has fallen mysteriously ill. The saint 
in the tale functions like the psychoanalyst trying to interpret what is ailing the slave-
girl. The saint begins to ask her various questions whilst holding her wrist with his 
fingers on her pulse, and the slave girl begins talking – like the psychoanalytic 
talking-cure – and as the saint asks her various questions about her family, her 
hometown, etc., he discovers that her pulse rose considerably faster as he closed on 
the city of Samarkand, and finally he discovers that the source of her ailment is the 
love that she secretly harbours for a goldsmith who lives there, and her separation 
from him is the cause of her illness. In a similar way, in 1974 in Television, Lacan 
makes a startling claim and posits the figure of the psychoanalyst “in relation to what 
was in the past called: being a saint.” Lacan states, “The more saints, the more 
laughter; that’s my principle, and it may even be the way out of capitalist 
discourse.”83 This correlation of the figure of the saint and the analyst in Lacan, is 
homologous to what we encounter in Rumi’s tale, since the saint in the tale functions 
as the analyst who is called the “physician of the soul” or psyche, in other words, a 
psychoanalyst.  
 Having already mentioned Henry Corbin earlier, it is important to note the 
influence of Corbin’s work on Lacan,84 especially through his book on the 
Andalusian Sufi mystic Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240) called, Creative Imagination in the 
                                                        
83 Jacques Lacan, Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. 
Joan Copjec, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and Annette Michelson (New 
York: Norton, 1990), 16. 
84 For the influence of Corbin on Lacan see, Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan: 
An Outline of a Life and History of a System of Thought (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
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Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi. In his seminar VII on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, 
Lacan already mentions this book by Corbin, specifically in his discussion of courtly 
love.85 Corbin discusses Ibn ‘Arabi and many of the Sufis among the precursors of 
the tradition of courtly love, calling them Fedeli d’amore or the faithful of love.86 But 
what is significant here is another reference to Ibn ‘Arabi by Lacan that is mentioned 
by Fethi Benslema, namely the event of the encounter between the Andalusian 
philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) (Latinized as Averroes), and Ibn ‘Arabi:  
 
On at least one other occasion, Lacan returned to Ibn Arabi. This took place at 
a 1960 conference at the Facultes universitaires Saint-Louis (Brussels), to 
which he was invited by J.-P. Gilson. In the typed transcript that was sent to 
us, Lacan recalls the episode of the meeting of and dialogue between 
Averroes and Ibn Arabi in Andalusia, and affirms that his position as a 
psychoanalyst is aligned with Ibn Arabi rather than the philosopher.87  
 
This encounter between Averroes and Ibn ‘Arabi is recorded in Corbin’s book, and it 
would have been the only place that Lacan could have learnt of it.88 However, what is 
significant for our purposes here is that Lacan aligns the position of the analyst with 
                                                        
85 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 183.  
86 Corbin states that what: “we group as the Fedeli d’amore… [are] dominated by 
two great figures: Ibn ‘Arabi, the incomparable master of mystic theosophy, and 
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themselves in Arabic or Persian (‘ashiqun, muhibbun, arbab al-hawa, etc. [lovers, the 
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Corbin, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi 
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87 Fethi Benslama, Psychoanalysis and the Challenge of Islam (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009) 220. 
88 What is interesting to note is that the Ibn ‘Arabi we encounter in Corbin’s book is a 
thoroughly Persianized figure, and Lacan’s encounter with Ibn ‘Arabi therefore, is 
through Corbin’s Persianizing prism. This is one of the elements that Vahid Brown 
foregrounds in his critique of Corbin’s reading of Ibn ‘Arabi, as he states, “Examples 
of Corbin’s essentialist characterizations of Iran, Iranian spirituality, or events and 
personalities somehow related historically to Persian culture could be multiplied for 
pages, as they appear constantly throughout his many works. It will be seen to have 
been a constant theme in Corbin’s visionary rearrangement of the facts of the life-
history of Ibn al-‘Arab in his efforts to fit the latter into his own esoteric ‘counter-
history’.” See Brown, “A Counter-History of Islam,” 50.  
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that of the mystic Ibn ‘Arabi. This link between the psychoanalyst and the mystic can 
also shed light on what Badiou calls Lacan’s ‘anti-philosophy’ or Lacan as an ‘anti-
philosopher’, since by associating the psychoanalyst with Ibn Arabi vs. Averroes, 
Lacan is positioning himself against a certain type of philosophy exemplified by the 
figure of Averroes, namely Aristotelian or peripatetic philosophy, rather then 
philosophy as such. It should be recalled that Ibn ‘Arabi himself was a philosophizing 
mystic or mystic philosopher, and deeply influenced by the tradition of Platonic and 
Neo-Platonic (Plotinus) philosophy as translated into Arabic in the great translation 
movement in Baghdad during the Abbasid caliphate.89  
One of Ibn ‘Arabi’s theories that has a profound resonance with the position 
of the psychoanalyst is that the world is structured like a dream, a dream that requires 
interpretation. In the Fusus al-Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom), whilst referring to the 
famous prophetic tradition (hadith), “‘All men are asleep; only when they die, do 
they wake up’,” Ibn al-‘Arabi states “that ‘the Prophet [Muhammad] called attention 
by these words to the fact that whatever man perceives in this present world is to him 
as a dream is to a man who dreams, and that it must be interpreted”90 This 
correspondence between the position of the mystic and the analyst comes to the fore 
in the title of Ibn ‘Arabi’s collection of poetry entitled, Tarjuman al-Ashwaq or the 
Interpreter of Desires.91 Ibn ‘Arabi is said to have composed these poems after his 
encounter with the daughter of an Iranian family originally from Isfahan, named 
Nizam. She was called by Ibn ‘Arabi and others, “ayn al-Shams wa’l-Baha’, 
translated by Corbin as “Harmonia, Eye of the Sun and of Beauty.” Regarding her 
Corbin states, “the young girl who was for Ibn ‘Arabi in Mecca what Beatrice was for 
Dante, was a real young girl, though at the same time she was “in person” a 
theophanic figure, the figure of the Sophia aeterna …”92 The poetry of Tarjuman 
                                                        
89 For the translation movement see Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: 
The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasaid Society 
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90 Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 1983) 8. 
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92 Corbin, Alone with the Alone, 100-101. 
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contained such sensual and erotic imagery that Ibn ‘Arabi was castigated by the 
religious scholars (‘ulama) to have only written of carnal desire and profane love in 
the guise of mystical poetry; Ibn ‘Arabi was forced to write an extended 
interpretation of each poem articulating their esoteric (batin) allusions, lest his life 
become endangered at the wrath of the ‘ulama. It is in this title that we can discern 
the profound confluence of the position of the mystic and the analyst, since the entire 
function of the analyst like the mystic is to be the interpreter of desires, which is why 
as I already mentioned, Lacan called one of his seminars: Desire and its 
Interpretation.  
In the final analysis, it is here that we can see that the status of the mystic (Ibn 
Arabi) is akin to the psychoanalyst (Lacan), and the status of the analyst may be 
correlated to the film theorist/critic, as perceptively posited by Freydoun Hoveyda, 
insofar as they are all The Interpreter of Desires.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
One of the principle axis around which this thesis is structured is the Freudian partial 
(sexual) objects to which Lacan added the gaze and voice – the others being the 
phallus, the scybalum and the breast. Each chapter contains one of these partial 
objects, although in the case of the first two chapters the gaze and voice are 
positioned in the foreground, and in the case of the following three – the phallus, the 
feces, and the breast – they appear in the background. In Chapters 3 to 5 the partial 
objects do not function as the main argument of the chapters but as their libidinal 
underside, and although they are discussed in relation to the films they do not form 
the central core or argument of the chapters, as they do with the gaze and voice. All 
of the partial objects are different forms of what Lacan calls objet petit a or object-
cause of desire, since they all form an object that is imagined as an extension of the 
body, from which the subject must separate itself in order to constitute itself as 
subject. As Lacan states, “You know: the breast, the feces, the gaze, the voice, these 
detachable parts which are nevertheless entirely linked to the body - this is what is 
involved in the objet a.”93 Although Freud imagined the sexual objects in terms of the 
                                                        
93 For a provisional translation of this seminar, see Cormac Gallagher, Jacques Lacan, 
Seminar the Logic of Fantasy, Seminar XIV (1966-1967), 4. Translation modified. 
http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/THE-SEMINAR-
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developmental phase of the child, namely the initial oral phase, the breast, and later 
followed by the anal object, the excrement. The phallic phase is the last phase where 
the relation to the phallus (as object) organizes the way sexual difference is 
constituted (boy vs. girl). The other innovation of Lacan was to reinterpret the phallus 
not as the anatomical penis, but as a signifier. In Lacan the objet petit a does not have 
a developmental structure, but it is the way a field is organized around that particular 
object, hence the objet a in the visual field is the gaze and in the aural field it is the 
voice.  
The thesis is organized into two parts. Part I The New Iranian Cinema 
between Gaze and Voice, is structured around three chapters that theorizes that the 
New Iranian Cinema revolves around the axis between the (Lacanian) gaze and voice. 
Starting with Lacan’s concept of the gaze Chap. 1, “A Cinema of Desire: Object-
Gaze in the New Iranian Cinema”, provides a close reading of Abbas Kiarostami’s 
Shirin (2008), and Majid Majidi’s Baran (2001) in light of the gaze. I argue that 
contrary to Negar Mottahedeh’s thesis who argues that post-revolutionary Iranian 
cinema or New Iranian Cinema is the realization of the goals of feminist gaze theory, 
whereby the male gaze is absent, and hence can be conceived as a “women’s cinema” 
or a “feminist cinema,” I argue instead that what appears in the New Iranian Cinema 
is the Lacanian object-gaze, which makes this cinema, a cinema of desire, since the 
logic of desire is based one what is often beyond the visual sensorium, rather then 
what is reducible to it. I demonstrate that the logic of the averted gaze due the Shi‘ite 
modesty system (hejab), that is operative in this cinema can be theoretically 
correlated to the logic of ‘looking awry’ formulated by Žižek apropos Lacan; but 
unlike Mottahedeh and Naficy, who missed the Lacanian dimension of looking awry, 
I foreground it as an instance of the object-gaze in Lacan.  
In Chapter 2, “The Object-Voice: The Acousmatic Voice in New Iranian 
Cinema”, I theorize the structure of the voice in the New Iranian Cinema, especially 
through what Jacques Lacan calls the object-voice and the French film theorist 
Michel Chion calls acousmêtre or acousmatic voice, namely the disembodied voice. I 
focus on how the voice without the body, or a bodiless voice, in which the voice of a 
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character is off frame detached from a particular body, is often operative within 
Iranian cinema, as a way to circumvent showing bodies, especially female bodies, in 
erotic configurations. This phantom like voice without a body or acousmêtre, like a 
spectral presence, haunts the entire landscape of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. I 
will also focus on the male voice without a body, which acts to subvert the logic of 
veiling female bodies, since representing the acousmatic male voice without a body, 
critiques the foregrounding of the male subject as the privileged site of subjectivity. I 
analyze two films in light of the acousmatic voice, namely Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s 
Gabbeh (1996) and Rakshan Banietemad’s The May Lady (1999), and demonstrate 
that in both films the voice acts as an erotic signifier, and becomes a love-object, 
since the body cannot be displayed erotically on the screen the voice at times fills in 
the erotic void created by the censors. 
In Chapter 3, “From Femininity to Masculinity and Back: The Feminine ‘No’ 
in Daughters of the Sun,” the idea that guides the analysis of this chapter is the 
Lacanian feminine ‘No’ and feminine jouissance in reading Mariam Shahriar’s 
neglected masterpiece Daughters of the Sun (Dokhtaran-e Khorshid, 2000). I provide 
an close textual analysis of the film’s protagonist Amangol’s gender re-signification 
from feminine to masculine by her father through the technique of shaving her hair, 
and cross-dressing her as a boy. I argue that in the texture of the film a constellation 
of motifs emerge such as transgender, gender and sexual ambiguity, same-sex desire 
or homoeroticism, and cross-dressing or transvestism that provides Shariar with an 
opportunity to critique not only the imposition of the veil, but the loss of feminine 
identity. Finally, I demonstrate that the Lacanian ethics of the feminine ‘No’ and 
feminine jouissance are enacted by Amangol, through a radical suicidal act that 
entails the burning of the carpet-weaving sweat shop, whereby she sacrifices her 
imposed embodiment of masculinity. Thus, Amongol traverses from femininity to 
masculinity and back through the logic of the feminine ‘No’, and the full reassertion 
of her feminine identity. 
 Part II of the thesis consists of two chapters that articulate the shift away from 
the New Iranian Cinema of the 1990s and 2000s by theorizing a new filmic 
movement that is structured around what I call, Unheimlich between the Weird and 
the Eerie (relying on Mark Fisher’s formulation). In Chapter 4, “Dreaming of a 
Nightmare in Tehran: The Fright of Real Desires in ‘Atomic Heart’” a close textual 
reading of Ali Ahmadzadeh’s film Atomic Heart (2015) is provided, where I first 
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theorize Mark Fisher’s formulation of the weird and the eerie and situate this film 
(along with A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night in Chapter 5) as belonging to this 
category that I consider to form part of a new film movement. The film is structured 
into two halves with the first half apparently functioning as reality and the second 
half as surreality. I turn this double or two-part structure of the film around and 
deploying Lacan’s theory of fantasy and desire, I argue that contrary to outward 
appearance, the first part of the film functions as the world of fantasy and the second 
part as the world of desire. It is in the second half, when reality loses its grounding in 
the world of fantasy, that we are confronted with the traumatic (Lacanian) Real in all 
its horror in the figure of Toofan, whose link with totalitarian and dictatorial figures 
(Sadam, Hitler) represents the Islamic Republic, and the Iranian president Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad. I argue that the second part of the film stages Lacan’s dictum of the 
enigma of the Other’s desire, Che vuoi? where the question of what is the Other’s 
desire remains an incessant mystery, namely what does the Other, as in Toofan, who 
symbolizes the State, want from the two female protagonists of the film. In the 
second part of the film Nobahar and Arineh’s lesbian or homoerotic desire functions 
as the fright of Real desires, since in the Islamic Republic same-sex desire is 
forbidden and may bring one into confrontation with the Law, exemplified in the 
figure of Toofan. It is this oppressive, sinister and menacing atmosphere in Iran that 
this film so powerfully stages, and which is what all the films related to this emerging 
new movement have in common, and that I have theorized as revolving around the 
two modes of the weird and the eerie. 
In Chapter 5, “The Return of the Repressed: The Real of Feminine Sexuality 
in A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night”, I provide a detailed analysis of the diasporic 
Iranian filmmaker Ana Lily Amirpour’s vampire film A Girl Walks Home Alone At 
Night (2014), through the prism of the Freudian ‘return of the repressed,’ with a 
Lacanian twist. I demonstrate that if Atomic Heart typified the nightmare of the 
people living in Tehran, this film stages the nightmare of the Islamic Republic: the 
fear and anxiety of autonomous and uncontrolled female sexuality, embodied, as it is, 
in the figure of the chador-clad female vampire, the Girl. The return of repressed 
feminine sexual energy, or libido, is represented by the figure of the vampire Girl, 
who haunts and kills the male inhabitants of Bad City. I demonstrate that female 
sexuality functions as the traumatic Real (in the Lacanian sense), in Islamo-Shi‘ite 
jurisprudential imaginary, which is why it functions as a source of traumatic horror to 
 33 
the Islamic Republic. In order to contain this traumatic excess or Real in female 
sexuality, the system of modesty (hejab) was established to cover over this surplus in 
feminine sexuality. In this way, to have a veiled female vampire attacking and killing 
the men in Bad City functions as the pure nightmare of the State. I provide a 
contextualization of the film in the history of Iranian horror cinema in the post-
revolutionary era, but theorize it more specifically as an instance of the films that I 
consider to exemplify the two modes of the weird and the eerie. I locate the film’s 
aesthetics in Hamid Naficy’s theory of accented cinema, due to the film’s diasporic 
status, and provide a number of Freudo-Lacanian readings that circulate around the 
idea of the return of the repressed: the double, castration anxiety, das Ding (the 
Thing), the death drive, and obscene immortality. Finally, the Persian writing in the 
diegetic reality of the film (i.e., graffiti, signs, posters, tattoos, etc.) is theorized 
through Michel Chion’s concept of athorybos and the inscription of desire in Lacan, 
where I point out (apropos Lacan) that in the final analysis ‘the written’ in the 
diegetic space of the film itself functions as the return of the repressed. 
 Finally, this thesis simultaneously makes several theoretical interventions in 
a number of related fields and/or theories: first, it contributes to a Lacanian film 
theoretical approach to Iranian cinema and reconfigures the previous approach that 
was dominated by first wave psychoanalytic film theory or Screen theory; second, it 
makes a case for the productivity of a Lacanian theoretical approach in studies of 
desire and sexuality in Iranian cinema and in Iranian studies more generally; third, it 
contributes to the new and emerging field of the encounter between psychoanalysis 
and Islam; finally, it theorizes that a new avant-garde and genre bending film 
movement is emerging in Iranian cinema moving on from the New Iranian Cinema of 
the past, and also beyond the influence of a figure such as Asghar Farhadi. In all 
these areas this thesis has either opened up new avenues of theoretical enquiry or 
reconfigured older approaches and debates to questions of desire and sexuality by 
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A Cinema of Desire: the Object-Gaze in the New Iranian Cinema 
 
The objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze. 
 
– Jacques Lacan94  
 
In this chapter, I will theorize the deployment of the gaze in the New Iranian 
cinema, especially through what Lacan calls the object-gaze (l’objet regard). As it 
will be seen, the gaze according to Lacan is not on the side of the subject looking or 
the camera, as it was theorized by Screen theory where the camera’s look represented 
the male-gaze, but rather on the side of the object. In this way the gaze is that obscure 
stain or blot in the image, that when looked upon (either by the character in the film 
or the spectator watching the film) returns the gaze. I will argue that the Lacanian 
gaze often appears within the New Iranian cinema as the result of censorship 
restrictions that impose the rules of the modesty system (hejab) on the cinema and 
enjoined the practice of the averted gaze, as a way to purify or cleanse the visual 
sensorioum in order to contain the male-gaze. In this way the New Iranian cinema 
inadvertently or paradoxically becomes the site of the Lacanian gaze rather than the 
site of feminist gaze theory as proposed by Negar Mottahedeh. This pervasive 
presence of the object-gaze in the New Iranian cinema renders it the locus classicus 
of the cinema of desire, as theorized by Todd McGowan, since it is what is often 
invisible rather than visible in the field of vision that structures the formal logic of 
this cinema. In this sense, the New Iranian cinema is the cinema of desire at its 
purest. I will look at two filmic instances in which the object-gaze appears in the New 
Iranian cinema which implicates the spectator’s desire by removing our ability to see, 
by staging what cannot be reducible to the visual field, and by removing the ability of 
direct vision from the spectator, focusing thereby on Kiarostami’s Shirin (2008), as 
well as Majid Majidi’s Baran (2001). In Kiarostami’s cinema the gaze appears 
through the lack or absence in the visual field, which activates the spectator’s desire, 
that is, the desire of the viewer is accounted for through what cannot be seen in the 
screen image, or what remains invisible from the scopic field. I will argue that with 
Shirin, Kiarostami reaches the apotheosis of the gaze, in which the film itself returns 
                                                        
94 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller and trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 105. 
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the gaze. In Baran, the gaze appears not where it is expected, in Latif’s voyeuristic 
act of looking as theorized by Screen theory, but in the opacity of the window, which 
blots the picture and behind which is the silhouetted figure of Baran. In this sense, it 
will be argued that the New Iranian cinema is one of the exemplary sites of the 
(Lacanian) gaze, since it relies on absences and lack in the cinematic form and 
narrative, and in this way it is linked to other film movements such as Italian 
Neorealism and the French New Wave as exemplary instances of the cinema of 
desire. 
 
1.1 The Gaze in Lacan: From Screen Theory to the Object-Gaze  
 
In the introduction I briefly articulated the difference between the first and second 
wave psychoanalytic film theory and gestured towards the difference that lies 
between the two, namely the gaze and the cinematic apparatus and their 
interconnection. Here I will foreground their differences in the deployment of the 
gaze, especially psychoanalytic film theory or gaze theory, and mark out the 
difference of Lacan’s object-gaze from the gaze operative in feminist gaze theory 
which operated under first wave psychoanalytic film theory. The first phase or wave 
of psychoanalytic film theory also called Screen theory (because many of the film 
theorists associated with this phase published their work in the British journal 
Screen), began in the late 1960s and 1970s and emphasized Lacan’s Imaginary order 
and to a lesser degree the Symbolic order, in Lacan’s ternary registers of psychic 
formation (i.e., Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real). It was characterized by a critique of 
the operation of ideology and the role of the cinematic apparatus in purveying this 
process. In this first phase of psychoanalytic film theory such figures as Jean-Louis 
Baudry,95 located this ideological interpolation of the subject (apropos Louis 
Althusser’s notion of ideological interpolation) in the cinematic apparatus rather then 
                                                        
95 Baudry, Jean-Louis. “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus.” InNarrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader. Edited by 
Philip Rosen, 286–298 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); cf. Jean-Louis 
Baudry, “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of Reality 
in Cinema” [1975]. In Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, edited by Philip Rosen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 299–318. 
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the filmic narrative.96 According to this phase of psychoanalytic film theory, as 
articulated by Baudry and Metz, the gaze functions as a way to ideologically 
construct the spectator as a subject, since it purveys the illusory impression of control 
and mastery over the visual field. This is then developed by other theorists such as 
Jean-Pierre Oudart97 and Christian Metz,98 and especially, Metz, whose influential 
study The Imaginary Signifier was the first full length study to deploy psychoanalytic 
theory to articulate the ideological work of the (dominant) cinema as a sign system. 
These theorists problematized the specific spectatorial position produced by the 
cinematic situation, which they argued was a voyeuristic and fetishistic position that 
produces a gaze of mastery in the spectator. Through the camera’s gaze, the spectator 
is positioned as mastering all that it sees, and in this way the spectator’s constitutive 
dependence is occluded. In this reading of the gaze, the spectator is always already 
positioned as a voyeur.  
The feminist iteration of this conception of the gaze was theorized by Laura 
Mulvey in her formative and foundational essay, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema,’ where following Baudry and Metz, she argues that Hollywood cinema or 
dominant cinema is intrinsically voyeuristic and based on the logic of the male-gaze 
that positions the female character in the filmic diegesis as an object of what she calls 
“to-be-looked-at-ness,” not only for the spectator but within the film world itself. 
Mulvey states: 
 
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split 
between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects 
its phantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly. In their 
traditionalexhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and 
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so 
                                                        
96 Figures such as Stephen Heath, Daniel Dayan, also directly critiqued the 
ideological process of the cinematic apparatus in this period from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. See, Stephen Heath, Questions of Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1981); Daniel Dayan, “The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema.” In 
Movies and Methods. Vol. 1. Edited by Bill Nichols, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), 438–450. 
97 Jean-Pierre Oudart, “Cinema and Suture.” Translated by Kari Hanet. Screen 18.4 
(Winter 1977–1978): 35–47. 
98 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier (London:  
Macmillan Press, 1982). 
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that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness.99 
 
In this essay, Mulvey articulates three forms of the gaze operative in cinema: first the 
cinematic gaze or the look of the camera, which is always voyeuristic; second the 
way male characters look at female characters in the profilmic universe; and lastly, 
the spectators gaze or the spectatorial gaze itself, which due to the previous logics of 
the gaze, namely the cameras look and the look of the male protagonist(s) at female 
characters, structurally demands the adoption of a (heterosexual) male position as a 
viewer. In Screen theory the gaze is conceptualized as an ideological problem that 
must be overcome, whereby a cinema in which the male-gaze is absent can become 
possible as part of a feminist emancipatory struggle to overcome privileging the male 
subject. Mulvey deploys Lacan’s mirror stage essay as a way to equate the male 
spectators look at the female character in the screen image with the child’s look into 
the mirror. The child’s gaze into the mirror bestows an illusion of wholeness on the 
fragmented body, whereby the child misrecognizes the seen object (i.e., its body in 
the mirror).100 Therefore, Mulvey conceives the cinema screen as mirror and the gaze 
as a form of violence enacted on the the female body, and in this way the gaze 
functions as the modus operandi of classical cinema and thereby functions as the site 
of the dominant ideology (patriarchy) and must be critiqued and dismantled. It is here 
that the misunderstanding of Lacan’s notion of the gaze and the logic of the look in 
Screen theory becomes visible, since for Lacan gaze is not on the side of the looking 
subject nor does it have anything do with mastery and control, but rather on what 
destabilizes and disrupts our control or mastery in our vision or when we look,101 as 
Lacan states, “the gaze is not the vehicle through which the subject masters the 
object, but a point in the Other that resists the mastery of vision.”102 Therefore, 
Screen theory erroneously conceives the cinematic screen as a mirror, and in so 
                                                        
99 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” In Film Theory and 
Criticism: Introductory Readings. 7th Ed. Ed. Leo Braudy and Michael Cohen (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 715.  
100 Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 714.  
101 Todd McGowan, Psychoanalytic Film Theory and the Rules of the Game, p. 60-
61.  
102 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 73.  
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doing, as Joan Copjec aptly puts it, “it operates in ignorance of, and at the expense of, 
Lacan’s more radical insight, whereby the mirror is conceived as screen.”103  
This conception of the gaze has been influential in theorizing the visual 
structure of the New Iranian Cinema, particularly in Negar Mottehdeh’s use of 
feminist gaze theory in her book, Displaced Allegories, which is particularly indebted 
to Laura Mulvey, and is operative under the sign of first wave psychoanalytic film 
theory or Screen theory. Mottahedeh’s argument rests on the premise that due to the 
Shi‘ite laws of the modesty system (hejab), post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, at the 
level of form, is the enactment of the goals of feminist film theory, and is therefore 
“the apotheosis of 1970s feminist gaze theory.” She states, “In the attempt to cleanse 
its technologies, the post-Revolutionary Iranian film industry came to produce a 
cinema that I will argue is the apotheosis of 1970s feminist gaze theory.”104 In this 
reading, contra Hollywood cinema, the male-gaze is absent in Iranian cinema, since 
through the logic of the veil the spectator is no longer positioned in a voyeuristic or 
fetishistic spectatorial position. In this sense, Mottahedeh derives her theory of 
visuality in the new Iranian cinema from Screen theory that influenced feminist film 
theorists (Mulvey, Doanne, Silverman), a psychoanalytic film theory based on a 
misconception of Lacan’s concept of the gaze and its relation to the imaginary order, 
identifying the gaze with the camera and the voyeuristic (heterosexual) male-gaze 
which rendered female bodies into objects of to-be-looked-at-ness. In this sense, 
Mottahedeh’s deployment of feminist gaze theory inherits some of the 
misconceptions and misunderstandings of Lacan’s theory of the gaze from Screen 
theory as she applies them to the New Iranian cinema.  
One of the admirable theoretical efforts of a rapprochement between Screen 
                                                        
103 Copjec, Read my Desire, 15-16. The notion of the screen in Lacan must be 
understood in light of his discussion of the gaze in his seminar XI, where he states, 
“"Only the subject - the human subject, the subject of the desire that is the essence of 
man-is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps 
himself in it. How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and plays with it. 
Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the 
gaze. The screen is here the locus of mediation.” Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis,107. In other words, the screen acts as the point of 
mediation between the gaze and the I in the field of the visible. Once the gaze 
becomes manifest, the visual field takes on an uncanny dimension of alterity. It no 
longer seems to belong to the subject, to the encunciative I, and straightaway takes on 
the form of a screen. See Copjec, Read My Desire, 35. 
104 Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories, 2. 
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theory and the Lacanian theory of the gaze is developed by Henry Krips105 in his 
critique of Joan Copjec. Although Krips agrees with Copjec that Screen theory is 
based on a particular misunderstanding of Lacan’s concept of the gaze, he claims that 
Copjec has gone too far in emphasizing their differences. Krips sets out to 
demonstrate their similarities by how the logic of the gaze in Screen theory, which is 
based on the look of surveillance operative in the Foucauldian panoptic gaze (based 
on Bentham’s panopticon), can function like Lacanian gaze in so far as they both 
represent the notion of being seen from all around. However, Krips’ effort at 
reconciling the two concepts fails since Screen theory’s Foucauldian logic of the 
panoptic ‘gaze’ hinges on mastery, control and surveillance of a supposed subject 
looking; whilst the Lacanian gaze in contrast is based on the gaze that is on the side 
of the object and the non-conicidence of vision with a look of mastery and control, 
and the split between the eye and the gaze, which enacts the destabilization and 
disruption of the subjects control or mastery in the act of looking. In this sense, the 
two theories are fundamentally irreconcilable. 
 The misconception of the gaze in Screen theory is not only based on what 
Joan Copjec has aptly termed “a Foucauldianization” of the gaze, but also on the 
Sartreanization of the gaze, where the ‘look’ is conceptually confused with the 
Lacanian notion of the gaze.106 It should be noted that the confusion lies in the 
difference between early and later versions of the gaze in Lacan, where later Lacan 
himself clearly distinguishes his notion of the gaze from Sartre’s. Indeed, it must be 
recalled that Lacan’s early formulation of the gaze owes much to Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
analysis of ‘the look,’ since in his first seminar “Freud’s Papers on Technique” 
(1953-1954), Lacan’s concept of the gaze is almost indistinguishable from Sartre’s, 
although there is still a discernable kernel of difference (in fact the term ‘look’ which 
is often translated for Sartre’s works in order to distinguish it from Lacan’s gaze, is 
the same term in French: le regard). Sartre’s interpretation of the gaze/look is what 
makes the subject to acknowledge the Other also as subject, which (like Lacan) is 
clearly influenced by Hegel’s dialectic of the master and the slave. For Sartre, the 
                                                        
105 Henry Krips, “The Politics of the Gaze: Foucault, Lacan and Žižek.” Culture 
Unbound 2 (2010): 91–102. 
106 This Sarterrian logic of the gaze is evident in an article written by one of the early 
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and the author of Signs and Meaning (1969). See, Peter Wollen, “On Gaze Theory,” 
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possibility of being seen by the Other is what constitutes our connection with the 
Other-as-subject.107  
It is in his Seminar XI, the Fundemental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964), 
that Lacan develops his full theory of the gaze as object, in which the gaze is no 
longer on the side of the subject in the act of looking, but on the side of the object. In 
this sense, Lacan divests the term gaze from its common sense meaning or dictionary 
definition, and invests it with a new theoretical significance that disturbs our normal 
subject and object relations, wherein the gaze is no longer the subject looking (or 
cinematic spectator), but appears outside (in the filmic image), where the object 
looked upon returns the gaze. It is here that the gaze as object acts as the agent that 
causes our desire in the visual field, and thereby becomes what Lacan calls l’object 
petit a or the object-cause of desire, as he states, “The objet a in the field of the 
visible is the gaze.”108 The locution objet petit a signifies that the object at issue here 
has no positive substantiality, but appears only as a gap or void in the scopic field. It 
is not located in the subject’s act of looking at the object, but appears in the fissure or 
hole within the subject’s seeming look of mastery over the visible. This lacuna in our 
act of looking signals the moment at which our desire becomes manifest in the very 
thing that we see in the order of the visible (i.e., the screen image).109 This is the 
point at which our desire distorts the visual field, and this distortion is registered by 
us through the gaze as objet petit a. As Žižek puts it, “the object a is an object that 
can be perceived only by a gaze ‘distorted’ by desire….”110 In this sense, the object 
manifests itself in the visual field only through a gaze ‘distorted’ by desire. 
Therefore, the gaze as objet petit a is this distortion of the visual field through the 
subject’s desire.  
In Lacan the gaze is an eyeless gaze, it does not derive from a subjective 
eye(s) that look(s), but from a gaze without an eye, which is why Lacan says there is 
a split between the eye and the gaze.111 Using Lacan’s own approach where he often 
uses the homophony between words, let us draw out the homophony in the word 
                                                        
107 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological 
Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, (London, Methuen, 1958 [1943]), 256. 
108 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 105. 
109 Todd McGowan, The Real Gaze, 5-6. 
110 Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 12. 
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‘eye’ and the pronoun ‘I’ in English, since they both have the same sound, and in this 
way ‘eye-less’ becomes ‘I-less’, which is what the gaze is, it is without an ‘I,’ it does 
not come from the first-person subject looking, but rather from the object, hence the 
object-gaze. Apropos the gaze, in French there is an expression that exemplifies 
Lacan’s notion of the gaze, namely jeter l’oeil, which has a less than satisfactory 
counterpart in English, to ‘cast a glance’.112 The term literally means ‘to throw an 
eye’, as though it is on the obverse side of where the eye is, the eye literally is never 
cast or thrown but remains fixed in its place on our head, in their sockets, but in this 
throwing as it were, the eye is outside as an object, as Lacan states, “…outside, is the 
point of gaze.”113 In Persian there is an expression chashmi-bendaz, which literally 
means ‘to throw the eye,’ that is the precise correlate of the French jeter l’oeil and 
exemplifies what Lacan means by the gaze. For instance, in Persian we often say, go 
to the party or store and chashmi-bendaz, meaning go and have a look, but its literal 
sense is to ‘throw an eye’ which is where its Lacanian dimension comes in. 
Therefore, the expression chashmi-bendaz in its literal sense is to have the eye or the 
faculty of vision out there on the side of the object.  
 In his seminar Les non-dupes errent (The Non-Duped Err) (1973–1974), 
Lacan asks himself a rhetorical question as to what he invented apropos 
psychoanalysis, and he states that it is the “objet (a)”.114 Lacan often insisted that the 
term always remain in French as objet a or objet petit a, so that it may signal its non-
coincidence with the social order or the big Other (grand l’Autre), the world of 
language and signification. 115 The objet petit a is an element which the subject must 
                                                        
112 In a talk on Hitchcok’s Vertigo (1957), whilst discussing the object gaze Žižek 
refers to this French phrase via a French joke about the famed idiot Martin, “In 
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no girl loved me for doing that.” Slavoj Žižek, "Organs Without Bodies," Thursday 6 
November 2003 Accessed May 15, 2018. 
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separate itself from in order to constitute itself as subject in the process of entering 
the world of language and signification (the symbolic order),116 which is why the 
objet petit a is not any thing that exists as such but exists only in so far as it is lost. 
The loss of the object a is only posited retroactively after the subject’s entrance into 
language, since it does not exists before it is imagined as lost. This is where the 
constitutive lack inhering in the subject emerges, since the loss of the object gives 
rise to the desiring subject, the subject emerges as desiring insofar as it lacks the 
(desired) object. In this way, the objet petit a is the object-cause of desire, rather than 
the actual desired object. The objet petit a is the unattainable object of desire, always 
eluding the subject’s reach, which is why desire always circulates around this 
privileged object without ever attaining it. This is what in psychoanalysis is called the 
drive (Terib), and where the split between the eye and the gaze manifests itself.117  
Since the gaze functions as the objet petit a in the visual field, it is through the 
gaze that this field is ordered. When something within the visual field provokes the 
subject’s desire, the gaze appears there beyond the sensorium. The gaze attracts our 
look, as it seems to offer us access to what is unseen, the obverse side of what is 
visible. The gaze is the point at which we recognize that we are co-implicated in what 
we are seeing and the moment in which what is seen appears to take our desire into 
account.118 The object-gaze occurs therefore when the visual field or the screen 
image in the cinematic fiction implicates the desire of the viewing subject. In this 
way, the gaze is on the side of Lacan’s register of the Real (as with all the other 
instances of objet petit a), rather than the Imaginary or Symbolic, whereas in Screen 
theory the gaze was formulated in light of Lacan’s mirror phase, and hence it was on 
the side of the Imaginary, which is why the screen was conceived as a mirror that did 
the work of ideological or imaginary identification. The gaze as an instance of the 
Real rather than the Imaginary “marks a disturbance in the functioning of ideology 
                                                        
116 Lacan states, “It is here that I propose that the interest the subject takes in his own 
split is bound up with that which determines it —namely, a privileged object, which 
has emerged from some primal separation, from some self-mutilation induced by the 
very approach of the real, whose name, in our algebra, is the objet a.” Lacan, The 
Four Fundamental Concepts, 83.  
117 Lacan states, “The eye and the gaze—this is for us the split in which the drive is 
manifested at the level of the scopic field.” Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, 
72. 
118 McGowan, The Real Gaze, 7. 
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rather than its expression”.119 In this sense, the Lacanian gaze has a political 
dimension that functions as a critique of ideology, unlike the (male) gaze in Screen 
theory, which is part of the dominant ideology. 
In his book, The Real Gaze, Todd McGowan provides a theorization of the 
cinema of desire based on the way the gaze appears in this cinema. He states, “In the 
experience of desire, the gaze remains a motivating absence: it triggers the movement 
of desire but remains an impossible object in the field of vision. Visually, desire 
concerns what we don’t see, not what we see…”120 McGowan distinguishes between 
the way in which desire and the gaze function in what he calls the cinema of fantasy, 
exemplified by Hollywood cinema as the cinema of fantasy par excellence, from the 
way it manifests in the cinema of desire, “Whereas the cinema of fantasy renders the 
gaze manifest through a distortion of the filmic image, the cinema of desire sustains 
the gaze as a structuring absence and an impossibility.”121 Contrary to the cinema of 
fantasy that seeks to resolve the tensions of desire through the creation of a fantasy 
scenario, “the cinema of desire offers spectators the opportunity of recognizing and 
embracing their position as desiring subjects.”122 In this sense, the New Iranian 
Cinema and its apotheosis in the cinema of Kiarostami, is the cinema of desire, since 
its logic is based on absence and lack or what remains invisible in the visual field, 
and thus what causes us (the spectator) to desire is the structuring absence in the 
order of the visible. Therefore, the filmic image reveals the gaze as objet petit a, 
through what remains unseen in the field of vision.  
In the chapter dedicated to the cinema of desire, McGowan considers two film 
movements, Italian neorealism and the French nouvelle vague (and a couple of 
individual directors such as Orson Welles and Claire Denis), to be examples of the 
cinema of desire.123 To this we may add the New Iranian Cinema as another film 
movement that can be theorized as the cinema of desire, and Kiarostami as its 
exemplary practitioner, since it is based on absence in the cinematic form and 
narrative that is distinctive to this cinema, and in this respect, it bears a close 
resemblance to these film movements. Indeed, the New Iranian Cinema and many of 
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its directors have been variously associated with the influence of the above two 
movements, and Kiarostami himself has acknowledged the influence of Italian 
neorealism on his cinematic universe.124 But I would argue that this link is not based 
on what has often been characterized as their similarity (rural settings, 
nonprofessional actors, realist technique, etc.), but rather on the specific deployment 
of the gaze operative in their filmic structure and in the way Kiarostami’s cinema for 
instance always contains, both at the level of form and narrative, what remains 
invisible and unseen in the visual field or is irreducible to this field. In this sense, 
Kiarostami’s cinematic oeuvre, emblematic of the New Iranian Cinema, can be 
designated as an exemplary instance of the cinema of desire.  
 
 
1.2 The Averted Gaze as Looking Awry: An Islamic Theory of the Gaze 
 
The advent of the 1979 revolution brought about a radical transformation of 
the cinema in Iran, which was nothing short of “the Islamization of film culture in 
Iran,”125 as Naficy puts it. In 1982, ‘the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance’ 
(Vezarat-e Farhang va Ershad-e Islami) was instituted in order to ensure that films 
made in Iran were produced according to the codes and conventions of an Islamic 
“system of modesty” – veiling or hejab in its broadest sense. These guidelines were 
instituted in order to control the ways in which women’s bodies were to be 
represented on screen. Women were to be portrayed wearing veils, headscarves, and 
loose fitting clothing that obscured the contours of their bodies. The rules were to 
ensure that women’s movements on the screen would not frame their bodies in an 
erotically charged manner. The guidelines also sought to proscribe the visual field by 
the “commandments of looking” (ahkam-e negah kardan), which was to ensure that 
unrelated men and women do not glance at each other on screen with a desiring gaze 
– hence the logic of the averted gaze.126 All these restrictions were related to the 
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125 Hamid Naficy, “The Islamization of Film Culture in Iran,” in The New Iranian 
Cinema: Politics, Representation and Identity, ed. by Richard Tapper (London/New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
126 Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories, 8-9.  
 46 
“purification” (pak-sazi) of the sensorium, so that it may be aligned to an Islamic 
system of modesty or veiling.   
In post-revolutionary Iranian cinema or New Iranian Cinema, the female body 
becomes the site of heterosexual erotic desire par excellence. The female body must 
be veiled from the male gaze both on screen and in the theater. The Islamic modesty 
system proscribes close-ups of women or point-of-view shots prevalent in dominant 
or Hollywood cinema, that create the cinematic illusion in which unrelated men and 
women directly look at each other on screen. The eye-line matches and shot-reverse-
shot that are the constituent elements of the system of suture (the invisible stitching 
of the spectator into the filmic narrative) in dominant cinema are often absent as they 
represent “a threat to male piety, in relation to a female body in which, in Islamic 
culture, heterosexual desire itself is said to reside.”127 This censorship of visuality or 
veiling of the visual sensorium hinges upon the Shiite logic of the veil, which was to 
ensure that the male gaze would be contained or controlled through the modesty 
system, and the female figure would not be staged on screen in a way that would 
arouse male desire. In an Islamic jurisprudential theory of the gaze, there are strict 
laws that regulate the gaze (negah)128 and the voice (seda).129 The concept of 
averting the gaze has its origin in the Qur’an, where it states that God has set the 
limits (hodud Allah) of what is permissible and impermissible: “Say to the believers 
to cast down their eyes and guard their private parts; that is purer for them. God is 
aware of the things they work” (24: 30–31).130 Such statements are further elaborated 
in Islamic law (fiqh) and tradition (sunnah), where an elaborate set of prescriptions 
set limits on what is a “‘lawful look’ (al-nadhar al-mubah’).”131 As Bouhdiba has 
perceptively noted, the corpus of Islamic traditions functions as a veritable super-ego 
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injunction over the Muslim community.132 For example, in a controversial tradition 
(hadith), prophet Muhammad states, “The zina [adultery], of the eye is the gaze.”133 
In her discussion of sexuality within a Muslim framework, Fatima Mernissi has 
argued that the eye “is undoubtedly an erogenous zone;”134 and in some 
jurisprudential sources the logic of the veil is prescribed as a way to impede “zina al-
‘ayni”, namely adultery of the eye or visual adultery.135  
In the context of Islamic legal theory (fiqh), the direct gaze is part of what is 
called ‘awra which variously means nakedness or ones private bodily parts, 
especially a women’s body and hair which is to be veiled or covered before all non-
related men (na-mahram).136 As Haeri states, “In the context of the Perso-Arab 
Muslim society, a woman is perceived as ‘aura, or ‘aurat in its Persian usage, though 
the meaning of the term is not understood exactly the same in the two cultures. The 
Arabic term ‘arua is complex and multifaceted, meaning, among other things, both 
woman and genitalia.”137 The term‘awra has a profoundly rich root in Arabic, and as 
Bouhdiba notes, it also signifies the “loss of the eye.” Bouhdiba notes that it is here 
that a powerful and culturally significant association between the gaze, the sexual 
organ and the logic of women as ‘awra become co-incident.138 There are several 
ahadith (traditions), according to Baouhdiba that “bear witness to the canonical and 
oneiric importance of ‘aura.” For instance, ““The man who looks with concupiscence 
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at the attractions of a woman who is not his will have lead poured into his eyes on the 
Day of Judgment.”139 
Now in Iranian Shi‘i legal theory in general, there are limits set on both men 
and women’s gazes, and a distinction is made between what is considered “a lustful 
gaze (raybe), and an innocent look.”140 Whilst the former is completely forbidden, 
the later has been a source of constant debate among religious scholars (‘ulama).141 
As noted earlier, in Shi’ite law a whole system of guidelines were constituted called 
ahkam-e negah, which formed an elaborate set of prohibitions on the gaze. For 
instance one of the clerics, Ayatollah Khoe’i states: “Gazing at the body of a 
namahram [non-related] woman is forbidden for a man, whether it does or does not 
invoke feelings of pleasure.”142 Ayatollah Khomeini contends, “It is best, ihtiyat-i 
vajib, not to look at a woman’s body, face and hands, even if it does not provoke 
pleasure. Likewise, it is forbidden for a woman to look at a man except for his face 
and hands.”143 This is why Khomeini was against the Pahlavi state, since it allowed 
women to appear unveiled in the cinema. Khomeini states:  
 
By means of the eyes they [the Shah’s government] corrupted our youths. 
They showed such and such women on television and thereby corrupted our 
youth. Their whole objective was to make sure that no active force would 
remain in the country that could withstand the enemies of Islam so they could 
do with impunity whatever they wanted.144 
 
This is why the logic of the averted gaze as related to the modesty system (hejab) was 
enacted in relation to post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. Hamid Naficy makes an 
important link between Žižek’s concept of “looking awry”145 and the averted gaze as 
it appears in Iranian cinema; he writes, “Like the looking awry’ that Slavoj Žižek 
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formulated, the averted look theorized here is anamorphic, as it makes the power 
relations at work in the game of veiling clearer: anamorphic looking is charged, and 
distorted, by the voyeuristic desires and anxieties of the lookers and by the 
regulations of the system of modesty” [emphasis added].146 Mottehedeh also uses the 
term “looking awry,” gesturing towards Žižek (but without mentioning his name or 
citing him), and similarly links it to the averted gaze.  
 
But the Iranian camera’s adoption of the averted and modest gaze, in 
embodying the look of the veiled subject, also emphasizes the spectator’s 
vulnerability vis-àvis the inscription of voyeurism in cinematic codes, as his 
look identifies mimetically with the look of the camera. Acknowledging 
possibilities of reversal within film technologies, the post-Revolutionary 
camera looks awry in a gesture of purification, not only in self-defense against 
the subject’s loss of mastery, in its becoming image, but also to produce a 
different relation to time and space in film beyond the commodified image 
[emphasis added].147 
 
However, although I agree with the theoretical link that Naficy and Mottahedeh have 
made between the averted gaze and Žižek’s looking awry, they nonetheless confuse 
the notion of looking awry with the first wave psychoanalytic theory’s concept of the 
gaze and link it to voyeurism, on which their work is largely based, and thereby miss 
the radical Lacanian dimension of Žižek’s formulation of looking awry.  Žižek states: 
 
If we look at a thing straight on, matter-of-factly, we see it “as it really is,” 
while the gaze puzzled by our desires and anxieties (“looking awry”) gives us 
a distorted, blurred image. On the level of the second metaphor, however, the 
relation is exactly the opposite: if we look at a thing straight on, i.e., matter-
of-factly, disinterestedly, objectively, we see nothing but a formless spot; the 
object assumes clear and distinctive features only if we look at it “at an 
angle,” i.e., with an “interested” view, supported, permeated, and '”distorted” 
by desire.148 
 
Here Žižek’s formulation of looking awry is precisely related to Lacan’s concept of 
the gaze as objet petit a, which he derives from Lacan’s reading of a painting. In 
Seminar XI, Lacan provides an instantiation of the gaze in Hans Holbein’s painting 
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The Ambassadors (1533). The painting is a representation of two world travellers and 
the wealth they have acquired in their journeys. However, at the bottom of the 
painting there appears a distorted image, which the viewer is unable to make out at 
first, and which functions as a disruption in the painting. This image is an 
anamporphosis or an anamorphic figure which when looked at directly nothing is 
clearly seen, but once we look at the figure from an angle and to the left, the image of 
a skull comes into focus. It is here that for Lacan, the anamorphic figure of the skull 
functions as the site where the gaze appears in the image.149 This is why Lacan states, 
“We… see emerging on the basis of vision… the gaze as such, in its pulsatile, 
dazzling and spread out function, as it is in this picture [i.e., Holbein’s The 
Ambassadors].”150 The anamorphic figure in the image thereby acts as a blot or stain 
in the image which when looked at awry takes the viewing subject into account, and 
returns the gaze. 
This looking awry or viewing sideways has the structure of the averted gaze 
or the sideways glance in the Islamic system of modesty, in which the female subject 
is not to be directly looked upon in a frontal direct way nor is she to look directly at 
the male subject – hence in this paradoxical way, the averted gaze, far from reducing 
or diminishing the cause of desire, on the contrary becomes the object-cause of 
desire, the Lacanian objet petite a.151 In other words the object of desire (either the 
male or female) only properly becomes the desired object by being viewed sideways 
or by looking awry – this is the paradoxical logic of the averted gaze, it does not 
suppress your desire, but rather causes you to desire. Recall for instance the first 
moment in Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958), where Scottie sees the fake Madeline 
in the restaurant. While sitting at the bar in the restaurant Scottie waits to get a 
glimpse of Madeline, and once she passes by he glances at her sideways, this is done 
through the camera by a lack of a subjective-point of view shot, and in this non-
subjective shot his look is effectively averted so as not to draw attention to himself by 
looking awry rather than directly at her. It is precisely at this moment that Madeline 
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becomes the object-cause of his desire, as she enters the coordinates of his desire by 
entering his frame of fantasy. This is why fantasy is “the mise en scène of desire,”152 
as Jean Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis put it. In his chapter called, “Troubles with the 
Real: Lacan as a Viewer of Alien,” Žižek states: “The status of this object-cause of 
desire is that of an anamorphosis: a part of the picture which, when we look at the 
picture in a direct frontal way, appears as a meaningless stain, acquires the contours 
of a known object when we change our position and look at the picture from aside. 
Lacan's point is here even more radical: the object-cause of desire is something that, 
when viewed frontally, is nothing at all, just a void—it acquires the contours of 
something only when viewed sideways.”153 In this sense, the averted gaze, which is 
rightly linked to the logic of looking awry by Mottahedeh and Naficy, is co-incident 
with the Lacanian gaze. In this quite formal sense, the way the averted gaze functions 
in the New Iranian Cinema is how the (Lacanian) gaze becomes manifest. 
In his discussion of Islamic prohibitions on the gaze regulating relations 
between the sexes, Bouhdiba makes a fascinating connection to Sartre’s conception 
of the look and writes, “The confrontation of the sexes, as conceived by Islam, 
transforms each sexual partner into ‘être-regard’, being-as-a-look, to use Sartre’s 
term.”154 (37). Here, I would go further than Bouhdiba, and contend that the relation 
between the sexes as conceived in Islam renders each sexual partner susceptible to 
what Lacan calls l’objet regard or the object-gaze. For instance, as one religious 
scholar, Daylami, states, ““Never go into water without clothing for water has 
eyes…’”155 This recalls Lacan’s notion of the gaze as object, since such descriptions 
take on an uncanny dimension where even water (an object) can return the gaze. In 
this way, a short-circuiting reading becomes possible where there is an uncanny 
homology between the Lacanian gaze and the Shi‘i Islamic theory of the averted 
gaze. In order to contain the “male gaze” as it were, by prescribing the modesty 
system’s averted gaze, the New Iranian Cinema paradoxically became the exemplary 
site of the Lacanian gaze, and thereby produces, a cinema of desire. 
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1.3 The Film Returns the Gaze: Abbas Kiarostami’s Shirin 
 
Upon his untimely death, Abbas Kiarostami (d. 2016) was perhaps the greatest and 
the most renowned auteur of the New Iranian Cinema. For more than three decades 
he created a unique form of cinematic art that mesmerized the world and left an 
indelible mark in the history and language of cinema. It is perhaps a testament to this 
profound influence on the formal language of cinema that no less of a figure than 
Jean Luc-Godard said of him, “Film begins with W.D. Griffith and ends with Abbas 
Kiarostami.”156 The cinema of Kiarostami garnered world-wide praise for its poetic 
beauty and at once formal complexity and narrative simplicity, and won major 
awards in prestigious film festivals around the world including the Palme d’Or at the 
Cannes Film Festival for Ta‘m-e gilas (Taste of Cherry, 1997), the first ever to be 
given to an Iranian director.  
 It is little wonder than that among all the Iranian filmmakers of his generation, 
it is Kiarostami’s cinema that has received the greatest critical attention by some of 
the most renowned film critics, scholars and theorists, who have each strived to distill 
the essence of his cinema by describing its unique formal and narrative structure. The 
cinema of Kiarostami has variously been designated as the cinema of “delay and 
uncertainty,”157 the “cinema of questions,”158 of “ellipsis and omission,”159 an 
“unfinished” or “half-finished cinema,”160 “cinema as thought experiment,”161 the 
cinema of “an open image,”162 and “a cinema of silence.”163 Many of these scholars 
have often noticed and noted both the aural and visual absences in Kiarostami’s 
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Reflections,” in International Journal of the Humanities 17, no. 2 (2010): 23-37. 
161 Joan Copjec, “Cinema as Thought Experiment: On Movement and Movements,” 
differences (2016) 27 (1): 143-175. 
162 Shohini Chaudhuri and Howard Finn, “The Open Image: Poetic Realism and the 
New Iranian Cinema,” Screen 44, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 38-57. 
163 Babak Tabarraee, “Abbas Kiarostami: A Cinema of Silence,” Soundtrack 5, no. 1 
(June 2012), 5-13; cf. “Silence Studies in the Cinema and the Case of Abbas 
Kiarostami” (Unpublished Master’s thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013). 
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cinema, yet no one has fully theorized the significance of these absences. Indeed, it is 
in Kiarostami’s cinema that we can witness the proper tension between gaze and 
voice: the axis around which the art of cinema revolves. This is why I argue that the 
cinema of Kiarostami is the cinema of desire par excellence, since the (Lacanian) 
gaze (and voice) is ubiquitous in his cinematic universe. It is through an analysis of 
Kiarostami’s film Shirin (Iran, 2008), that the logic of the gaze that produces this 
cinema of desire will be analyzed. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that more than any other auteur of New Iranian 
Cinema, it is the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami that has attracted the gaze of 
psychoanalytic film theorists. Psychoanalysis and Kiarostami’s cinema see through a 
similar lens as it were and Kiarostami himself notes this uncanny co-incidence in a 
foreword to a book on psychoanalysis in Tehran, and states that, “the psychoanalytic 
lens closely resembles what I see through my camera”. 164 Indeed, one of the loci 
where these two lenses converge and come together is through the logic of the gaze. 
Although the gaze has been theorized to a degree in film theoretical work on the New 
Iranian Cinema, it has largely been in the form of the first wave psychoanalytic film 
theory or Screen theory (i.e., the absence of the male-gaze),165 and only recently has 
there been instances of a direct engagement with the Lacanian gaze in light of New 
Iranian Cinemas master practitioner Abbas Kiarostami.166 It was the philosopher 
                                                        
164 Gohar Houmayounpour, Doing Psychoanalysis in Tehran (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012) ix.  
165 For the deployment of feminist gaze theory or Screen theory in reading post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema and the films of Kiarostami, see Negar Mottahedeh, 
Displaced Allegories: Post-Revolutionary Iranian Cinema (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009. Also see Sara Saljoughi, “Seeing, Iranian Style: Women and 
Collective Vision in Abbas Kiarostami’s Shirin”, Iranian Studies, Volume 45, 2012 - 
Issue 4, pp. 519-535. Saljoughi argues that in Shirin Kiarostami “challenges the post-
revolutionary modesty laws and their emphasis on not looking at women and at 
avoiding a spectator–image relationship based on the fulfillment of the desiring male 
gaze.”  
166 For the use of the Lacanian gaze see, Joan Copjec, “The Object-Gaze, Hijab, 
Cinema,” Filozofski Vestnik: XXVII (2) (2006), 161-83; also, Farhang Erfani, Iranian 
Cinema and Philosophy: Shooting Truth (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Contrary to 
Copjec and Erfani who discuss the gaze only in relation to one of Kiarostami’s films 
– Copjec analyzing the Lacaian gaze in The Wind Will Cary Us (1999), and Erfani’s 
analysis of the gaze in Close-Up (1990) – I argue that the object-gaze is ubiquitous in 
Kiarostami’s entire cinematic oeuvre. Since a full analysis of the gaze in 
Kiarostami’s cinema is beyond the scope of this chapter, I can only briefly allude to 
several other films where the gaze is operative. For example, in Zendegi va digar 
hich (Life and Nothing More…, 1992), the gaze appears at the end of the film when 
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Jean-Luc Nancy, in his now classic book on Kiarostami, L’évidence du film (2001), 
who described Kiarostami’s cinema as the cinema of the gaze (the French le regard, 
is often translated in the book into English as ‘look’), as he states, “Kiarostami 
mobilizes the look (le regard): he calls it and animates it, he makes it vigilant.”167 
But, although Nancy’s formulation of the gaze in relation to Kiarostami’s cinema was 
influential on subsequent attention on the way the gaze appeared in Kiarostami’s 
cinema, it bears slight relation to Lacan’s notion of the object-gaze or the gaze as 
objet petit a, since Nancy’s use of the look/gaze is on the side of the subject 
(spectator) looking or what the camera shows, it is still related to the looking subject, 
rather than a split between the eye and the gaze.  
Shirin (2008) is the apotheosis of Kiarostami’s experiment with what is 
unseen in the screen image, and if we accept his own assessment that he would like 
Shirin in some ways to be regarded as his last film, we can well understand that what 
this film achieved at its purest, was a common motif that ran through all his films, 
namely “their play with what’s not shown on screen”168 Shirin consists mostly of 
single close-up shots of a group of 114 women in the foreground (with a few men 
partially visible in the background), who are presumably (I say presumably, since as 
we shall see they were not in a movie theater, and were never watching a film) in a 
darkened movie theater watching the film-within-a-film about the life of princess 
named Shirin based on the 13th century poet Nezami Ganjavi’s romance Khowsrow 
and Shirin. Throughout the film we never see the film-within-a-film, but hear its 
                                                        
we are unsure if the father/director will be able to find the boy in the next village. 
This exemption of narrative closure is what engenders the gaze since our desire has 
been accounted for in the cinematic image. Similarly, in the final closing-scene of 
Zir-e derakhtan-e zayton (Through the Olive Trees, 1994), the two figures are staged 
amdist olive trees in an extreme long-shot where we are unable to hear the reponse to 
the wedding proposal that would provide us with narrative closure–by being denied 
this closure we are left desiring as spectators, and it is at this moment that the gaze 
appears, since the spectator’s desire has been implicated in the formal and narrative 
structure of the film. Lastly, in Kiarostami’s Dah (10, 2002), we are denied the ability 
to see the female driver for about 17 minutes and only hear her voice (a voice that is 
acousmatic and only later becomes de-acousmatized – see next chapter on the 
acousmatic voice) whilst the camera is focused on the son. It is here that the object-
gaze appears in the film (among other instances), since the subject’s desire is 
implicated through its desire to see the invisible or absent presence in the image. 
167 Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Évidence du film. Abbas Kiarostami. [The Evidence of Film: 
Abbas Kiarostami.] (Bruxelles: Yves Gevaert Éditeur, 2001),16.  
168 Geoff Andrew, “Kiarostami and the Art of the Invisible.” DVD booklet for Shirin. 
(London: British Film Institute, 2008) 1. 
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narrative story on the soundtrack, and gleams of reflected light cast on the actresses 
faces from the (supposed) film. All we can see as viewers is the reaction and the 
emotions writ large on the faces of these women (consisting of mostly famous 
actresses in Iranian cinema, including the French actress Juliette Binoche) who are 
presumably moved by the power of this love story that is being enacted and heard 
through music, sound effects, and the actors’ voices. The women at times appear to 
look into the camera at the viewer, but more often they appear to be looking at an 
invisible point, presumably the cinematic screen. This, in short, is the entirety of the 
85 minutes that make up Shirin.  
 In order to bring to the fore the structure of the gaze in Shirin, I will use 
Lacan’s reading of a famous painting by Diego Velázquez, Las Meninas (1656), 
since as I will argue, there is a profound co-incidence between the way the gaze 
functions in this painting and the film. The painting depicts a scene in an expansive 
room in the Royal Alcazar at the court of the Spanish King Philip IV, with several 
figures notably the young Infanta Margaret Therassa at the centre, the king’s 
youngest surviving daughter, surrounded by maids of honour, chaperone, a 
bodyguard, a dwarf, a child and a dog. At the left hand of the painting, Velázquez has 
portrayed himself engaged in the act of painting on a large canvas. Several of the 
figures, including Velázquez and Margaret Therassa, directly look outwards beyond 
the space of the painting towards where the viewing subject would be standing. There 
is a mirror at the back of the painting, which reflects in a medium shot (to use a 
cinematic term) the figures of the king and queen, who seem to be positioned outside 
the pictorial space possibly in the position of the viewing subject. Finally, just to the 
right of the mirror, there is another figure, a man standing by an open door, who 




Figure 1.1 Las Meninas, by Diego Velázquez (1565); Wikimedia Commons. 
 
In his unpublished Seminar XIII, l’Objet de la Psychanalyse (The Object of 
Psychoanalysis) (1965-1966),169 Lacan provides a brilliant reading of Las Meninas, 
(against Foucault’s reading in his book The Order of Things).170 In this seminar 
Lacan argues that the “the painting functions as a trap for the gaze, [and] its imagery 
                                                        
169 For the unpublished seminar see, Jacques Lacan, l’Objet de la Psychanalyse, 
Seminar XIII (1965-66), available online: http://www.valas.fr/Jacques-Lacan-l-objet-
de-la-psychanalyse,258; for a provisional translation of this seminar, see Jacques 
Lacan, Seminar XIII (1965-66) The Object of Psychoanalysis, trans. Cormac 
Gallagher, http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/13-The-
Object-of-Psychoanalysis1.pdf.  
170 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 2001), chapter 1. 
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incites the spectator’s desire and does something with this desire.”171 For Lacan, 
there are several ruses operative in the painting, which many interpreters are taken in 
by (such as Foucault), namely the mirror in the back of the painting where the image 
of the king and queen appear. According to Lacan, such a reading occludes the 
question of the desire of the looking subject, or the desire that divides the subject. As 
Aaron Schuster notes the overall thesis of Lacan “is that the subject is not only the 
spectator who looks at the picture, but the picture in a way looks back, it looks back 
at the subject and frames it in its own manner, the subject’s gaze is inscribed in the 
picture as something separated from it, as an object, an object that is the subject.”172 
In this sense, the subject is not only outside the painting, looking at it from a safe 
distance, but is effectively drawn into the painting, and as Lacan puts it, is “caught 
like a fly in glue”,173 and appears there as an uncanny object. As Schuster notes, this 
“synthesis of the divided subject with a partial object, in this case the gaze, defines 
the structure of fantasy,” since for Lacan Las Meninas “provides a brilliant 
illustration of the visual structure of fantasy.”174 Hence, Lacan argues that the 
painting is not a “representation of representation” (as it is for Foucault), but an 
instance of the Freudian “representative representation” (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz), 
which signifies a representation of the scopic derive.175 
                                                        
171 Aaron Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation: Las Meninas, Sexuality, and the 
Unconscious.” 8. Transcript of a lecture delivered at the “Lacan Contra Foucault” 
conference, American University of Beirut, December 4, 2015. Lacan states, “the 
picture is a trap for the look, that it is a matter of trapping the one who is there in 
front…” Lacan, The Object of Psychoanalysis, 226. In his Seminar XI, whilst talking 
about Hans Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors, Lacan similarly states, “This 
picture is simply what any picture is, a trap for the gaze. In any picture, it is precisely 
in seeking the gaze in each of its points that you will see it disappear.” See Lacan, 
The Four Fundamental Concepts, 89. 
172 Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation”, 8. 
173 Ibid, 8; cf. Lacan states, “believing that nothing is happening to us when we are in 
front of a picture, we are caught like a fly in glue;” Gallagher trans. Lacan, The 
Object of Psychoanalysis, 226.  
174 Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation”, 8; cf. Lacan states, “We are here to see 
how this picture inscribes for us the perspective of the relationships of the gaze in 
what is called fantasy, in so far as it is constitutive” [translation amended]. Gallagher 
trans. Lacan, The Object of Psychoanalysis, 227; cf. Lacan, l’Objet de la 
Psychanalyse, 607. The Lacanian matheme for fantasy is “$<>a”: The $ is the symbol 
of the barred or split subject, a is objet petit a or object-cause of desire, and losange 
or diamond functions as the relation between the two.  
175 Ibid, 8-9; cf. Lacan states, “It is a structure different to any representation. It is in 
this connection that I insist on the essential difference constituted by this term of 
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It is here that we can turn to Shirin, since in the film the gaze formally 
functions in the same way as it does in Lacan’s interpretation of Las Meninas. Like 
Las Meninas, Shirin functions as a trap for the gaze, the images on screen evoke the 
spectator’s desire, and it does something with this desire. The first ruse at work in 
Shirin is the film-within-a-film, which we can hear on the soundtrack and observe the 
women watching it but remains unseen and invisible. The spectator’s desire is 
thereby aroused, since we want to see the invisible film-within-the-film that the 
women are watching. While watching the film we are taken in by the trick that these 
women are watching a film, but in reality they were never watching a film. All the 
women were shot separately, in small groups sitting in Kiarostami’s living room. 
Similarly the trick of the film is to make us think that they are responding to a real 
film, but no such film exists, the actresses were told to just look at a few dots above 
the camera. The supposed film was a radio play performance of Khowsrow and 
Shirin that was used later by Kiarostami and added on the soundtrack in the editing 
process, matching the various emotions of the actresses to the development of plot 
points in the story. In this way the spectator looking at the film, all of a sudden has 
the uncanny feeling that the film returns the gaze, and thereby divides the subject, the 
subject’s gaze becomes inscribed in the film as a separated object, an object that 
functions as the subject. In this sense, the spectator is no longer outside the film 
looking at it from a safe distance, but is drawn into the film, and appears there as an 
uncanny object. This division of the subject from the partial object, namely the gaze, 
is what characterizes the logic of fantasy, and following Lacan’s reading of Las 
Meninas, it may be said that Shirin is a cinematic visualization of the structure of 
fantasy.  
In Lacan’s reading Las Meninas is not about the play of mirror reflections (as 
it is for Foucault), but a window, “the window or the frame of fantasy.”176 Lacan 
argues that the mirror functions as a sort of trap in the painting, and that the true key 
for understanding the painting is the window or frame.177 Indeed, the logic of the 
frame, or the frame of fantasy is exactly what is at work in Shirin. Kiarostami himself 
                                                        
representative of the representation, Vorstellungsrepresentanz, borrowed from 
Freud.” Lacan, The Object of Psychoanalysis, 231; cf. Lacan, l’Objet de la 
Psychanalyse, 615.  
176 Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation”, 9.  
177 Ibid, 9.  
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was fully aware of this function of the frame, as he states,  “I’ve often noticed that we 
are not able to look at what we have in front of us, unless it’s inside a frame.”178 
From this perspective, each shot of one of the actresses in the film functions as a 
frame, or the frame of fantasy. The other ruse in the painting is the question of the 
canvas, namely the mystery of the painting within the painting, and what Velázquez 
is painting there. Many interpreters (such as Foucault) are taken in by this trick of the 
painting, but Lacan suggests that perhaps there is nothing on the canvas at all, and 
that “the question of what’s on the canvas is the wrong question to ask. The very 
question is a trap. The painting wants us to wonder about what’s on the other side of 
the canvas.”179 This is the trick of Shirin, since the film wants us to wonder about the 
contents of the mysterious film-within-the-film, which does not exist. Shirin is 
perhaps the only film in which the film-within-the-film is itself completely fictional 
and non-existent.180 In an interview Kiarostami states, “Someone who had seen the 
movie told me, and I quote, ‘when I was watching the film, I just wanted to see the 
things they were watching.’ Do I want to see what they were watching, I asked 
myself? The answer was no way, no way.”181 In other words, for Kiarostami what 




Figure 1.2 Actresses watching the invisible film-within-the-film (Shirin) 
 
                                                        
178 24 Frames, directed by Abbas Kiarostami (Iran: CG Cinema and Kiarostami 
Foundation, 2017), Film. 
179 Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation”, 9.  
180 On film(s) within film see Christian Metz, Impersonal Enunciation, or the Place 
of Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). In Chapter 8. 
181 Khatereh Khodaei, “Shirin as Described by Kiarostami,” Volume 13, Issue 1 / 
January 2009. http://offscreen.com/view/shirin_kiarostami 
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Now following Lacan, what we have to do here is to analyze how this trick 
operates in the film, rather then be taken in by it. Lacan argues that the way the 
canvas functions in the painting is to stage “the painting’s completely fictional 
status,” as Schuster states, for Lacan “The point is not merely to create an illusion, 
but to make illusion appear as illusion, or to make appearance appear as 
appearance.”182 This is what is formally operative in Shirin, Kiarostami has not just 
created a cinematic illusion through the film-within-the-film, but has made illusion 
appear as illusion, namely to make cinema appear as cinema. In order to draw out this 
fictional status of the painting as a way to make illusion appear as illusion, or how the 
painting within the painting functions, Lacan makes an illuminating link between 
another painting, namely René Magritte’s The Human Condition (1933) as a way to 
understand what is at work in Las Meninas.  
 In The Human Condition Magritte draws a paradoxical image in which a 
painting canvas stands in front of a window, in which the contents of the painting 
become part of what we see through the window. The two become indistinguishable, 
as Lacan states, Magritte, “inscribes a picture in a window.”183 As Schuster puts it, 
“Instead of looking through the painting, as it were, and entering into its scene…we 
think we are going to enter into the painting and then we discover that the painting is 
actually an obstacle in front of the reality it is meant to be depicting.”184 In his 
seminar on Anxiety, Lacan had already referred to Magritte’s painting in order to 
illustrate the structure of fantasy, and Schuster sums it up and states that for Lacan, “ 
fantasy… is like a painting enframed by a window… fantasy acts as a screen that 
frames reality while also obscuring what’s behind it… a window provides a frame 
through which we can see, and fantasy is like a window on reality…”185 Lacan’s 
ultimate point here is that we never get to see reality in itself unmediated, since space 
is the Real (beyond symbolization), we only have access to reality through the frame 
of fantasy, through a fiction that structures reality, without which reality would 
                                                        
182 Schuster, “The Lacan-Foucault Relation”, 9. 
183 Ibid, 9; cf. Lacan writes, “… this is the provocative image that a painter like 
Magritte produces before us when, in a picture, he in fact inscribes a picture in a 
window”. Lacan, The Object of Psychoanalysis, 231; cf. Lacan, l’Objet de la 
Psychanalyse, 616. 
184 Ibid, 9. 
185 Ibid, 10.  
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disintegrate.186 In this sense, we should read the following statement of Kiarostami’s 
in light of Magritte’s The Human Condition, “My films attempt to express the human 
condition rather than the specific conditions or masks that localize this or the other 
group or person [emphasis added].”187 Shirin, like Las Meninas, functions as a 
Magrittean revelation in The Human Condition.  
Although Kiarostami’s cinema has mostly been read as a form of self-
reflexivity (films about the process of making film) and as the symbiosis of 
documentary and narrative fiction, but what this cinema reveals is not self-reflexivity 
or mies-en abyme but what it does is to question our very conception of reality itself. 
Jean Luc-Nancy is correct when he states that “[Kiarostami] is not interested in the 
film about the film or in the film, he is not investigating the mise-en-abyme.”188 The 
achievement of Shirin as cinematic art is rather to make us discern the fictional 
structure of reality itself, that is to say, reality would cease to exist without the 
fictions or the fantasmatic support that sustains it. As Žižek’s formulates it: “The 
ultimate achievement of film art is not to recreate reality within the narrative fiction, 
to seduce us into (mis)taking a fiction for reality, but, on the contrary, to make us 
discern the fictional aspect of reality itself...”189 This is what Kiarostami’s cinema is 
about in general, and which Shirin stages at its most distilled form. Shirin, like Las 
Meninas and The Human Condition, is not about the representation of reality by 
reproducing it as representation cinematically, but it reveals that reality itself can 
only be viewed through the window of fictions, through the frame of fantasy; this is 
the elementary lesson of fantasy in psychoanalysis: without the fictions that sustain 
reality, there would be no reality as such, since reality is always already mediated by 
fictions. Such is the truly radical core of Kiarostami’s cinema, it does not give us the 
reality of fiction but the fiction of reality; what cinematic art at its best gives us is 
                                                        
186 Lacan writes, “It’s crucial to grasp the nature of the reality of space as a three 
dimensional space if we are to define the form that the presence of desire takes on at 
the scopic level, namely, as a fantasy. The function of the frame, the window frame I 
mean, which I tried to define in the structure of the fantasy, is not a metaphor. If the 
frame exists, it’s because space is real.” Lacan, Anxiety, 283.  
187 Abbas Kiarostami, ‘Foreword’, in Gohar Houmayounpour, Doing Psychoanalysis 
in Tehran (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2012) x. 
188 Nancy, L’Évidence du film, 27. 
189 Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski Between Theory and 
Post-Theory).  
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rather the recognition that we never get to bare naked reality without fantasy. In this 
formal sense, Shirin stages the fictional structure of reality itself. 
In Shirin therefore the story of the invisible film-within-the-film on the 
soundtrack is a ruse that incites the subject’s desire to see this invisible film, but as 
Kirostami states, “I believe if you dare let go of the story [of Shirin], you will come 
across a new thing which is the Cinema itself. In fact, I suggest you let go of the story 
and just keep your eyes on the screen.”190 By letting go of the story and keeping our 
eyes on the screen what we come to realize as spectators is that it is not only we who 
look at the film, but in a way the film itself looks back at us. Even an avowed post-
theorist such as David Bordwell recognized that what is going on in Shirin is that 
“the movie looks back at us.”191 But since Bordwell lacks the theoretical terms to 
articulate the gaze as a cinematic object, he is unable to recognize that when an 
object, such as the movie-screen looks back at the viewer, what we have is the object-
gaze. Therein lies the profound significance of Shirin, since it is one of the few 
masterpieces in the history of cinema where the film itself returns the gaze.  
 
1.4 The Fantasized Object-Gaze in Baran  
 
Majid Majidi’s Baran (2001) is one of the post-revolutionary films produced in Iran 
that received world wide critical attention, and was distributed in the US by Miramax 
films. The film represents an example of ‘poetic cinema’ (an appellation that Majidi 
himself endorsed in relation to his films), which came to be associated with the New 
Iranian Cinema at international film festival circuits.192 Baran fits well into what 
Blake Atwood has theorized as a set of “reformist aesthetics” that he argues are 
unique to films produced in the reformist era under president Mohammad Khatami 
(1997-2005), such as the motif of “mystic love.”193 Like many of Majidi’s films, 
                                                        
190  Khodaei, “Shirin as Described by Kiarostami.” 
191 David Bordwell, “The movie looks back at us,” Wednesday | April 1, 2009, 
accessed 20 May, 2018. http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2009/04/01/the-movie-
looks-back-at-us/ 
192 Shiva Rahbaran, Iranian Cinema Uncensored: Contemporary Film-makers since 
the Islamic Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2015), 151. 
193 Blake Atwood, Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political Change in the Islamic 
Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 23. For a review of the book 
see, Farshid Kazemi, “Reform Cinema in Iran: Film and Political Change in the 
Islamic Republic,” Iranian Studies Vol. 50, Iss. 5, (May 2017): 741-744. 
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Baran often draws on Sufi mystical discourse, such as the mystical allegory of the 
voyage of the soul towards the divine Beloved, as found in the works of classical 
Persian poets, such as Sana’i, ‘Attar, Rumi, and Jami.194 In this way, most of Majidi’s 
cinematic oeuvre, including Baran, have often been read in light of the mystico-
philosophical motif of “the Voyage and the Messenger,” to borrow a phrase from 
Henry Corbin’s eponymous book.195 
Baran (literally meaning ‘rain’ in Persian) is effectively a story of youthful 
love between an illegal Afghani worker and an Azari construction worker. The Azari 
youth, Latif (Hossein Abedini), works at a construction site for Memar (Mohammad 
Amir Naji), doing simple jobs such as grocery shopping and serving tea to the 
workers. During a work accident, an Afghan worker named Najar breaks his leg, and 
his fragile looking son Rahmat is brought in as replacement for his father, by an 
elderly Afghan family friend, Soltan, so that the poor family may survive. Once 
Rahmat appears, Latif suddenly feels threatened by him, as he immediately loses his 
work in the kitchen to him, forced to engage in heavy work instead. His initial hatred 
is transformed into amorous desire when he finally discovers that the fragile 
androgynous boy is in fact a girl named Baran (Zahra Bahrami), who had cross-
dressed as a boy in order to work at the construction site. During a raid by authorities, 
the illegal Afghanis, including Baran, run away and she is reduced to working at a 
nearby village lifting large heavy stones from the river to support her family. Latif 
discovers her plight and buys crutches for her father Najaf, and entrusts his year of 
wages to Soltan to give to Najaf, as a way to compensate for his disability pay. In 
similar poverty, Soltan instead takes the money and returns to Afghanistan, 
promising in a note to pay the boy back. Desperate to help Baran and her family, 
Latif sells his identity papers and gives the money to Najaf under the pretext that it is 
from Memar, but in a twist of fate, Najaf uses the money to go back to Afghanistan. 
In the final scene, just as they are about to leave, Baran drops some fruits on the floor 
                                                        
194 See Nacim Pak-Shiraz, Shi'i Islam in Iranian Cinema: Religion and Spirituality in 
Film. (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011) 93-122; Michael Pittman, “Majid 
Majidi and Baran: Iranian Cinematic Poetics and the Spiritual Poverty of Rumi,” 
Journal of Religion & Film: Vol. 15: Iss. 2, Article 4, (2012); Cyrus Ali Zargar, 
“Allegory and Ambiguity in the Films of Majid Majidi: A Theodicy of Meaning,” 
Journal of Religion & Film: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 3, (2016). 
195 Henry Corbin, The Voyage and the Messenger: Iran and Philosophy (Berkley, 
California: North Atlantic Books, 1999). 
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and Latif helps her pick them up and for a moment she looks at him, before flipping 
the burqa (Afghani face-veil) over her head to leave on the back of the truck, but her 
shoe gets stuck in the mud, and Latif takes the shoe and holds it as she puts it back on 
her foot. The last shot of the film is of rain (baran) filling the footprint left behind by 
Baran, which will shortly wash away. 
The emblematic scene where we get the imagined, fantasied gaze is perhaps 
the most beautifully shot in the entire Baran. The scene begins with a shot of Latif 
about to carry a heavy cement bag, and as he moves towards the camera, a rush of 
rustling wind blows a fog of debris across the screen that agitates Latif’s eyes, 
causing him to momentarily lose his sight. The sound of the rustling leaves and wind 
and thunder in the background, all of a sudden turn his attention towards the kitchen 
where the curtain covering the kitchen door is being blown open lightly by the wind, 
which draws Latif towards the kitchen area. At the same time as we hear the sound of 
wind blowing and thunder, we can hear the faint sound of a female humming on the 
soundtrack. As Latif’s blinking stops, the camera pulls towards him in a medium 
close up, and we get a reverse shot of the curtain slowly blowing in the wind and as 
the camera pulls closer for a brief moment we get a glimpse of the silhouette of a 
female figure behind an opaque window frame combing her hair. The camera stays in 
medium shot by the curtain and we see Latif enter the frame with his back to the 
camera as he approaches the curtain. Latif slowly pulls the curtain partially open and 
we get a reverse shot of Latif looking through the crack of the semi opened curtain, 
his eyes widening at the full revelation of what he is seeing. Then in a reverse shot, 
which is a subjective point of view shot of Latif, we see the silhouette of Baran 
behind an opaque window frame brushing her long hair, presumably humming to 
herself (although the voice seems to be extra-diegetic yet the implication is that the 
source is Baran). The logic of the modesty system is maintained by having Baran 
framed behind an opaque window which functions as a veil that separates the look of 
Latif and that of the spectators from seeing her unimpeded, and the backlighting 
creates a strong contrast where she becomes a shadow cast on a screen (a cinematic 
screen even). The scene ends when all of a sudden Latif hears the sound of footsteps, 
and he realizes that she is about to come out, which makes him run away in panic, 
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and hide behind the stack of cements, as he spies on her leaving, dressed as a boy, 
















Figure 1.3 The location of the gaze in Baran is in the opacity of the window glass, 
representing the cinematic screen, rather than Latif’s voyeuristic look. 
 
 This scene where Latif is effectively a peeping Tom or voyeur, is a perfect 
instantiation of the fantasized or imagined gaze, and the power of fascination in this 
entire scene resides in the fact that it traverses from the Sarrterian gaze to the 
Lacanian gaze. In the scene at first you have the classic description of the gaze in 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness regarding the voyeur peeping through a keyhole. For 
                                                        
196 Michelle Langford, “Negotiating the sacred body in Iranian cinema(s): National, 
physical and cinematic embodiment in Majid Majidi’s Baran (2002).” Negotiating 
the Sacred II: Blasphemy and Sacrilege in the Arts. E. Burns-Coleman, and S. 
Fernandes-Dias (Canberra, The Australian National Univeristy Press, 2008), pp. 167-
168. 
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Sartre the gaze emerges not only from the organ of sight, but is evoked through the 
sound of rustling leaves, which startles the voyeur. Sartre states: 
 
Of course what most often manifests a look is the convergence of two ocular 
globes in my direction. But the look will be given just as well on occasion 
when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by 
silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain.197 
 
This description of Sartre uncannily resembles what we get in this scene from Baran, 
all the elements are there, the sound of rustling branches via the wind, the light 
movement of the curtain, etc. According to Sartre, these sounds are heard at the 
moment he is engaged in the act of looking through a keyhole and where a feeling of 
shame associated with the gaze suddenly surprises the voyeur, since a gaze is what is 
imagined in the field of the Other. It is at this moment where the voyeur imagining 
himself being observed by another acquires a sense of self. 198 In this sense, as Joan 
Copjec states, in Sartre the gaze acts “as an ‘indispensable mediator’ between the 
voyeur and himself, the condition necessary for precipitating him out as subject from 
the act of looking in which he has until this point been totally absorbed”.199 Here the 
voyeur emerges as a subject, without which there would only be a peering through 
the keyhole. Sartre’s description of the voyeur peeping through a keyhole and the 
rustling of wind that surprises him can be precisely mapped within the coordinates of 
the above scene where Latif as a voyeur peeps through the curtain, and all of a 
sudden at the end becomes aware of himself as subject through the intervention of 
some noise (wind, birds flying, footsteps, etc.) that startles him. In other words, the 
entire scene functions as a way to jolt Latif into self-awareness as a subject; but here 
Latif is less a Sarterian subject that becomes aware of himself through the gaze 
imagined in the field of the Other, but is rather a Lacanian subject, namely, a subject 
of desire.200 Thus, in foregrounding Latif as the subject of desire, we traverse from 
the Sarterian gaze (apropos shame) to the Lacanian gaze (apropos desire). 
                                                        
197 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 257 
198 Ibid, 369. 
199 Copjec, “The Object-Gaze”, 177. 
200 Lacan after a critical summary of Sartre’s notion of the gaze in order to 
distinguish it from his own, brings to the fore what for him is the crucial relation of 
the gaze to the subject of desire, he states, “But does this mean that originally it is in 
the relation of subject to subject, in the function of the existence of others as looking 
at me, that we apprehend what the gaze really is? Is it not clear that the gaze 
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The (Lacanian) gaze in the scene is therefore not located in Latif’s voyeuristic 
looking, which is where Screen theory would have located the gaze, but on the 
contrary it is located in the inter-space that acts like a crack in reality itself, from 
where Latif opens the curtain to look. It is as though Baran is out there, in common 
existing reality, while Latif is peering at her from some in-between space, a 
barazakh, from some mysterious liminal world. As Žižek states, “This is the location 
of the imagined, fantasised gaze. Gaze is that obscure point, the blind spot, from 
which the object looked upon returns the gaze.”201 There is an intense inter-filmic 
dialogue at work between this scene and a similar one in Hitchcok’s Vertigo, where 
we see Scottie in a position of the voyeur observing Madeleine from behind the crack 
of a door. This seeming crack in reality or “inter-space” from which Scottie observes 
Madeleine is precisely the location of the fantasied gaze.  
The key question to be asked here is: why did Latif get drawn to the kitchen 
in the first place where Rahmat is and like a peeping Tom spy on Rahmat? Therein 
resides the key to the whole scene, which stages the Lacanian notion of the gaze. In 
his Seminar I (1953-1954) Lacan states, “I can feel myself under the gaze of someone 
whose eyes I do not see, not even discern. All that is necessary is for something to 
signify to me that there may be others there. This window, if it gets a bit dark, and if I 
have reasons for thinking that there is someone behind it, is straight-away a gaze.”202 
This is precisely what happens to Latif as he is drawn to the kitchen curtain that is 
being blown lightly by the wind, the window is a little dark, and he has reasons to 
think there is someone behind it, and this straight-away becomes the gaze.  
  The gaze then is not where we usually expect it, it is located in the blurred, 
opaque window, which manifests the subject’s (Latif’s and the spectators) desire and 
distorts the visual field. The gaze is not on the side of the subject looking (Latif), but 
is encountered by the spectator in the object, in the window. This opacity of the 
window, blots the visual field and distorts everything that Latif sees, as well as what 
                                                        
intervenes here only in as much as it is not the annihilating subject, correlative of the 
world of objectivity, who feels himself surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in 
a function of desire? Is it not precisely because desire is established here in the 
domain of seeing that we can make it vanish?” Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 
84-85.  
201 Slavoj Žižek, Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, directed by Sophie Fiennes, (2006). 
Film. 
202 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique (New York: 
Norton, 1988), 215. 
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the spectator’s sees, since the window as blot or stain represents Latif’s desire as well 
as the viewers desire. This is why Lacan states, “And if I am anything in the picture, 
it is always in the form of the screen, which I earlier called the stain, the spot.”203 The 
gaze thereby triggers the spectator’s desire in the visual field, and becomes the objet 
petit a or object-cause of desire. This play of light and opacity of the window is the 
screen, the stain or the spot where Latif’s desire and our desire becomes manifest. It 
also stands for the cinematic screen itself, where our desires appear to us at such 
moments. Once the spectator encounters the opacity of the window as a stain or blot, 
suddenly the whole scene is de-naturalized, since we recognize that our desire has 
been accounted for by what we are looking at. In this way, Latif’s desire and our 
desire is inscribed as a blot on the window screen and the cinematic image, and our 
libidinal investment in what we are viewing is brought to the fore. This is the 
traumatic dimension in encountering the gaze, since it forces the spectator to confront 
their desire, which acts as a distortion of reality, and de-naturalizes the world by 
rendering it non-neutral (i.e., since our desire appears inscribed in what we see out 
there in reality).  
This opacity of the window is also the window or frame of fantasy that 
enframes reality, just as we saw above how Lacan illuminated the fantasmatic 
structure of the window apropos the painting Las Meninas. Once Latif glimpses the 
silhouette of Baran behind the window (whom he had originally thought to be a boy), 
it is at that moment that she enters his fantasy frame and the coordinates of his desire. 
Without this fantasmatic window enframing reality, Latif’s desire would not have 
been aroused, since it is the window of fantasy that provides “the mise en scène of 
desire”. Paradoxically, this is where the logic of the modesty system (hejab) and the 
Lacanian gaze become co-incident, since the opaque window is placed there by 
Majidi so that Latif and the spectator will not be able to directly look at Baran 
combing her long tresses (since women’s hair is ‘awra). In this technique of veiling 
Baran behind the opacity of the window whilst the backlighting illuminates the 
contours of her silhouette, the object-gaze becomes manifest. 
A theoretical question imposes itself here apropos the figure of the peeping 
Tom or voyeur; namely why is it that in Baran (a so-called religio-mystical film) the 
male protagonist, Latif, assumes the position of the voyeur, observing through a 
                                                        
203 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, 97. 
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crack the feminine figure through a window? Is this just an anomaly in Baran or is 
the same logic operative in other so-called religious or mystic films. Indeed the same 
logic is operative in other so-called mystic films produced in post-revolutionary Iran, 
such as Khoda nazdik ast (God is Near, 2006), where the central character, 
Mohammad Esfahani, falls in love with a beautiful teacher and assumes the position 
of the peeping Tom gazing at her outside the window of her class. It is as if the secret 
message in the libidinal economy of these films is: the only way for the religious 
male subject to look at a woman is to assume the position of a voyeur or peeping 
Tom. (Besides Majidi’s own religious commitment to Shi’ism, Hitchock’s own 
Catholicism must be recalled here, since instances of the peeping Tom figure 
reverberate in his films, especially in Vertigo and Psycho). 
Baran is effectively about the sublimation of male (sexual) desire into 
spiritual or mystical love; which is why at the end of the film Baran is no longer 
needed, as she had to be overcome for Latif to become a mystic-lover (‘arif-e‘asheq) 
in search of the true Beloved (ma‘shuq-e haqiqi) i.e., God. From this perspective 
woman (Baran) simply functions as a vanishing mediator, once she has served her 
purpose, she disappears. This is precisely the lesson of Otto Winenger, where he 
effectively claims that “woman doesn’t exist”, and that “woman is the sin of man.”204 
In this way, such films as Baran are often profoundly reactionary and misogynistic, 
since woman as the object of desire stands for lust or carnal desire (shahwat), which 
the mystic (Latif) must traverse in order to reach the true invisible object of desire, 
the divine Beloved (i.e., God). Majidi states, “In a way, he [Latif] renounces Baran. 
He leaves his cap behind, which is an indication that he goes beyond material things 





This chapter has theorized that the New Iranian Cinema is the site of Lacan’s notion 
l’objet regard or the object-gaze. By deploying Lacan’s concept of the gaze, the 
                                                        
204 Otto Winenger cited in Žižek, Metastasis of Enjoyment, 141. 
205 “Refugees in Love and Life Interview with Majid Majidi by Gonul Donmez-Colin 
( Film Critic),” (Reprint from Asian Cinema Studies Vol 13, No 1 Spring/Summer 
2002.), accessed September 19, 2017, http://www.cinemajidi.com/ 
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chapter analyzed the way in which the object-gaze operates in the New Iranian 
Cinema through two filmic examples, namely Abbas Kiarostami’s Shirin and Majid 
Majidi’s Baran. Contrary to the logic of the gaze operative in first wave 
psychoanalytic film theory or Screen theory where the predominance of the camera’s 
look is undergirded by the male-gaze or the look of the male subject both within the 
diegesis, and in the spectatorial position; the Lacanian gaze was demonstrated to be 
on the side of the object rather than the looking subject, where the object looked 
upon, returns the gaze. It was argued that the object-gaze is constitutive of the New 
Iranian Cinema, which renders this cinema among the few examplars of the cinema 
of desire, since what is often invisible or unseen in the visual field structures both the 
formal and narrative logic of this cinema. 
Through a close look at the proscriptions on the gaze in Islamic and Shi’i 
legal theories of the gaze, where it is considered part of a women’s ‘awra or 
nakedness, it was argued that the censorship codes that enforce the system of 
modesty (hejab) on the cinema, recommended the practice of the averted-gaze in 
order to cleanse the screen image from the male-gaze. I demonstrated that one of the 
consequences of these restrictions on the gaze, paradoxically, made the New Iranian 
Cinema one of the exemplary sites of the Lacanian gaze due to its uncanny 
correlation between the Islamic theory of the averted-gaze as opposed to Negar 
Mottahedeh’s reading, where post-revolutionary Iranian cinema is seen as the locus 
of feminist gaze theory and hence ostensibly “a feminist cinema.” Indeed, I 
demonstrated that Mottahedeh’s invocation of the term ‘looking awry’ as a way to 
read the Islamic injunction of the averted gaze unconsciously relies upon Lacan via 
Žižek without realizing its explicit connection to the Lacanian gaze; similarly Naficy 
also directly invoked Žižek  apropos the motif of looking awry in relation to the 
averted gaze, but both of them failed to recognize the Lacanian origin of Žižek’s 
formulation, and hence the consequences of its relation to Lacan’s object-gaze. 
It was seen that in Kiarostami’s cinematic universe the gaze often manifests 
itself through the play of lack and absence in the visual field, which acts to solicit the 
spectator’s desire, since the objet petit a or the object-cause of desire in the visual 
field is the gaze. Based on this ‘unseen’ that structures his films, I argue that within 
the New Iranian Cinema, Kiarostami’s cinema is the cinema of desire par excellence, 
since the gaze (and the voice) is constitutive of his cinematic oeuvre. In order to 
theorize this structure of the gaze in Shirin, I deployed Lacan’s interpretation of 
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Diego Velázquez painting, Las Meninas, as a prism to read the uncanny similarity 
between the way the gaze appears in this painting and the film. I demonstrated that 
among Kiarostami’s film, Shirin acts as the apotheosis of the Lacanian gaze, since in 
this film the cinema screen itself returns the gaze. 
Through a detailed analysis of one of the most famous peeping Tom scenes in 
Majidi’s Baran, I demonstrated that it contains the exemplary site of the Lacanian 
gaze. The scene where Latif appears as a peeping Tom or voyeur is an instantiation of 
the fantasized or imagined gaze, as it traverses from the Sarrterian gaze to the 
Lacanian gaze. Contrary to where Screen theory would have located the gaze, namely 
in Latif’s voyeuristic act of looking through the curtain, I argued that the Lacanian 
gaze is located in the inter-space that acts like a crack in reality itself, from where 
Latif opens the curtain to look. This is the site of the fantasized or imagined gaze. 
The gaze was also located in the opacity of the window behind which was the 
silhouette of Baran and triggered Latif’s and the spectator’s desire by distorting the 
visual field. The Lacanian gaze in this instance was not on the side of the looking 
subject (Latif), but in the object (window screen) itself. Paradoxically, this is where 
the logic of the modesty system (hejab) and the Lacanian gaze find their homology, 
since the opaque window functioned as a screen, as a veil, so that Latif and the 
spectator could not directly look at Baran unveiled. Through this technique of 
screening Baran behind the opaque window, the object-gaze appears as a stain in the 
image, that when looked upon, returns the gaze. 
In the final analysis, this chapter has contributed to second wave 
psychoanalytic film theory or Lacanian film theory, by demonstrating how the New 
Iranian Cinema may be considered one of the emblimatic sites of the Lacanian gaze 
in the cinema rather than the locus of feminist gaze theory. The New Iranian Cinema 
may be regarded as one of the film movements in the world that is not only one of the 
emblematic instances of the cinema of desire, but an exemplary instance of the art of 










The Object-Voice: The Acousmatic Voice in the New Iranian Cinema206 
 
What object is at issue here? This object is the one that is called the voice. 
 
 – Jacques Lacan, Seminar X, Anxiety. 
 
Slavoj Žižek states that the proper tension –that is “the principal axis” –in the cinema 
is the one between gaze and voice.207 This axis is of special significance in post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema, as it revolves around the staging of the female body. 
For female bodies to be represented on screen, legitimate use of the voice and gaze 
had to be discovered within Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). As Hamid Naficy states, 
“Theologians mined Islamic doctrines to develop further guidelines about women’s 
representation, their on-screen relations with men, and the permissible uses of voice 
and gaze – theirs as well as those of men”208 [my emphasis]. In this fascinating sense, 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema is born out of the problem of representing the 
female body between the gaze and voice. 
Though the gaze has been discussed to some extent in the scholarly literature 
on Iranian cinema and on cinema more generally,209 the voice, on the contrary, has 
not received the theoretical attention that it rightly merits.210 In this chapter, I will 
                                                        
206 An earlier version of this chapter was submitted to Camera Obscura and accepted 
for publication on September 28, 2016, but due to the journal’s long queue it was 
published on May 2018. See Farshid Kazemi, “The Object-Voice: The Acousmatic 
Voice in the New Iranian Cinema,” Camera Obscura: Feminism, Culture, and Media 
Studies, 98 (vol. 33, no. 2) 2018, pp. 56-81.  
207 Slavoj Žižek, Reflections of Media, of Politics and Cinema. Interview with Geert 
Lovink, InterCommunication 14, February 27 1995, accessed December 12, 2015, 
http://www.lacan.com/zizek-reflections.htm  
208 Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Vol. 4. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 111.  
209 On the Lacanian gaze see Chapter 1.  
210 At present there is one study that addresses aspects of the female voice in Iranian 
cinema, Rosa Holman, Iranian Women’s Cinema: Recovering Voice, Reclaiming 
Authority (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, UNSW, Australia, 2014). However, Holman 
does not use Chion’s concept of the acousmatic voice (or Lacan’s object-voice) that I 
deploy as the privliged film theoretical term that sheds light on the unique structure 
of the female voice operative in some instances of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. 
As indicated the vast majority of the literature on cinema has focused on visuality or 
the gaze, with only a handful of studies focusing on the female voice in Hollywood or 
classic cinema. Besides Doane (1980) and Silverman (1988) that I will discuss below, 
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theorize the deployment of the voice in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, especially 
through what the French film theorist Michel Chion calls acousmêtre or the 
acousmatic voice. The acousmatic voice is a voice without a body or disembodied 
voice, in which the voice of a character emanates from off-screen space detached 
from a particular body. The acousmatic voice is often operative within post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema as a way to circumvent the restrictions on staging 
bodies (both male and female) in intimate or erotic configurations. This phantomlike 
voice without a body haunts the entire landscape of post-revolutionary Iranian 
cinema like a spectral presence. 
I will look at two instances in which the acousmatic voice is deployed as a 
way to subvert the logic of veiling the female voice through the acousmatization of 
the male voice, focusing on two films, namely Rakhshan Banietemad’s Banoo-ye 
ordibehesht (The May Lady, Iran, 1997) and Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s Gabbeh 
(Iran/France, 1996). The instances of the voice in these films represent a feminist 
move and a counter-ideological gesture since what is rendered acousmatic in these 
two films is the male voice rather than the female voice. This male acousmatic voice 
acts to subvert the logic of veiling the female voice, since representing the male voice 
without a body, critiques the foregrounding of the male subject as the privileged site 
of subjectivity in the Islamic Republic. In this way, the acousmatic voice foregrounds 
female desire rather than male desire, whilst simultaneously drawing out the erotic 
potential of the male voice, a dimension only ascribed to the female voice in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Relating Chion’s concept of acousmêtre with that of Lacan’s notion of 
the voice as objet petit a–alongside the concept of “voice-off” in feminist film theory 
of Mary Ann Doane and Kaja Silverman–this chapter argues that the voice acts as a 
signifier of desire and becomes a love-object, in place of the forbidden erotic 
configurations of bodies on the screen. In New Iranian Cinema, therefore, the 
acousmatic voice fills in the erotic void created by the censors.  
 
  
                                                        
exceptions include: Amy Lawrence, Echo and Narcissus: Women’s Voices in 
Classical Hollywood Cinema (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Sarah 
Kozloff, Invisible Storytellers: Voice- Over Narration in American Fiction Film 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Britta Sjogren, Into the Vortex: 
Female Voice and Paradox in Film (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois 
Press 2005). 
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2.1 Chion with Lacan: The Acousmatic Voice and Feminist Psychoanalytic Film 
Theory 
 
One of the foremost theorists of the voice in cinema is the French composer and film 
theorist, Michel Chion. In his classic text, The Voice in Cinema (La voix au cinema, 
1982), Chion refers to a voice whose source or origin is obscured from the visual 
field as acousmêtre or the acousmatic voice. As Chion states, “For the spectator… 
the filmic acousmêtre is ‘offscreen,’ outside the image, and at the same time in the 
image…It’s as if the voice were wandering along the surface, at once inside and 
outside, seeking a place to settle. Especially when a film hasn’t shown what body this 
voice normally inhabits.”211 Though Chion borrowed the term acousmêtre from his 
teacher, Pierre Schaeffer, it is to him that we owe its full articulation in relation to the 
cinema. The acousmatic voice therefore is a voice that is heard in the diegetic reality 
of film, but is not specifically attached to a body; it is a disembodied voice – a 
spectral voice freely floating without a body. For Chion, there are different forms of 
the acousmêtre operative in cinema, such as the complete or partial acousmêtre, 
commentator, radio, telephone, and already visualized. According to Chion, once the 
acousmatic voice is finally anchored in a specific face or body it is then that the voice 
becomes de-acousmatized. Therefore, for Chion the acousmatic voice becomes a 
cinematic object, no less powerful than the images that pervade the cinematic screen. 
In referring to this illusive object-voice in cinema, the acousmatic voice, 
Chion makes a subtle but important connection to Jacques Lacan’s theory of the 
voice as object. Chion considers Lacan to have provided “a serious theoretical 
elaboration of the voice as an object.”212 Indeed, Lacan added two more objects, the 
voice and gaze, to the list of the Freudian partial objects (as already discussed in the 
introduction).213 As Chion notes, “Lacan… placed the voice – along with the gaze, 
the penis, the feces, and nothingness- in the ranks of “objet (a),” these part objects 
                                                        
211 Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 23.  
212 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 1.  
213 In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis Lacan states, “These are 
the objets a –the breasts, the faeces, the gaze, the voice. It is in this new term that 
resides the point that introduces the dialectic of the subject qua subject of the 
unconscious.” See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1978), 242. 
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which may be fetishized or employed to ‘thingify difference.’”214 For Lacan, objet 
petit a acts as a partial object, an element which is imagined as separable from the 
rest of the body, such as the voice. There is a crucial distinction to be made between 
what you desire, the loved one, and what causes you to desire. The Lacanian objet 
petit a is not the object of desire (the beloved, etc.), but rather the object-cause of 
desire, that ever elusive feature which causes one to desire, the surplus that produces 
or evokes desire.215 As Žižek puts it, “Objet petit a, the object-cause of desire [is]: an 
object that is, in a way, posited by desire itself. The paradox of desire is that it posits 
retroactively its own cause, i.e., the object a is an object that can be perceived only by 
a gaze ‘distorted’ by desire….”216 In a similar way, the voice as objet petit a is an 
object that can be heard in the aural field only by an ear that is ‘distorted’ by desire. 
The voice as objet petit a is a distortion of the aural field through the subject’s 
desire.217 This is why the acousmatic voice can become a love object, not in the sense 
that one would fall in love with a voice, but in the sense that it is a medium, “a 
catalyst that sets off love.”218 In this sense, the voice as object-cause of desire is 
intimately connected with the acousmatic voice. 
Though Chion, as noted, addresses Lacan’s concept of the voice as a 
psychoanalytic object, Lacan’s notion of the voice as objet petit a provides an 
important supplement to Chion’s acousmatic voice, since in Lacan’s formulation the 
dimension of desire in the voice and its ability to function as a love-object is 
foregrounded. It is here that the voice as object-cause of desire and the dimension of 
desire in the female voice in post-revolutionary Iranian Cinema become co-incident. 
                                                        
214 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 1. 
215 For a full discussion of the gaze as objet petit a, see Chapter One. Cf. Jacques 
Lacan “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a,” in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. 67-119. 
216 Žižek, Looking Awry, 12. 
217 Todd McGowan states, “Though Chion doesn’t explicitly identify himself with 
psychoanalytic theory, the acousmêtre is a conception of the voice as objet a. When 
the spectator hears the acousmêtre, she or he encounters the voice as a detached 
object. The voice as objet a manifests the subject’s desire because it is what can be 
heard beyond the regime of sense.” See McGowan, Psychoanalytic Theory, 77. But 
as I have indicated, Chion does refer to Lacan at the beginning of his book, and 
therefore implicitly makes a connection between the voice as objet petit a and the 
acousmêtre. 
218 Slavoj Žižek and Renata Salecl ed., Gaze and Voice as Love Objects (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1996), 3. 
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Lacan’s concept of the voice brings to the fore then the logic of desire that inheres in 
the voice, a logic that is operative in the invocatory drive.219  
Another correlation between Lacan’s concept of the voice as objet petit a, and 
the acousmatic voice, may be found in the technological apparatuses that stage this 
dimension of the voice. For Lacan, the voice as objet a can be found in “those objects 
that can be lined up on the shelves of a library in the form of gramophone records or 
reels of tape.”220 Indeed, among some of the first technologies that rendered the voice 
acousmatic was the radio, gramophone, tape-recorder and the telephone, in which the 
source of the voice was no longer seen but only emanated from the various 
technological instruments, and the true source of the voice remained hidden, 
invisible.221 Therefore, such technologies as the gramophone or reels of tape that 
Lacan mentions, in which the voice appears separable from its source is at once both 
the voice as objet petit a, and the acousmatic voice. As we shall see, in The May 
Lady, the telephone is the apparatus through which the acousmatic dimension of the 
voice as objet petit a is manifested.  
One of the first sustained applications of psychoanalytic film theory to the 
voice in cinema, Kaja Silverman’s The Acoustic Mirror, foregrounds the female 
voice in its analysis of classic cinema in a similar manner that 1970’s feminist gaze 
theory or Screen theory (particularly Laura Mulvey) foregrounded the male gaze. In 
her text Silverman critiques Chion’s analysis of the voice in the cinema on the 
grounds that he does not address the question of gender of the voice in classic 
cinema. She states, “unfortunately, Chion’s sorties into the domain of sexual 
difference seem motivated primarily by the search for poetic props, and so remain for 
the most part both uncritical and devoid of self-consciousness.”222 Silverman goes on 
to say that Chion’s discussion of the voice remains “within existing gender 
demarcations” and “assumes much of the symptomatic value of a Hollywood 
                                                        
219 Lacan writes, “At the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of 
desire, of the desire of the Other. It is the same at the level of the invocatory drive, 
which is the closest to the experience of the unconscious. Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts, 104. 
220 Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, trans. A.R. Price 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 315.  
221 Mladen Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2006), 63. 
222 Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 49. 
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film…”223 In this respect, Silverman’s foregrounding of the gender of the voice in 
classic cinema and the female voice in particular, is especially relevant in relation to 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. Indeed, for Silverman what is occluded in Chion’s 
analysis is that the acousmatic or disembodied voice is often the male voice, whilst 
the female voice is generally confined to the spectacle of her body. Although 
Silverman’s critique of Chion is generally apt, she may be overstating the case 
however, since Chion seems to be aware of the gender of the acousmatic voice, as he 
states, “(it must finally be said) most acousmêtres are masculine.”224 According to 
Silverman, in classic cinema (Hollywood cinema), “the female voice and body [are] 
insistently [relegated] to the interior of the diegesis, while relegating the male subject 
to a position of apparent discursive exteriority by identifying him with mastering 
speech, vision, or hearing.”225 For Silverman, authority and power are located in the 
disembodied voice that is either a voiceover or voice-off, which speaks whilst 
remaining invisible. This voice is almost always male. Conversely, the female voice 
is often embodied within a character that the viewer can see, which effectively 
disempowers the woman.226  
In Gabbeh and The May Lady, the voice operates under a different logic. 
Because of modesty laws, to have the female voice manifested by a character that one 
can see grants her apparent discursive powers. Conversely, to have the male voice as 
a disembodied voice with a voiceover, remaining unseen whilst speaking, does not 
give power to that voice, but renders it impotent since in the visual economy of the 
New Iranian cinema, space or spatial relations are gendered: what you see or what is 
visible is considered male space (public space), and what is invisible or should 
remain hidden is female space (private space) – hence the logic of the veil.227 By 
                                                        
223 Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror, 49. 
224 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 55.  
225 Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror, ix. 
226 McGowan, Psychoanalytic Theory, 76. 
227 This feature of a gendered space was even part of the architectural structure of 
traditional homes in Iran, which contained what is called a biruni, an outer public 
space, reserved for men, and the andaruni or inner private space, reserved for the 
women of the household to which men had no access. This gendered architecture was 
not unknown in the Europe of the 18th and 19th century as well, where the parlor 
(from the French, ‘to speak’) in the house was a women’s room vs. the gentlemen’s 
room was reserved for men. 
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rendering invisible the male body from the screen image, the male voice is feminized 
formally through its acousmatization. 
The auditory regime of the New Iranian Cinema therefore operates under a 
different logic from classic cinema due to the logic of the veil, in which the female 
voice is often un-synched or asynchronous with their bodies, emanating from beyond 
the frame or off-screen space in order to veil the female voice. For Silverman, the 
equivalent of shot/reverse-shot and other elements of suture in classic cinema is the 
operation of synchronization, which syncs or marries sound and image in each frame. 
As she states, synchronization is “the sound analogue of the shot/reverse shot 
formation.”228 But, significantly the standard shot/reverse-shot in Hollywood or 
classic cinema is absent in the New Iranian cinema, especially when the two 
characters are an unrelated man and a woman. This shift away from the rule of 
synchronization affects the auditory register of the film, and exposes the illusion of 
the unity of voice and body mediated by the cinematic apparatus and the film’s site of 
enunciation. In this way, the female voice in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema often 
functions as an acousmatic voice, with her body remaining invisible from the visual 
field within the screen. Paradoxically, then, the New Iranian cinema is the realization 
of the ideals of feminist voice theory espoused by theorists such as Doane and 
Silverman. Negar Mottahedeh notes something similar at the level of the gaze, when 
she claims, somewhat hyperbolically that “Iranian cinema is the apotheosis of 1970s 
feminist gaze theory.”229  
Upon closer scrutiny, however, such claims are not entirely correct. Post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema cannot be considered an “apotheosis” of feminist voice-
theory (or gaze-theory for that matter), but appears so only on the surface, since the 
sound regime of Iranian cinema hinges on Shi‘ite laws of veiling the female voice 
due to its erotic power to seduce the heterosexual male subject both within and 
without the diegesis. Therefore, though Iranian cinema paradoxically achieves, at the 
level of form, some of the goals of a feminist voice theory (non-synched, not 
confined to their bodies, emanating from off-screen spaces etc.), an emancipatory 
feminist logic does not necessary follow.  
                                                        
228 Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror, 45. 
229 Mottahedeh writes, “In the attempt to cleanse its technologies, the post-
Revolutionary Iranian film industry came to produce a cinema that I will argue is the 
apotheosis of 1970s feminist gaze theory.” Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories, 2. 
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There is a theoretical correspondence or homology between Chion’s 
acousmatic voice and voice-off (voix-off in French at once denotes both voiceover 
and voice-off)230 in feminist film theory. This is how Mary Ann Doane describes it in 
her foundational article, ‘The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and 
Space:’  
 
“Voice-off” refers to instances in which we hear the voice of a character who 
is not visible within the frame. Yet the film establishes, by means of previous 
shots or other contextual determinants, the character's "presence" in the space 
of the scene, in the diegesis. He/she is "just over there," 'just beyond the 
frameline," in a space which "exists" but which the camera does not choose to 
show.231   
 
This description of the voice-off is virtually identical to the way that Chion has 
characterized the acousmatic voice. In his discussion Chion states that the complete 
acousmêtre is “the one who is not-yet-seen, but who remains liable to appear in the 
visual field at any moment”.232 For Silverman on the other hand, the voice-off is still 
gendered and “sexually differentiated in much the same way that a synchronized 
voice is…” which means that the male voice is the privileged site of voice-off.233 In 
contrast to this, in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema it is the female voice that is 
often a voice-off or rendered acousmatic due to Shi’ite laws of veiling.   
In order to illustrate the operation of the acousmatic voice in cinema, Chion 
provides several cinematic examples such as the mother’s voice in Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), Dr. Mabuse’s voice in Fritz Lang’s The Testament of Dr 
Mabuse (Das Testament des Dr Mabuse (1933), and the director’s voice in Orson 
Welles’ The Magnificent Ambersons (1942).234 In his discussion of the acousmatic 
voice in (largely Euro-American) cinema, Chion often draws attention to the uncanny 
                                                        
230 Regarding the voice-off Chion writes, “The French term for the word ‘voiceover’ 
is ‘voix-off’ (as if any voice could be ‘off’) and it designates any acousmatic or 
bodiless voices in a film that tell stories, provide commentary, or evoke the past. 
Bodiless can mean placed outside a body temporarily. Detached from a body that is 
no longer seen and set into orbit in the peripheral acousmatic field.” Chion, The Voice 
in Cinema, 49. 
231 Mary Ann Doane, “The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and 
Space,” Yale French Studies, No. 60, Cinema/Sound (1980): 37.  
232 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 22. 
233 Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror, 48. 
234 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 18-19. 
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and haunting effects of the acousmatic voice in the above films (Žižek and Dolar both 
also focus on the uncanny dimension of the acousmatic voice), whereby the voice 
through its acousmatization acquires a terrifying dimension, becoming all-pervasive, 
all-knowing and all-seeing.235 Similarly Doane also highlights the uncanny effects of 
the voice-off and how by becoming detached from the body, it reveals itself as a 
signifier: “As soon as the sound is detached from its source, no longer anchored by a 
represented body, its potential work as a signifier is revealed. There is always 
something uncanny about a voice which emanates from a source outside the 
frame.”236 In this way, the acousmatic voice and voice-off are theoretically co-
incident since they produce an uncanny effect upon the spectator due to the de-
coupling of the voice from its source, the body. 
However, in the New Iranian cinema, the acousmatic voice has a different 
libidinal economy, it is less concerned with the uncanny dimension of the acousmêtre 
or voice-off (though this feature is not completely absent), but with its capacity to 
become a love object, the voice as objet petit a or object-cause of desire. Before 
turning to this aspect of the acousmatic voice in examining Gabbeh and The May 
Lady, especially through the complete and partial acousmêtre, I will first provide the 
necessary background for an Islamic theory of the female voice that informs the 
auditory sensorium of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. 
 
2.2 Veiling and Aurality: An Islamic Theory of the Female Voice  
 
Besides the censorship on visuality, discussed in the previous chapter on the gaze, 
another important guideline of the system of modesty is the proscription on aurality, 
the veiling of the auditory sensorium, which was to ensure that the female voice 
would not be represented on screen in a way that would evoke male desire, since in 
the libidinal economy of the Islamic Republic heterosexual desire is desire par 
excellence. According to the logic of the veil (hejab), the female voice must be veiled 
or concealed from men’s aurality, since it may cause them to become sexually 
aroused. In an Islamic jurisprudential theory of the voice, the voice of women is 
considered part of her ‘awra or private parts of her body (pudenda) that are deemed 
                                                        
235 Ibid, 25. 
236 Doane, ‘The Voice in the Cinema,’ 40.  
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“shameful” and should be covered or concealed before unrelated men (na-
mahram).237 As Abdelwahab Bouhdiba states, “the voice of a Muslim woman is also 
‘aura [‘awra]. Not only because of the sweet words coming from her mouth must be 
heard only by her husband and master, but because the voice may create a 
disturbance and set in train the cycle of zina [unlawful sexual relations or 
adultery]’238 Though there is no direct reference to the proscription of the female 
voice in the Qur’an, some scholars who argue for the female voice as ‘awra, refer to 
verse 24:30-31. But the concept of the veil or hejab (literally meaning a curtain) has 
both a visual and aural dimension as is evident in this Qur’anic verse: “And when 
you ask of [the wives of the prophet] anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. 
That is purer for you and their hearts” (33:53). Similar injunctions on the female 
voice are found in Judaism and Christianity,239 but perhaps the precise homologue to 
the Islamic concept is provided in Jewish Rabbinic sources such as the Babylonian 
Talmud, which states, “a women’s voice is nakedness.”240 There are many Shi‘i 
traditions (hadith) in this respect, indicating that only the husband or a relative can 
hear the voice of a woman. For instance, there is a hadith attributed to Imam ‘Ali 
prohibiting women from speaking more than five words with anyone other than her 
husband or a relative (mahram).241 Similar hadith exist in Sunni sources, such as this 
one, “Women is a “shameful thing” [‘awra]. If she goes out, Satan attempts to 
                                                        
237 Ayatollah Ali Moraweji, Sinama dar ayine-ye fiqh [Cinema in the mirror of 
jurisprudence], ed. Mohammad Reza Jabbaran (Tehran: Pazhuhishgah-e farhang va 
honar-e Islami, 1999). On the question whether the female voice is ʻawra, see 36–47. 
Also see, Shahla Haeri, “Sacred Canopy: Love and Sex under the Veil,” Iranian 
Studies, Volume 42, 2009, p. 116, 119, 124-125.  
238 Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, 39. 
239 For the interdiction against the female voice in the New Testament, see 
Corinthians 14:34-35, and 1 Timothy 2:11.  
240 Efrat Tseëlon, “On Women And Clothes And Carnival Fools,” in Masquerade and 
Identities: Essays on Gender, Sexuality and Marginality, Ed. by Efrat Tseëlon 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2001), 155. 
241 Abu Ja‘far Muhammad b. ‘Ali b. al-Husayn b. Babuya al Qummi al-Shaykh al-
Saduq, Man la yahduruhu al-faqih. Vol. 4, accessed December 15, 2015, 
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control her.”242 According to some Sunni jurists, the female voice is considered 
‘awra that must be veiled before men.243  
This logic of the Islamic theory of the female voice is also operative within 
Sufi discourse (Islamic mysticism), which is often thought to value music and the 
aesthetics of the voice, especially through the practice of sama or spiritual audition. 
For instance, in a Sufi hagiography it is related that a certain ‘Umar Murshidi whilst 
sojourning through the desert heard a beautiful voice in which he took great pleasure. 
Afterwards he was overcome with a powerful desire to see the person to whom the 
voice belonged and could not cast out the idea from his mind even after he had 
returned to his Sufi lodge. As Bashir relates it:  
 
Then, when he was reading the Qur’an, he suddenly heard a voice 
commanding, “Look!” When he did this, he said, “I saw a woman, naked 
from head to foot, sitting and showing me her vagina, unhesitatingly and 
boldly, uncovering herself in a way that no wife would ever do in front of her 
husband.” The voice then said, “This is the woman whose voice you had 
heard and taken pleasure from. Your hearing of her voice is the same as 
seeing her vagina [my emphasis].244  
 
In this way, even within Sufi discourse the ideology of Islamic legal theory mediates 
the social relations among the sexes, whereby hearing the voice of an unrelated 
women indexes the possibility of unlawful or adulterous sexual relations between 
them.245  
On the question of the female voice, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the 
Shi‘ite cleric and revolutionary leader of the new Islamic Republic stated that, “the 
conversation of a women with a man in a provocative manner, the mellowing down 
of her expression, the softening of her talk, and the prettifying of her voice so that a 
heart-sick person is enticed is Haram [forbidden].”246 Indeed, unrelated men must 
                                                        
242 L. Clark, ‘Hijab According to the Hadith: Text and Interpretation’, in The Muslim 
Veil in North America, ed. S.S. Alavi, H. Hoodfar, & S. McDonough, pp. 214-286 
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246 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Resaleh-ye novin [New treatise], trans. ʻAbdul 
Karim Baizar-e Shirazi (Tehran: Ketab, 1982), 69. For a discussion of the 
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make themselves known by their voice before entering a home, so that women in the 
house will have a chance to arrange the mise-en-scène before the male gaze. As 
Naficy puts it, “A woman must not only veil her body from unrelated men but also 
her voice. The veiling of the voice involves using formal language with unrelated 
males (and females), a decorous tone of voice, and the avoidance of emotional 
expressions such as singing or boisterous laughter, although grief or anger are 
allowed.”247 It is clear that the female voice, beyond expressions of grief or anger, is 
considered to possess a seductive power to sexually arouse the (heterosexual) male 
subject. 
A traditional method for women to veil their voices in Iran was for a woman 
to distort her voice. For instance, when an unrelated man would knock at the door of 
the house (in many old traditional houses in Iran there were two separate doors with 
separate gate handles for women and men, whence knocking at the appropriate gate 
handle for men would alert the women inside that a man is at the door), she could 
distort her voice by placing her index finger in the side of her mouth and pull it while 
speaking with the unrelated man outside. An allusion to this practice is described by 
the Babi feminist Sadigheh Dawlatabadi (1882-1961),248 in an article called, The 
Return of the Veil, she writes, “For instance, previously it was said if a virtuous 
woman was obliged to talk to a man, she should curl her tongue like a nut, so her 
voice would not sound alluring or attractive and be the cause of corruption. This is 
foolish.”249  
This distorting of the female voice is operative in Iranian cinema often 
through the distortion of the female singing voice. This changing of the female 
singing voice is rendered palpable in Ali Hatami’s film, Delshodegan (The Love-
Stricken, Iran, 1992), in which a group of Persian classical musicians in the Qajar era 
                                                        
proscription on the female voice, see Farzaneh Milani, Veils and Words: The 
Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1992), 48–52. 
247 Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema Vol. 4, 104.  
248 See Farzin Vejdani, Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print 
Culture (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 104. In this 
connection Vejdani states, “opponents of the women’s movement accused many 
feminists of being irreligious, atheistic, or Babi. The specter of being labeled Babi—a 
term made synonymous with heresy—haunted pioneering women journalists and 
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249 Lloyd Ridgeon, Religion and Politics in Modern Iran: A Reader (London/New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2005) 82. 
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go abroad to make a recording of their music on a gramophone. The composer 
Hossein Alizadeh (b. 1951), who composed the score for the film, “used the wordless 
voice of Sudabeh Salem (b. 1954), a pre-revolution soprano singer, to create a 
powerful nostalgic effect.”250 In this precise way, Salem’s voice was distorted 
through a heteroglossia of voices in a wordless song of inarticulate speech.  
Another form of veiling the female voice is to literally have the veil (chador) 
lifted before the face as a protective screen whilst speaking to unrelated men. This 
image of veiling the female voice is perfectly exemplified in Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s 
film, Nun va goldun (A Moment of Innocence, 1996), when in the last iconic freeze-
frame shot at the end of the film, the young girl (Maryam Mohamadamini) lifts her 
veil like a screen/curtain to cover her face and thereby her voice (Figure 2.1), while 
asking the young policeman the time. In post-revolutionary Iranian cinema therefore, 
the gender of the voice is significant, since the female voice is conceived as part of a 
woman’s private body parts, it must be veiled or concealed from unrelated men, but 





Figure 2.1 Veiling the voice in A Moment of Innocence. 
                                                        
250 Parmis Mozafari, “Carving a Space for Female Solo Singing in Post-revolution 
Iran,” in Resistance in Contemporary Middle Eastern Cultures: Literature, Cinema 
and Music 
edited by Karima Laachir, Saeed Talajooy (New York/London: Routledge, 2013), 
265. Mozafari notes that since there is a ban on female solo singing in Iran to this 
day, there are 5 ways in which female singing is staged in post-revolutionary Iran: 1) 
singing in choruses, 2) singing along with a second or third voice, 3) Singing in a 
changed voice, 4) singing in private gatherings inside houses, 5) singing in female-
only performances in music halls. 
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As mentioned earlier, at the origin of the acousmatic voice is the figure of 
Pythagoras, who spoke to his disciples from “behind a curtain.” This act of speaking 
from behind a curtain, recalls a similar event at the dawn of Iranian modernity, when 
the female Babi poet, philosopher and mystic Tahirih Qurat al-‘Ayn (d. 1852),251 like 
an acousmêtre hidden behind a curtain, would speak to a band of her fellow disciples, 
until eventually she enacted the paradigmatic traumatic event in early modern Iranian 
history: unveiling herself before a male audience. She was officially the first Iranian 
woman to have at once de-acousmatized the female voice and to have removed her 
face veil – a double act of unveiling voice and vision. This is why, as Farzaneh 
Milani has so perceptively noted, she had to be silenced by the Qajar State and the 
Shi’ite clerical establishment, so she was strangled to death (which as Milani reminds 
us, khafeh kardan in Persian also means “suppressing, stifling and silencing” the 
voice).252 Indeed, one of the iconic images of the New Iranian cinema that may well 
allude to her act of unveiling, as well as the unveiling of her voice or de-
acousmatization occurs in Bahram Bayzaie’s film Bashu, gharibe-ye koochak 
(Bashu, The Little Stranger, Iran, 1988). In the scene, the camera turns to an empty 
space within a field, and the female lead Na’i (Susan Taslimi) suddenly rises into the 
frame, holding a veil before her head and mouth, and directly looks into the camera. 
Naficy describes this historical moment in the New Iranian cinema thus, “With this 
one shot, which draws attention to the alluring possibilities of unveiled vision . . . 
[Bayza’i] breaks years of entrapment of films by rules of modesty.”253 But, this 
iconic shot draws our attention to another phenomenon, the alluring possibility of the 
unveiled voice, the revelation of the female voice, which may be termed vocophany. 
In this dramatic moment, it is as if Na’i is about to rend the veil asunder from before 
her hair and mouth (unveiling of the voice), an image that indexes the revolutionary 
act of Tahirih Qurat al-‘Ayn a century earlier: the de-acousmatization of the female 
voice (Figure 2.2).254 
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Figure 2.2 The image of Na’i indexing both Tahirih’s act of unveiling, as well as the 
female divinity of the voice Vac/Vak/Vach/Vaq in Bahram Bayzaei’s Bashu, The 
Little Stranger. 
 
In many of the cinematic works of Bahram Beyzaie, the leading female 
character(s) are represented through several different codes, often gesturing towards 
aspects of Iranian cosmogonic or creation myths. One such symbol or code 
structuring his strong female characters is the myth of the Speaking Tree mentioned 
in the Shahnameh or Epic of the Kings, and which in the more ancient Indo-Iranian 
tradition is called Vac/Vak, Vach or Vaq. Vac is the female divinity or goddess (izad 
banoo) of the word, speech, or voice and is related to the theme of creation, fertility 
and life.255 Indeed, Na’i is perhaps one of the most vociferous and strong female 
heroines of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, and she is also symbolic of the female 
divinity Vac/Vak/Vach/Vaq, who later becomes synonymous with another female 
divinity in Iran, Anahita.256 Her name itself is related to the voice, to breath, since 
                                                        
See “In Memory of Amin Banani: A life in letters and Iranian Studies.” Available 
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0cwmoxKV50. Beyzaie’s talk is at the 
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such as, Gharibeh va meh (Stranger and the Fog, 1976), Cherike-ye Tara (Ballad of 
Tara, 1979), Shayad Vaghti digar (Maybe Some Other Time, 1988), Qali-ye 
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Na’i gestures to the sound of the human voice, and refers specifically to one who 
breaths into the reed-flute (ney), namely the reed-player (na’i). In this sense, the 
female divinity of the voice symbolically embodied in many of the female characters 
in Beyzaie’s cinema, completely shatter the entire effort of the censors to veil over 
the female voice and hence female identity and agency.257 
Apropos the singing female voice, Bahman Ghobadi’s mesmerizing 
Niwemang (Half Moon, Austria/France/Iran/Iraq, 2006) is a resounding critique of 
the proscription on female singing in and outside the cinematic screen. The film was 
banned in Iran and has never been allowed screening in the country. The film 
critiques the restriction imposed by the Islamic Republic on solo female singing, 
through directly staging a female character named Hesho (Hedieh Tehrani), who is 
said to have a “celestial voice”, to sing in the film.  An elderly Kurdish musician, 
Mamo (Ismail Ghaffari), who has been invited to Iraqi Kurdistan to give a concert, is 
intent upon bringing the female singer Hesho for the concert, where she has been 
exiled to a village along with 1,334 women singers who were consigned there as 
punishment for their public singing in the past. In a remarkable scene, Hesho is seen 
off by many of the women, who all gather around her and line up on rooftops singing 
(although the female voices are extra-digetic) and playing the daf (a sacred hand 
drum for the Kurds), whilst she leaves with Mamo. Then comes the scene which is 
one of the most beautiful moments of the liberation of the female singing voice in 
post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, where Hesho sings a solo piece in a practice 
session, and the verse of the Kurdish love-song that she sings signifies all too well the 
plight of these women: “the heart of the world is full of joy/ but only my heart is 
filled with sorrow.” In the end, the problem is how to conceal Hesho from the Iranian 
authorities at the border, but they discover her in the bus and take her back to the 
village. 
Through a short-circuiting reading, one of the paradoxes that comes to light is 
that the Lacanian theory of the female voice has certain correspondences with the 
Islamic theory of the female voice, in which at least for some men, the female voice 
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257 For a different reading of Beyzaie’s cinema, see Negar Mottahedeh, “Bahram 
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may act as the cause of their desire. As Bruce Fink notes, “In the case of certain men 
it is a woman’s voice that is of primary importance; it is not so much what she says as 
the way in which she says it, the tone and timber of her voice, that arouses their 
desire.”258 The difference between the psychoanalytic theory of the female voice vs. 
the Islamic theory however is that in the Islamic context it is universalized to all men, 
rather than being confined to certain men. In her discussion of sexuality within a 
Muslim framework, Fatima Mernissi has argued that the eye “is undoubtedly an 
erogenous zone.”259 Indeed, in Islamic jurisprudence the ear is an erogenous zone as 
well. According to some compendia of Islamic jurisprudence, ‘“aural adultery’ (zina 
al-udhuni) was considered a constant danger even where the veil impeded ‘visual 
adultery’ (zina al-‘ayni).”260 Indeed, for Lacan the ear also functions as an erogenous 
zone, which forms part of the invocatory drive that is related to sexual desire. (Lacan 
identifies four partial drives, the oral, anal, scopic, and invocatory). According to the 
logic of an Islamic theory of the voice, therefore, there is always a erotic surplus in 
the female voice that must be veiled or contained through various means, so that the 
full disclosure of the voice in all its erotic dimensions may be veiled from the male 
ear on screen, or the male spectator in the cinema. In this sense, the soft and sonorous 
timber associated with the female voice acts as an exposed private bodily part that is 
thought to be the cause of men’s desire.  
In order to delimit the eros of the gaze in Iranian cinema, the voice is often 
foregrounded. But according to the above theory, the voice itself is filled with eros: 
the attempt to contain it backfires, and the voice retains its erotic surplus. This is one 
of the central concerns of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema: how to de-eroticize the 
female voice. But of course such a procedure of censoring, veiling or containing the 
voice (and gaze) is impossible, as there is always an indivisible remainder (to borrow 
a phrase from Žižek), a surplus in the voice that resists de-eroticization. This is the 
voice as objet petit a or object-cause of desire. Indeed, the more you focus on the 
erotic potentiality of the voice (and the gaze), by trying to erase it or to efface all 
traces of eroticism in it, the more it escapes your grasp, remaining ever elusive and 
                                                        
258 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
92. 
259 Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, 141. 
260 Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, 39; also see H. E. Chehabi, “Voices Unveiled: 
Women Singers in Iran,” in Iran and Beyond edited by Rudi Matthee and Beth Baron 
(Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2000) 151.  
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uncontainable – the over avoidance itself thus draws more attention to the voice and 
foregrounds it as the object-cause of desire. 
The proper theoretical question to be asked here then is: what is the 
appropriate mode of aurality in an Islamic theory of the female voice? Indeed, the 
paradox is that the ideal mode of hearing the female voice in Islamic voice-theory 
would be the acousmatic voice: to hear the voice without the source of its origin, 
namely the female body, and to have the body properly veiled from the visual field of 
the male spectator. In this precise sense, the female voice would be rendered 
acousmatic and hence religiously acceptable. But of course the problem is that the 
acousmatic voice, this voice without a body, can still function as a love-object and 
hence become the object-cause of desire. Moreover, according to Silverman and 
Doane, the voice whose source is invisible is more powerful than the embodied 
voice: it seeps into the extra-diegetic register, where it is free to roam in the 
enunciative space of the text. According to their arguments, in classical cinema, male 
voices tend to be given greater liberty: they are permitted to narrate, to be detached 
from the body, to emanate from off-screen spaces. Female voices, by contrast, tend to 
be synched up and confined to the bodies from whence they emanate. Fascinatingly, 
in certain examples of Iranian cinema, this paradigm is reversed: the mandate to veil 
the female body results in her voice occupying an acousmatic, “off-screen” space 
normally reserved for male characters.  In this sense, as it will be seen in the two 
filmic examples below, the acousmatic voice is deployed to subvert and destabilize 
the modesty system’s injunction of veiling the female voice by rendering acousmatic 
the male voice, and by turning the voice into an object, a love-object that sets off 
desire. 
 
2.3 The Acousmatic Voice in Gabbeh 
 
Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s film, Gabbeh (1996), is perhaps one of the most well known 
art-house films produced after the revolution in Iran (co-produced by a French 
production company MK2), and is representative of the colorful visual poetics and 
aesthetics associated with post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. Occupying as it does 
the middle period of Makhmalbaf’s cinematic career, Gabbeh was the last film he 
made in Iran before becoming a diasporic and exilic director. At first, Makhmalbaf 
had intended to make a documentary film of the Qashqa’i nomads in Iran, and the 
 90 
weaving practices of their colorful gabbeh rugs, but in the process he came to settle 
on a fiction film. 
Gabbeh is ostensibly a tale about a young nomadic girl of the Qashqa’i tribe 
in Iran who is in love with a youthful lover on horseback, and who is prevented from 
forming a union with him by her possessive tribal father. The frame narrative of the 
film begins with an elderly couple, who are bickering about which one of them will 
wash their gabbeh, a carpet that is weaved by the Qashqa’i tribes women, and which 
contains the narrative love story of the couple. Then through the technique of magic 
realism, from the rug/gabbeh, a girl, called Gabbeh (Shaghayegh Djodat) magically 
materializes from the rug. The girl as the rug-gabbeh begins to tell the narrative 
history of her family to the elderly couple and how she came to love a stranger on 
horseback. In the film one of the obstacles to Gabbeh’s union with her young lover 
on horseback is her father and her uncle’s arrival and search to find a bride. As the 
story unfolds we slowly come to realize that the young girl Gabbeh, who is 
narrativizing the tale, is in fact the elderly woman, and the elderly man, is her 
youthful lover on horseback. The narrative temporalities in the film are not presented 
in a chronological order, of past, present and future, but are weaved together like the 
wool and spool of the gabbeh rug, in which the past, present and future are 
simultaneously occurring in a timeless present.  
The first thing to be noted at the outset is the gabbeh carpet on which the 
figure of Gabbeh appears is the same type of Qashqa’i carpet that adorns Freud’s 
famous couch, the couch being synonymous with psychoanalysis itself (Figure 2.3). 
The psychoanalytic connection between the carpet on Freud’s couch and the gabbeh 
carpet is a fortuitous conjunction, as Gabbeh who materializes on the carpet precisely 
begins to talk and narrate her story, and psychoanalysis was called “the talking cure” 
by the first female patient Anna O who went into analysis with Freud. Gabbeh 
narrates her troubled love story, with the figure of the father functioning as the 
ultimate obstacle to the erotic relationship between her and the lover on horseback. 
This image is not incidental as a woman appearing on the rug (or couch) also evokes 
the image of Shahrazad in the frame narrative of The Thousand and One Nights, 
which was based on a Middle Persian or Pahlavi original from the pre-Islamic 
Sasanian period called, A Thousand Tales (Hezar Afsan), that is now lost. There is a 
profound link between Shahrazad and the female voice in Iranian mytho-poetic 
textual universe, in which the figure of Shahrazad is related to the old indo- Iranian 
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goddess of the voice and speech, namely Vac (mentioned above). 261 In her excellent 
essay, “Freud’s Couch: A Case History”, Marina Warner refers to the film Gabbeh 
and notes the psychoanalytic connection to the carpet on Freud’s couch and to 
Shahrzad,262 but although she evokes the figure of Shahrazad in this connection, she 
is unaware of the link between Shahrazad and the ancient Iranian female divinity of 
the voice, Vac.263 Warner also recalls incorrectly the detail of the appearance of 
Gabbeh and states, “… she appears, stepping out of the stream…”264 whereas 
Makhmalbaf had her appear from the gabbeh itself in a magic realist turn, in order to 
establish a connection between the two. 
 
                                                        
261 Shahrazad who speaks at night and tells stories to her husband King Shahriyar in 
the frame story of The Thousand and One Nights, with her sister Dinazad or Dinarzad 
are in fact the two sisters mentioned in ancient Iranian sources, Sanghavak and 
Arenavak. The two sisters appear in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh as Shahrnaz and Arnavaz 
in the mythic section of the story of Zahak, but they are derived from the much older 
Zoroastrian Avesta in relation to the myth of Yima (Jamshid) and Azhi Dahaka 
(Zahak), where they are called: Sanghavak and Arenavak. Note both names end with 
Vak the female divinity of the voice. See Beyzaie, Hezar Afsan Kojast?, 211-234.  
262 Marina Warner, “Freud's Couch: A Case History,” Raritan, 31 (2), (2011). pp. 
146-163. See also, Nathan Kravis, On the Couch: A Repressed History of the Analytic 
Couch from Plato to Freud (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2017). In Kravi’s 
otherwise fine book, the Iranian mytho-history related to the carpet and the couch and 
its connection to the female voice still remains “repressed.” For the complex history 
of the entanglement of Persian carpets as a national commodity in the transnational 
circuitry see, Minoo Moallem, Persian Carpets: The Nation as a Transnational 
Commodity (London/New York: Routledge, 2018).  
263 Warner is fascinated by the frame story of Shahrazad in The Thousand and One 
Nights, and its relation to the female voice and story telling and has dedicated an 
entire book in exploring it, but since she does not read Persian, she has not been able 
to uncover the genealogy of Shahrazad back to the Shahnameh and ancient 
Zoroastrian sources, that I have briefly gestured to here. See Marina Warner, 
Stranger Magic: Charmed States and the Arabian Nights (Boston: The Belknap 
Press/Harvard University Press, 2012). 
264 Warner, “Freud’s Couch,” 154. 
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Figure 2.3 The Persian gabbeh carpet on Freud’s couch at his home in London. 
Courtesy of the Freud Museum London. 
 
In one of the first scenes of the film, Gabbeh is shown in a mid close-up shot centered 
within the frame, with her back to the camera (with a mise-en-scène of a gabbeh 
behind her), where through the sound of a wolf-like howling voice off-screen, she 
turns around to face the camera. Though at first glance it looks as though she is 
directly gazing at the camera and hence the spectator, yet upon a closer look we can 
see that her gaze is directed off-screen (which in film studies is called, a look of 
outward regard) towards the direction of the wolf’s howling voice outside the frame. 
In the dominant cinema (i.e., Hollywood), such a shot anticipates an eye-line shot of 
what she sees, but in the New Iranian cinema this formal procedure is absent due to 
the proscription on the exchange of glances between male/female couples. Here, the 
logic of the averted gaze of the modesty system is operative within the frame, and 
therefore her gaze does not visually address the spectators sitting in the theater. In 
this precise sense, the close-up shot does not allow the direct gaze or the taking 
pleasure of looking, or the activation of scopophilia in the spectator, by not 
constituting the spectator as the subject of Gabbeh’s gaze. This forecloses the 
possibility of the direct relay of looks between the characters (Gabbeh and the 
offscreen lover), as well as Gabbeh and the spectator. The formal structure of the 
scene ensures that the spectator is not sutured into the diegesis. In this way the 
desiring gaze of Gabbeh is directed towards elsewhere, towards the absent body of 
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her youthful lover (almost always shot off-screen), but more precisely to the voice, 
the voice without a body.    
As discussed earlier the voice without a body is what Chion calls, acousmêtre, 
or what Doane has called voice-off, and Silverman the disembodied voice. This voice 
without a body, or a bodiless voice, in which the voice of a character is off-screen 
detached from a particular body, is often operative within Iranian cinema as a way to 
circumvent showing bodies, especially female bodies, in erotic configurations. This 
phantom like voice without a body in Gabbeh, is exemplified by the howling voice of 
the youthful lover. In the film there is a partial de-acousmatization or embodiment of 
the voice of the youthful lover. Since even though we see the body of the young 
horse riding lover often in a long shot or very long shot, we never see him speak or 
make the howling sound, but only see parts of his body such as his hands; hence he 
formally remains a partial acousmêtre. On the other hand, the young horse riding 
lover’s voice without a body, acts to subvert the logic of veiling female voices and 
bodies on screen, since representing the acousmatic male voice without a body, 
critiques the foregrounding of the male subject as the privileged site of subjectivity.  
In Gabbeh, the voice further acts as an erotic signifier, and becomes a love-
object, since the body of the young lover cannot be displayed erotically on screen 
with Gabbeh. In this way, the acousmatic voice of the youthful lover fills in the erotic 
void created by the censors. For Lacan, the voice as objet petit a acts as a part-object, 
which sets off desire through the distortion of the aural field. In Gabbeh, the howling 
voice of the youthful lover, is precisely the Lacanian partial object or objet petit a. 
There is within the voice an inflection that eludes the empirical dimension, which 
transforms it from an everyday object into the object-cause of desire, thereby 
eroticizing the aural field. This is parallel to the gaze of Gabbeh towards the howling 
voice – a gaze distorted by desire in the visual field. It is as it were, the very 
cinematic texture of the screen points to an uncanny observation: it is not the body or 
person of the youthful lover that is desired by Gabbeh, but rather it is as it were the 
voice itself – it is the voice that sets off her desire, or in Lacanian terms, it is the 
voice that acts as the object-cause of her desire. In one early scene of the film this is 
narratively enunciated by Gabbeh, who states, “I fell in love with a horseman, with a 
strange voice, with an illusion, that like a shadow, followed our tribe to take me 
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away.” Thus the wolf-like howling voice without a body or acousmatic voice of the 
youthful lover is literally the love-object for Gabbeh.265   
Apropos the voice in the film, there is a structural parallel between the voice 
of the youthful lover, and the voice of the future bride of Gabbeh’s uncle. In an 
important scene set by the stream, we follow Gabbeh’s uncle who the night before 
has had a dream of a canary by the stream, and now is following the acousmatic 
voice of a girl singing a Turkish poem offscreen. The uncle follows the acousmatic 
voice to the stream and discovers the daughter of Alladad, who is singing a poem that 
she composed the night before, the “singing canary by the stream.” Here, unlike the 
voice of Gabbeh’s young lover on horseback, the voice of Alladad’s daughter 
becomes de-accousmatized and becomes attached to a specific body. In this precise 
sense, Alldad’s daughter through her voice and poetry becomes the canary of the 
uncle’s dreams, whereby he asks for her hand in marriage. The acousmatic voice of 
the young lover on horseback also contains a poetic secret, which Gabbeh states in an 
earlier scene of the film in which the elder Gabbeh asks the younger Gabbeh why his 
voice sounds like the howl of a wolf, and she states “it’s a secret between him and 
me,” and provides the meaning in the coded message of the voice, which in a more 
complete translation from the Persian states: “I’ve gone mad from love’s desire/ I’ve 
become restless, why don’t you come?” (Figure 2.4) The acousmatic voice of the 
youthful lover, typified by the howling voice which often acts as the partial 
acousmêtre is literally the love-object for Gabbeh, as it is always to this haunting 
wolf-howl that her desiring gaze is directed.  
Indeed, it is not incidental that the voice of the youthful lover is properly not a 
male voice, it is rather the voice of a wolf, which is striped of its human dimension, 
and hence its erotically charged potential. The same goes for the voice of Aladad’s 
daughter whose voice is symbolically substituted with the voice of a canary. This is 
precisely why the singing voice of Alladad’s daughter is heard off-screen, without 
showing her singing the song. Her singing voice remains acousmatic and does not 
become de-acousmatized by showing her face and mouth as she sings. In this precise 
                                                        
265 For another reading of Gabbeh largely from feminist gaze theory of the 70s, see 
Negar Mottahedeh “‘Life Is Color!’ Toward a Transnational Feminist Analysis of 
Mohsen Makhmalbaf’s Gabbeh”, Signs, no. 30, 2004, pp. 1403-1428; cf. 
Mottahedeh, Displaced Allegories, 157-168.  
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sense both voices are deprived of their human dimension by taking on animal form, 
and thereby stripped of their capacity to signify an erotic dimension. Such a 
transformation of their voices is an attempt to contain the voice in all its erotic 
ambiguity. 
At the end of the film, the voice in all its radical ambiguity is narratively 
foregrounded as the site of libidinal investment and the love-object par excellence. In 
the very last scenes of the film, Gabbeh’s voice over narration states, “my father had 
not killed us, but it was rumored everywhere that he had. So that from now on, my 
sisters may not lose their heart and religion by the voice of a howling wolf. That is 
why, since 40 years on, no one has heard, from any spring, the song of a canary” 
[emphasis mine]. In this precise sense, the two voices – the howling wolf like voice 
of the young lover on horseback and Alladad’s daughter – are intimately linked 
within the filmic text, and their signification as the site of erotic desire or as the love-
object are narratively enunciated, just as they were enunciated within the formal 
















2.4 The Acousmêtre in The May Lady  
 
Rakhshan Bani-Etemad is perhaps one of Iran’s most celebrated post-revolutionary 
female directors (along with Samira Makhmalbaf and Tahmineh Milani), who started 
her career as a documentary filmmaker in the mid 1980s. She has won many 
international awards and accolades around the world for her films, the most recent of 
which was Tales (Ghesse-ha, 2014), for which she was awarded the best screenplay 
at the 71st Venice International Film Festival, with long time writer-collaborator Farid 
Mostafavi. 
Bani-Etemad’s The May Lady (Banoo-ye Ordibehesht, 1997/8) is the story of 
a female documentary filmmaker Forough Kia (Minoo Farshchi) – her first name is a 
clear allusion to the female Iranian poet Forough Farrokhzad266 – a divorced single 
mother in her early forties, who lives with her teenage son Mani (Mani Kasraiyan). 
While pursuing her career, and raising her rebellious teenage son, she has a romantic 
relationship with a man with whom she is not married, despite her sons dislike for the 
man. While working on a documentary commissioned by television on the lives of 
bereaved mothers who have lost their husbands and sons to the Iran-Iraq war, the film 
ruminates – in a self-reflexive move both through the digetic documentary and the 
narrative fiction – on the theme of the societal expectations on what it means to be a 
mother in Iran, and on the trials and tribulations of a single mother who longs for 
love and intimacy, but who is denied them by the superego injunctions of Iranian 
society, where what it means to be a “good” mother is to remain single interminably 
(after being widowed or divorced). 
But, how is this love relationship between Forough and her lover staged in the 
film? Given the restrictions of the censorship codes imposed on directors in post-
revolutionary Iran, especially on staging intimacy between a woman and an unrelated 
man on screen, how is the liaison between Forough and her lover represented? In a 
word: through the voice, or more precisely by turning him into a complete 
acousmêtre, an acousmatic being present in the diegesis only through the voice. As 
Chion states, “When an acousmatic presence consists of a voice – and above all when 
                                                        
266 See Hamid Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, 4 Volumes. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012), 161; also Gönül Dönmez-Colin, Cinemas of the Other: 
A Personal Journey with Film-Makers from the Middle East and Central Asia 
(Bristol: Intellect, 2006) 20. 
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that voice has not been visualized, and one cannot therefore yet put a face to it – one 
is dealing with a being of a particular sort, a kind of talking, acting shadow, which I 
have named acousmêtre – that is, an acousmatic being.”267 Therefore, by rendering 
his voice acousmatic through the apparatus of the telephone, Banietemad is able to 
circumvent the censors and deploy a subtle critique of veiling the female voice in 
Iranian cinema. Hamid Naficy, in his brief analysis of the film notes the unique uses 
of the voice in The May Lady and states, “One of the narrative innovations [of The 
May Lady] is the way the male lover is simultaneously both effaced and inscribed in 
the film by means of a complex game of veiling and unveiling as well as voicing and 
unvoicing. He is visually absent from the entire film, but he is simultaneously present 
throughout by the epistolary means of telephone, letters, and voice-over poetry.”268 
Yet again, we encounter the acousmatic: the theoretical term for what Banietemad 
has technically achieved with the male lover’s voice here is the acousmêtre.  
Throughout the film, the body of the male lover remains off-screen, absent 
from the spectator’s visual field but ever present through his acousmatic voice, heard 
only through the telephone, the answering machine, and the apartment buzzer – never 
becoming embodied or de-acousmatized. The acousmatic dimension of the voice has 
been deployed in cinema through the telephone in the past. Films such as When a 
Stranger Calls (Fred Walton, 1979), exemplify the use of the telephone as a device 
for the acousmatization of the voice.269 But, what these filmic examples bring to the 
fore again is the uncanny dimension of the acousmatic voice in cinema, whereas with 
The May Lady, it is not so much the uncanny aspect of the accousmatic voice that is 
staged (though this is not completely absent), but it’s ability to become the love 
object, the voice as objet petit a. In this instance the telephone as “technology is a 
catalizer, it enlarges and enhances something which is already here”270 – the voice as 
partial object. Indeed, in The May Lady, the telephone is deployed as a technology to 
                                                        
267 Michel Chion, “The Impossible Embodiment,” in Everything You Always Wanted 
to Know About Lacan, but Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock, ed. Slavoj Žižek 
(London/New York: Verso, 1992), n1 206.  
268 Hamid Naficy, “Veiled Voice and Vision in Iranian Cinema: The Evolution of 
Rakhshan Banietemad’s Films,” SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer 
2000), 572; cf. Naficy, A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Volume 4, 160.   
269 Dolar, A Voice and Nothing More, 66. 
270 Mladen Dolar, “Telephone and Psychoanalysis,” Filozofski Vestnik, Vol. 29, No. 1 
(2008), p.12, quoted in Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of 
Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012), 674. 
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foreground the male lover’s voice as an erotic signifier or signifier of desire. The 
lover’s voice as acousmêtre becomes a love-object for Forough, since the body of the 
two lovers cannot be displayed erotically on screen, the accousmatic voice of the 
lover and Forough’s conversations with him fills in the erotic void created by the 
censors.  
In one scene while Forough is conversing over the phone with her lover, there 
is a subtle overlaying of her voice onto his acousmatic voice. As the male lover reads 
one of his love letters, her voice becomes superimposed onto his voice. It’s as though 
the merging and fusion of their voices on top of each other simulates the act of love 
making, since their bodies cannot be displayed laying on each other in an erotic 
embrace, it is their voices that merge and unite in place of their bodies. As Naficy 
puts it, “These interweaving male and female voices symbolically substitute for the 
desired but dreaded – because outlawed – physical contact between unmarried 
couples. By means of the verbal epistolary communications, they [Forough and Dr. 
Rahbar] are able to express their mutual love for one another and by means of voice 
fusion, they are able to become one vocally.”271 Hence the acousmatic voice acts as a 
substitute or proxy for intimacy that mediates between the two characters of Forough 
and Dr. Rahbar, since representing them physically on screen would not have been 
possible due to the censorship restrictions imposed by the system of modesty. Indeed, 
in an interview Banietimad was asked why she chose to have the lover remain 
invisible throughout the film and represented only as a voice, she responds, “The 
limitations we have in Iran in regards to showing realistic relations between opposite 
sexes determined my choice of the technique of the letter and the voice to display a 
much more natural relationship of love between a man and a woman.”272  
There is an intimate connection between the evocation of the telephonic voice 
in The May Lady and a poem by Forough Farrokhzad called, All That Remains is the 
Voice (Tanha seda-st keh mi-manad).273 Michael C. Hillmann in his book on her life 
and poetry renders the title of the poem as “It is Only Sound that Remains”274, but the 
problem with this rendering is that it occludes the sense in which the word ‘seda’, 
                                                        
271 Naficy, “Veiled Voice,” 572.  
272 Dönmez-Colin, Cinemas of the Other, 23. 
273 Forough Farrokhzad, Iman biavarim be aghaz-e faṣl-e sard [Let Us Believe in the 
Cold Season] (Tehran: Morvarid, 1963), 74–81. 
274 See Michael C. Hillman, A Lonely Woman: Forugh Farrokhzad and Her Poetry 
(Washington, DC: Mage, 1987), 160-162.  
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means both voice and sound, and in the context of the poem it is intended by 
Farrokhzad as the voice, the voice that reads her poems, the voice of poetry, her 
voice. We still have recordings of Farrokhzad’s recitation of her own poetry that she 
made for the radio. Indeed, others have also noted the allusion to Farrokhzad’s poem 
in relation to the foregrounding of the voice in The May Lady,275 but what is missing 
in such passing references is precisely the acousmatic dimension of the voice that is 
evoked here by Farrokhzad, since the voice that remains is an acousmatic voice, a 
disembodied voice, gesturing to her vocal recitations of her poetry that will remain in 
recordings on cassette tapes; a technology which precisely foregrounds the voice both 
in its acousmatic dimension and as the Lacanian object-voice.  
The long intimate telephone conversations throughout the film, between 
Forough and the male lover through the phone strangely recalls another phenomenon 
around which a whole industry was created (now largely waning), namely phone 
erotica. Before the advent of “sexting,” which has become the preferred mode of 
playing out sexual fantasies, it was the phone that served this purpose. To be precise, 
it was the voice, the acousmatic voice on the other side of the telephone line that 
enabled the listener to enact their fantasies. As Chion states apropos the acousmêtre, 
“A person you talk to on the phone, whom you've never seen, is an acousmêtre..”276 
The industry of phone erotica was precisely based on the logic of the acousmatic 
voice; it was founded on the assumption that the acousmatic voice can offset desire, 
and function as the fantasmatic support for erotic fantasies. In the absence of the 
body, it is the voice that fills in the fantasmatic void. The voice enters the fantasy 
frame as a partial object, becoming the object-cause of desire or objet petit a. In this 
sense, in The May Lady, the logic of the acousmatic voice functions as a fantasmatic 
support for Forough’s desire, as well as the spectator’s desire.  
This is precisely why the acousmatic voice that is never de-acousmatized 
holds a certain power of fascination, and takes on an uncanny dimension. Indeed, the 
acousmatic voice of the male lover, Dr. Rahbar, holds this power of fascination for 
the viewer, and causes the viewer’s desire; the spectator desires to see the source of 
                                                        
275 Sheila Whitaker writes, “Safari refers to the use of the telephone as having ‘… 
echoes of a well-known poem by Farrokhzad, All That Remains is the Voice.” Sheila 
Whitaker, “Rakhshan Bani-Etemad,” in Rose Issa and Sheila Whitaker, Life and Art: 
The New Iranian Cinema (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 72. 
276 Chion, The Voice in Cinema, 21. 
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the voice, which forever remains obscured and haunts the surface of the screen. This 
is the voice as the objet petit a, which detached from its origin becomes a partial 
object, and thereby the love object. In this way, the viewer’s desire is implicated, 
since the viewer also fantasizes about the absent source of the acousmêtre.  
There is an Oedipal imbroglio between the mother and the son in the film that 
is operative at the level of the mother’s voice – the maternal voice. Since one of the 
central motifs of the film is the role of the mother, there is a fascinating correlation 
between the mother’s voice and the libidinal economy of the son, since the primordial 
acousmatic voice is precisely the maternal voice. As Dolar states, “‘the mother of all 
acousmatic voices’ is precisely the mother’s voice, by definition the acousmatic voice 
par excellence, the voice whose source the infant cannot see—his tie with the world, 
his umbilical cord, his prison, his light.”277 Indeed, the threat that Dr. Rahbar poses to 
Mani therefore is the loss of the maternal object signified through the mother’s voice, 
the maternal object-voice to which he is libidinally attached. It is as if the son’s 
(Mani) jealousy of the lover (Dr. Rahbar) is located at the level of the mother’s voice 
as the object-cause of desire (objet petit a), since through the telephonic apparatus, it 
is the lover who has access to the mother’s acousmatic voice, which acts not only as 
an object-cause of desire for Dr. Rabar but more primordially for the son, since in the 
matrix of the womb it is the mother’s voice that was the first sonorous envelope that 
enfolded him and provided him with auditory pleasure. Therefore, the libidinal threat 
that Dr. Rahabar poses to Mani is in possessing the maternal voice, or more precisely 
the mother’s acousmatic voice.  
In one particular scene, the son’s libidinal attachment to the maternal voice is 
clearly indicated. While Forough is having dinner with her son, she reprimands him 
for falling asleep in school for staying up and watching films late at night stating, 
“now go ahead again and watch films every night. I should take your hand by force at 
8 pm every night, as I used to do when you were a child, and recount to you so many 
stories until you would fall asleep.” At this moment, in a reverse-shot while looking 
at her Mani says, “you had several phone calls,” alluding to Dr. Rahbar. It is 
precisely at the moment of the significance of the voice, in her narrating stories to 
him before falling sleep as a child that he looks at her with a sense of longing and 
despondency indicating that someone else is now the recipient of the auditory 
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pleasure of her voice, the mother’s lover. In an interview Banietemad was asked 
about the relationship between the mother and son in the film and its almost sensual 
dimension, which the interviewer describes as “very Oedipal...”278 Banietimad 
effectively confirms her sentiment and states, “Naturally, the relationship between the 
lone boy and the mother has a specific form as well as a broader definition. Apart 
from all these definitions, such relationships endure specific qualifications of our 
society. For instance, [Iranian] men are very sensitive in issues regarding their 
women, wives or mothers. The boy has such feelings. We can also name it Oedipus 
complex as a psychological issue” [emphasis added].279 Here Banietemad herself 
endorses an Oedipal scenario in the relationship between the mother and son. 
Finally, in the pure texture of the film not only does the male lover’s voice 
remain acousmatic for the viewer, but crucially, from the viewer’s perspective 
Forough’s voice is effectively acousmatized for the male lover. Since at the level of 
the diegetic reality of the film, what we see is that the lover only hears the voice of 
Forough but never sees her (regardless of the offscreen implication that they would 
meet, etc.), therefore in this way, her voice is an acousmatic voice for him, though it 
is de-acousmatized for the extradiegetic look/hearing of the spectator. The subtle 
point to be noted here is that by the lover (Dr. Rahbar) being always off-screen with 
only an acousmatic voice, what we get is the formal requirements of the Islamic 
theory of the voice, in which the female voice should ideally be heard through a veil, 
a screen, or an obstacle; and in the film this is effectively accomplished through the 
apparatus of the telephone, which acts as a veil that covers over Forough’s voice and 




This chapter has provided a new theorization of the unique structure of the voice 
operative in the New Iranian Cinema through what the film sound theorist Michel 
Chion calls the acousmêtre, or the acousmatic voice. By bringing together Chion, 
Lacan, and feminist film theory, the chapter analyzed the acousmatization of the male 
voice in Gabbeh and Banoo-ye ordibehesht (The May Lady). A close examination of 
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Islamic, especially Shiʻi legal theories of the voice were highlighted that impose 
restrictions on the female voice which was considered part of a woman’s ʻawra, or 
parts of her private body that are deemed shameful and should be veiled or concealed 
before unrelated men because of their seductive powers to sexually arouse the 
(heterosexual) male subject. I argued that Gabbeh and The May Lady deploy the 
acousmatic voice to subvert the logic of veiling the female voice (through the 
acousmatization of the male voice) and also to circumvent the prohibitions imposed 
on staging male-female erotic configurations on-screen. The chapter contributes to 
psychoanalytic film theory, and feminist film theory in particular, by demonstrating 
how New Iranian Cinema, largely owing to the Shiʻite logic of the veil or system of 
modesty, reverses the structure of the voice in classical Hollywood cinema, in which 
the female voice is often synched up to the body while the disembodied voice (i.e., 
the acousmatic voice and voice-off) is almost always male. 
Gabbeh and The May Lady represent two unique examples within the New 
Iranian cinema in which the acousmatic voice is creatively deployed in order to 
bypass the censorship restrictions imposed on filmmakers in Iran in representing 
heterosexual desire. The deployment of the acousmatic voice in Iranian cinema, as 
these filmic examples demonstrate, has a political and counter ideological dimension, 
in which filmmakers can mobilize the acousmêtre as a form of resistance and 
subversion of the injunction to veil the female voice. In this sense, by rendering the 
male body invisible, the acousmatic voice in New Iranian cinema is able to critique 
the privileging of the male voice over the female voice, and thereby male desire over 
female desire, and ultimately masculinity over femininity. Therefore, to render the 
male voice acousmatic or to distort one into a wolf’s howl is to stage what is often 
done to the female voice in Iranian cinema and society at large. Such films indicate 
that an unveiled or de-acousmatized voice is the only proper way for a woman’s 
voice to be heard. But to deploy the acousmatic voice in this manner also stages 
another dimension of the voice, namely its potential as the Lacanian objet petit a or 
the object-cause of desire. Just as in an Islamic theory of the voice it is thought that a 
female voice is endowed with an erotic surplus, these two filmic examples 
demonstrate that the male voice can also be equally invested with an erotic 
dimension, which can act as the object-cause of desire for women. In this precise 
sense, by rendering the male voice acousmatic these films bring to the fore the very 
aspect of the female voice which the rules of modesty seek to minimize, namely its 
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ability to offset desire. In both films, by rendering the lover’s body invisible or 
placing him in the background, the voices of the lovers are foregrounded and act as 
the love-object for Forough and Gabbeh, who, in the final analysis, seem to be in love 
with “a voice and nothing more.”280  
  
                                                        
280 The title of Dolar’s book on the voice is based on a saying reported by Plutarch, 
“A man plucked a nightingale and, finding but little to eat, said: “You are just a voice 
and nothing more.” Plutarch, Moralia: Sayings of Spartans [Apophthegmata 





From Femininity to Masculinity and Back: The Feminine ‘No!’ in Daughters of 
the Sun  
 
In her groundbreaking book, Professing Selves: Transsexuality and same-sex desire 
in contemporary Iran, Afsaneh Najamabadi provides perhaps the most incisive 
analysis on transsexaulity and same-sex desire in modern Iran.281 Deploying an 
anthropological methodology as well as theories of gender and sexuality, Najamabadi 
problematizes the either/or logic that considers Iran either “as a transsexual 
paradise,”282 or as the place where “sex reassignment surgery (srs)…[is]… performed 
coercively on Iranian homosexuals.”283 In her analysis Najamabadi notes that 
Khomeini was in fact the first cleric to have issued a fatwa (legal opinion) on 
transsexuality and thereby inaugurated the whole complex of “legal, Islamic 
jurisprudential (fighi), and biomedical/psycho-sexological discourses,”284 of the state 
that categorize and partially subsidize sex reassignment surgery. Najamabadi’s 
analysis covers the historical changing relationship with transsexuality, the religio-
cultural categories of femininity and masculinity, the emergence of gay, lesbian, and 
feminist discourses of the 70s, the advent of the Iranian Revolution and its impact on, 
medical, political, and religious disputes. She also discusses the autobiographical 
lived lives of transsexuals narrating their own self-narratives, trans activism, and 
aspects of popular culture and media coverage. Najamabadi, however, does not take 
up the task of analyzing Iranian cinema or Iranian documentaries on the subject, and 
notes, “The international effect of these television and video documentaries [on 
transsexuality] obviously deserves more than one line noting their quantity, but this is 
not a task I take up in this book.”285 Indeed, there is an immense lacuna in the 
scholarship on the subject of transgender and same-sex desire in Iranian cinema.286 
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Roshanak Kheshti, “Cross-Dressing and Gender (Tres)Passing: The Transgender 
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Therein resides the theoretical need for a sustained analysis of the filmic texts that 
bear on these motifs in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. 
In this chapter, I will read Mariam Shahriar’s film Daughters of the 
Sun (Dokhtaran-e Khorshid, 2000), through the prism of the logic of the feminine 
‘No’ and feminine jouissance in Lacanian theory. In the film, the female protagonist 
Amangol’s gender is re-signified from feminine to masculine by her father through 
the act of shaving her hair, and cross-dressing her as a boy in order to send her to a 
carpet-weaving shop to earn money for the family. This re-signification of her 
femininity into masculinity stages several motifs that run throughout the film such as 
transgender, gender and sexual ambiguity, same-sex desire or homoeroticism, and 
cross-dressing or transvestism, all of which function as a subversive gesture that 
problematizes concepts of gender, sexuality and desire in the Iranian cultural 
imaginary. I focus on several different registers in the representation of Amangol’s 
embodiment of masculinity in both the filmic form (e.g. mise-en-scène, long shot, 
medium shot) and content of the film, in particular how Amongol’s re-signified body 
functions as the site of erotic desire, and particularly the feminine body as the locus 
where socio-political-religious tensions are staged. Indeed, the technique of shaving 
Amangol’s hair and unveiling her, as well as gender masquerading and passing as 
male, enables Shahriar to deploy such strategies of unveiling to problematize and 
critique not only the imposition of the veil on women in the Islamic Republic, 
but also the loss of feminine identity, enacted through the repressive measures of the 
patriarchal symbolic order exemplified in the Iranian State. In the end, Amongol 
enacts the Lacanian ethics of the authentic act par excellence, namely the logic of the 
feminine ‘No’, where she stands up to the patriarchal symbolic order, through a 
radical act that entails a suicidal gesture of burning down the carpet-weaving sweat 
shop and thereby sacrificing the masculinity she had thus far embodied. In this way, 
she traverses from femininity to masculinity and back, and exemplifies what Lacan 
calls the feminine ‘No’, through the reassertion of her feminine self-identity by 
standing up to the figures of paternal authority embodied in the State and religion. 
 
  
                                                        
cinema, there is, at present, more than one study and they will be discussed 
accordingly throughout the chapter.  
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3.1 Daughters of the Sun (Dokhtaran-e khorshid) 
 
Daughters of the Sun (Dokhtaran-e Khorshid, 2000) by the first time director 
Maryam Shariar, is perhaps one of the underrated art-house films of the post-
revolutionary Iranian cinema or New Iranian Cinema. Upon its release the film won 
several international awards, such as the best fiction film at the Montreal World Film 
Festival in 2000, and circulated widely in gay and lesbian film festivals and was 
marketed as “the Iranian Boys Don’t Cry – a shocking drama of forbidden love,”287 
and has been called “Iran’s first lesbian film.”288 As a diasporic filmmaker Maryam 
Shahriar returned to Iran after 10 years in Italy during the time of the presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2000), in which some of the regular censorship 
restrictions imposed on filmmakers by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance  
(MCIG) were thought to have loosened due to the Khatami’s liberal tendencies and 
his predilection towards the arts. Shahriar returned to shoot Daughters of the Sun and 
initially got an approval for the script by MCIG, but as she finished and submitted the 
final cut, the censors asked her to cut out the first and final scenes of the film, to 
which she bravely replied, “over my dead body!” However, she eventually complied 
with the objections raised by the MCIG and in one night cut out all the “touching” 
scenes in order to show the film at the annual Fajr International Film Festival in 
Tehran. The censors never allowed her to screen the film at the festival and after 
Shahriar convinced one of the representative censors that there “was nothing 
political” in the film, they finally granted her permission to screen it in theaters 
outside the festival at 11 p.m. The censors objected that the film was “too bitter” in 
its portrayal of Iranian society and had questions as to why she had dedicated the film 
to the late poet Ahmad Shamloo (1925-2000), who was persecuted by both the 
Shah’s regime and the Islamic Republic, and whose belief in the separation of state 
and religion were well known.289 The film was never again allowed official screening 
in Iran.  
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The film’s narrative story centers on the life of a young rural girl, Amangol 
(Altinay Ghelich Taghani), whose head is shaved by her father and sent out as a 
“boy” named Aman, to another village to work as a carpet weaver to help support the 
family. S/he is then locked within a weaving shop, effectively a sweatshop, with three 
girls (one girl is blind and remains nameless, and the other two are named Bibigol 
and Belghis), and a domineering and harsh master overseer who punishes them 
regularly. Whilst there s/he develops an erotic love relationship with one of the girls 
named Belghis, whose uncle wants her to marry an elderly man, but she wants Aman 
to marry her and to leave together for her home village Tiva. A wandering darvish, 
who has come to the village, often plays music outside her room and also falls for 
Aman, and eventually proposes her to run away with him, but s/he refuses to leave 
with him. Aman eventually refuses Belghis’ proposal as well and while returning to 
the shop after being beaten by the master overseer, finds that Belghis has hanged 
herself. In the end, as retaliation for their harsh treatment and their slave-like work 
conditions, Aman sets fire to the weaving sweatshop. There is perhaps a deliberate 
ambiguity in the ending of the film, as we are unsure if Aman committed suicide by 
setting the sweatshop on fire while remaining in it. The final scene may be a shot of 
the real Amangoal on the road to her village, or a spectral apparition of Amangol 
freed from the toils and burdens of the sweatshop.  
Daughters of the Sun (Dohkhtaran-e Khorshid), represents one of the few art 
films in the New Iranian cinema that stage motifs such as transgender, gender 
passing, corssdressing or transvestism, sexual and gender ambiguity, same-sex desire 
or homoeroticism. Indeed, other scholars have noted the significance of these 
elements within the film text of Daughters of the Sun. In his discussion of the film, 
Hamid Naficy refers to the deployment of these motifs as a way of circumventing the 
imposition of the veil on women, “Transgender masquerade and passing were among 
the strategies of critiquing the imposed rules of veiling, while they introduced their 
own narratives of mistaken gender identity and political complications.”290 Indeed, as 
Naficy has pointed out, by removing the veil and shaving the hair, films such as 
Daughters of the Sun render, “faces sufficiently androgynous and ambiguous in their 
beauty and sexuality to be read as both male and female, creating doubt about both 
the sexual orientation and the gender of the characters, a most disturbing and 
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counterhegemonic move under a regime founded on the clear demarcation of sexes 
and their complete separation.”291 Minoo Moallem also reads the film as staging the 
theme of “passing,” as well as containing non-normative modes of erotic desire and 
sexuality. Moallem states apropos Daughters of the Sun that, “the transgendered 
hero(ine) [Amangol]… by staging antinormative erotic desire, permits fantasizing 
about and promotion of alternative sexualities. Through silence, eye contact, gestures, 
and dress codes, an erotically ambivalent situation is set up that allows a display of 
sexual deviance.”292 Moallem provides a queer reading of the gender ambiguity 
operative in Daughters of the Sun and states, “The queering of the gendered citizens 
of the Islamic republic and the cinematic display of bodies that are ambiguous with 
respect to gender mean that… Daughters of the Sun transgress the boundaries of 
citizenship and subvert veiling as a disciplinary tool.”293 Roshanak Kheshti grounds 
her reading of the film on “cross-dressing” and “passing” as well. She reads the film 
as a “transgender move” that creates “a temporary space of political and agential 
potential that many spectators—both domestic and diasporic—seek in the post 1990s 
New Iranian cinema.”294 Kheshti also sees films such as Daughters of the Sun as a 
way to “help construct sites of gender and sexual transgression that resonate beyond 
the screen, creating spaces of queer and transgender potential within the Iranian 
mediascape.”295 Similarly, Vanzan in her brief analysis of Daughters of the Sun, sees 
the film as staging “the queerness of gender” and considers that the motifs of “cross-
dressing” in the film, “implies issues of gender identity and … challenges the 
heteronormative [film] canon.”296  
Though these scholars consider the deployment of these motifs in such films 
to be subversive of the Islamic Republic’s ‘essentialization’ of gender norms and 
valorization of heterosexuality as normative, Naficy does not seem to consider these 
elements to be a truly subversive or transgressive gesture in such films as the 
Daughters of the Sun. Naficy writes, “However transgressive, subversive, or modern 
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these strategies of gender masquerade and passing may seem, in reality they were 
not, … [as] there is a rich tradition both in taziyeh performances and in the history of 
modern theater, dance, and cinema in Iran of men playing women’s parts.”297 
However, Naficy seems to forget that that is precisely the point, since in these older 
traditions of ta’ziyeh it was men who played women’s roles or gender masqueraded 
as women, but in these new films it is women who are playing men’s roles, thus the 
gender role playing are reversed.298 In fact, the ta’ziyeh – the dramatic passion play 
that represents the martyrdom of Imam Hussein in Karbala, the third Shi’i Imam – 
was also performed among women, who cross-dressed for male roles, but all of these 
Qajar performances of the ta’ziyeh was only confined to a private female only 
audience, and not for the general male public.299 This gender masquerading reversal 
in which women are gender passing as men in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema such 
as Daughters of the Sun, is part of the transgressive dimension of these films, but as I 
argue the subversive core of the film lies elsewhere, in Aman’s ethical authentic act 
of the feminine ‘No!’ enacted at the film’s end as the reassertion of her feminine 
identity. 
However, none of the scholars mentioned above theorize the transgender field 
in Iranian cinema through the prism of psychoanalytic theory. The only single study 
solely dedicated to the representations of the transgender in cinema is the book by 
John Phillips called Transgender on Screen. Indeed, Phillips in his book also deploys 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory as a theoretical lens for reading the 
transgender subject in the filmic texts that he analyses, as he states, “…my approach 
presupposes an unconscious sub-text which is accessible to psychological and 
psychoanalytical investigation. Hence, the application of Freudian and Lacanian 
theory – essential tools in the exploration of a powerful textual unconscious.”300 
Therefore, my own deployment of psychoanalytic theory will fill the gap in the 
scholarly literature on theorizing the representation of transgender bodies and 
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feminine homoerotic desire in Iranian cinema in particular, and cinema in general, in 
light of Lacanian film theory.   
Before I proceed directly into the analysis of the film, it is important at the 
outset to clarify some terms that I will be using throughout this chapter. The term 
‘transgender,’ is often deployed as an umbrella term that designates bodies that have 
been re-signified male or female. Therefore, by transgender I mean broadly the act of 
passing or traversing from one gender to another (from male-to-female or female-to-
male), which may or may not involve medical treatments (i.e., hormone treatments, 
etc.) or sexual reassignment surgery (srs) (which in Amangol’s case it clearly does 
not). This can include the symbolic re-signification of the subject’s body as either 
‘female,’ even when biologically ‘male,’ (male sexual organ) or as ‘male,’ even when 
biologically ‘female’ (female sexual organ) (which is what is at work in Amangol’s 
case). My engagement with the transgender field operative in this film is a 
contribution to a broader rapprochement between Lacanian theory and transgender 
studies, as well as to gender and queer theory.301   
I also use the terms cross-dressing and transvestism synonymously, as an act 
of dressing, behaving or appearing in ways that are normatively associated with the 
opposite sex, regardless of sexuality. In this respect Marjorie Garber’s definition of 
transvestism is relevant here, as she states, “transvestism is a space of possibility 
structuring and confounding culture: the disruptive element that intervenes, not just a 
category crisis of male and female, but the crisis of category itself.”302 In this reading, 
trasvestism stages the crisis of the category of male/female, 
heterosexual/homosexual, but I would go further and suggest from a Freudo-
Lacanian perspective, that the crisis of category itself is constitutive of sexuality. It is 
the disruptivity inherent in sexual identity that is brought to the fore in cross-dressing. 
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 In another instance Garber relying significantly on Lacan’s notion of the 
Symbolic order states that, “there can be no culture without the transvestite, because 
the transvestite marks the entrance into the Symbolic.”303 In other words, at the very 
threshold of entrance into the Symbolic order stands the figure of the transvestite, 
signaling that the Symbolic functions to categorize and stabilize through the signifier 
concepts of gender and sexuality, male vs. female, heterosexual vs. homosexual.  
However, I would argue that when we are dealing with sex and the subject, since in 
psychoanalytic theory the subject is always a sexed subject, the subject is not 
reducible to the signifier, but is its ultimate misfire. There is no way of having any 
knowledge of a sexed subject (him or her), “Sex serves no other function than to limit 
reason, to remove the subject from the realm of possible experience or pure 
understanding [emphasis in the original].”304 This is why sexuality is always co-
incident with subjectivity in psychoanalytic theory, which is unknowable and 
unfathomable to sense and reason. As Joan Copjec states: 
 
… sex… for psychoanalysis, [is] never simply a natural fact, it is also never 
reducible to any discursive construction, to sense, finally. For what such a 
reduction would remain oblivious to is the radical antagonism between sex 
and sense. Sex is the stumbling block of sense. This is not to say that sex is 
prediscursive; we have no intention of denying that human sexuality is a 
product of signification, but we intend, rather, to refine this position by 
arguing that sex is produced by the internal limit, the failure of signification. 
It is only there where discursive practices falter-and not at all where they 
succeed in producing meaning– that sex comes to be.305 
 
Therefore, what the cross-dressing figure stages is the radical undecidability of 
sexuality itself; in other word, cross-dressing foregrounds the logic of bisexuality at 
the abyss of human sexuality, and what psychoanalysis teaches us is “not [to] confuse 
the fact of bisexuality -that is, the fact that male and female signifiers cannot be 
distinguished absolutely with a denial of sexual difference.”306 To put it in Lacanian 
terms: sexual difference is Real, rather than Symbolic;307 that is to say, sexual 
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difference resists symbolization absolutely.308  This is the antinomy at the heart of 
human sexuality, which throws reason into contradiction at every turn in its efforts to 
understand it, as Lacan states, “Everything implied by the analytic engagement with 
human behaviour indicates not that meaning reflects the sexual, but that it makes up 
for it.”309 In other words, the sexual makes up for our inability to make sense of it, 
not that it reflects meaning or sense.  
 
3.2 Symbolic Castration and the Name-of-the-Father 
 
In the opening scene of the film the girl/Amangol is framed in the foreground 
looking offscreen with a large portion of her hair partially revealed (a clear violation 
of the system of modesty), and three female figures (her sisters) are framed in the 
background mise-en-scène. Then in the next shot the camera shows in a medium 
close up the ground and pieces of her long hair falling to the ground at the centre of 
the frame. The loss of her hair is symbolic of her feminine identity – her gendered 
signifier as a woman has been shorn off. Through the act of cutting her hair she is re-
signified from femininity to masculinity. Then in a long shot Amangol is shown 
sitting while her father continues to shave off her hair and the camera through a close 
up of her face shows her melancholy face and downcast glance. She is clothed in a 
dress in this scene, which acts as another signifier of her female gender and feminine 
identity. While her father, who is cutting her hair, is blurred or out of focus in the 
background, she slowly raises her head and gazes off screen into the distance, 
foreclosing the possibility of the direct gaze into the camera as part of the system of 
modesty in Iranian cinema. Hamid Naficy in his brief analysis of this scene in 
Daughters of the Sun states, “shorn of her hair and androgynized, the girl may also 
reveal the other forbidden feature of a woman: her direct gaze in close-up, which 
masculinizes her, since this counters the demure and averted look required of 
women.”310 However, the problem is that there is no direct gaze into the camera by 
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Aman, as the gaze is towards an invisible point off screen. In this precise way, the 
logic of the averted gaze in the Islamic system of modesty is maintained. 
In the Daughters of the Sun the cutting of Aman’s hair has an important 
symbolic and metaphorical function. Indeed, for Maryam Shahriar the shaving of 
Aman’s head, “became a great metaphor for the loss of identity.”311 Naficy on the 
other hand sees the hair as a strategy for unveiling or showing the female hair without 
a veil, “She [Shahriar] shows the protagonist’s long hair at the film’s beginning, 
violating the modesty rules, however, only when it is detached from her, and in 
extreme close-ups as the locks fall to the ground after being cut. With this strategy, 
Shahriar pointedly noted that the only permissible way to show women’s actual hair 
is in its disembodied form.”312 Indeed, the shaving of hair is a clear strategy of 
unveiling, however, beyond this formal technique of unveiling there is another 
significance to the shaving of Aman’s hair in the narrative structure of the film. To 
put in a psychoanalytic terms: the cutting of Amangol’s hair in the symbolic universe 
of the film represents castration and the loss of the mother. In Jeffry Anderson’s 
psychoanalytic interpretation of the fable of Rapunzel (1980), there are three 
symbolic meanings or functions to the cutting of hair, namely “castration, loss of the 
mother, and reparation.”313 Indeed, as we shall see, excluding reparation, the other 
two symbolic registers of castration and the loss of the mother are operative in the 
cutting of Aman’s hair.  
There is a structural parallel between the cutting of Amangol’s hair, and the 
cutting of her name from Amangol to Aman. Indeed, the motif of gender passing is 
gestured in the name of Amangol being transformed to Aman, as the name itself is at 
once a ‘castrated’ name. Here the ‘name’ stands as the signifier for the re-
signification of gender identity. The excising of the feminine element of the name 
from the masculine inscribes within itself the gender passing process. The name 
Aman is a male name meaning ‘protection,’ (literally s/he is the ‘protection/Aman’ of 
the family from poverty) and the word gol means ‘flower’ in Persian. In this way gol, 
which is cut off from the first part of the name Aman, like her hair, is the feminine 
                                                        
311 Stone, DVD booklet, 4. 
312 Naficy, A Social History of the Iranian Cinema 131. 
313 Jeffry J. Anderson, “Rapunzel: The Symbolism Of The Cutting Of Hair.” Journal 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1980, 28:69-88, Cited in Alessandra 
Lemma, Minding the Body: The Body in Psychoanalysis and Beyond (New York: 
Routledge, 2015) 139.  
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aspect that must be cut in order for her to be re-signified as masculine. In this sense, 
she is ‘castrated’ from her feminine identity, from her flower or gol, symbolizing her 
vagina, which incidentally many Iranian mothers often call their baby daughter’s 
vagina gol, or playfully redoubled gol-gol, which is an instance of what Lacan would 
have called lalangue,314 and with the further connotation of sexual de-flowering, 
which will have reverberations within the later part of the filmic narrative. Here, the 
cut or castration of gol from Aman, which stands as the signifier of feminine identity, 
is the Lacanian symbolic castration. In Žižek’s formulation of Lacan, symbolic 
castration occurs when the subject, in this instance Aman, experiences the “gap 
between my direct psychological identity and my symbolic identity, (the symbolic 
mask or title I wear, defining what I am for and in the big Other)…”315As Žižek 
states elsewhere, “I am what I am through signifiers that represent me, signifiers 
constitute my symbolic order”316 Thus, Aman is represented through the signifiers of 
her shaved head and new name, and thereby (re)inscribed into the Symbolic order as 
a masculine subject through these signifiers.  
This symbolic castration is re-doubled cinematically in the next shot. As 
Aman is shown leaving the village with her/his hair completely shaven, s/he is 
foregrounded while her/his family is out of focus in the background, s/he then 
glances back at the family and the father blocks her mother with his hand, so as to 
obstruct their reunion. The key feature to be noted here is the gesture of obstructing 
the mother by the father, in other words to prohibit access to the mother (See Figure 
1). This is the enactment of Lacanian symbolic castration signified by the term, ‘The-
                                                        
314 On Lacan’s notion of lalangue Bruce Fink writes, “The French… lalangue, is a 
term Lacan creates simply by putting together the feminine article la with the noun 
langue (language, but specifically spoken language as in tongue). Lacan discusses 
what he means by lalangue in the course of this seminar… very roughly speaking, it 
has to do with the acoustic level of language, the level at which polysemy is possible 
due to the existence of homonyms (like those Lacan plays on throughout this 
seminar). It is the level at which an infant (or songwriter) may repeat the one syllable 
of a word (for example, “la la la”), the level at which language may ‘stutter…’” See 
The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the 
Limits of Love & Knowledge 1972–73: Encore, ed. Jaques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce 
Fink (London: W.W. Norton, 1998), 44 
315 Žižek, How to Read Lacan 34. 
316 Žižek, How to Read Lacan note 15, 122. Lacan borrowed the term “signifier” 
from the semiotic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), but used the term 
in a novel way, as Žižek states in the same note, as “a feature, a mark, which 
represents the subject.”  
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Name-of-the-Father,’ (le nom-du-père) the paternal symbolic authority. According to 
Lacan, The-Name-of-the-Father (not the real father as such) is associated with the 
Symbolic Order, also called the big Other: the network of pre-existing social reality, 
such as language, laws, and customs (which is why in Lacan’s ternary register of the 
Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real – The-Name-of the-Father is one of the operations of 
the Symbolic Order), into which the child is born. As Lacan states, ‘It is in the name 
of the father that we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from 
the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law”317 Lacan 
often played with the homophony “of le nom du père (the name of the father) and le 
‘non’ du père (the ‘no’ of the father),” as an emphasis of the “legislative and 
prohibitive function of the symbolic father.”318 Indeed, in his earlier Seminars the 
Name-of the-Father is related to Freud’s notion of castration, as the process that 
severs the child’s attachment to the mother. For Lacan, "[This] relationship to the 
phallus . . . is established without regard to the anatomical difference of the sexes.”319 
Therefore since the phallus is symbolic in its signification, both girls and boys go 
through the castrating experience through the operation of the Name-of-the-Father.320 
Thus, the father in this scene stands as the Lacanian Name-of-the-Father, who 
castrates Aman’s attachment to the mother by denying access to the (m)other, and 
thereby (re)inscribing her/him into the Symbolic order as masculine.  
 
  
                                                        
317 Lacan, Écrits 67.  
318 Evans, Dictionary, 122.  
319 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1977) 282.  
320 As Miller states, ““Lacan argues that all speaking subjects, masculine and 
feminine, are “castrated” by their entrance into the symbolic order.” Elaine P. Miller, 
Head Cases: Julia Kristeva on Philosophy and Art in Depressed Times (New York: 















Figure 3.1 The father barring access to the mother, an instance of Lacanian symbolic 
castration and ‘The-Name-of-the-Father’ (le nom-du-père). 
 
The exemplary case of the deployment of the motifs of gender ambiguity and 
cross-dressing in the figure of Aman(gol), is brought to bear at the very beginning of 
Daughters of the Sun. In the same scene before leaving the village, s/he is shown in a 
medium close up with her clothes as yet unrevealed, but as the camera is positioned 
behind her and shows her walking on the road, we see that she is dressed as a boy, 
with her/his shaved and no longer in a dress. The re-signifying of her body, or 
transgendering her identity is staged through two markers: hair and dress. Here the 
motif of cross-dressing or transvestism comes to the fore in the figure of Aman. The 
cross-dressing motif also gestures towards the performance of gender by Aman, but 
not the “performativity” of gender as theorized by Judith Butler where she states, 
“There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; ... identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”321  
Aman’s performance of masculinity is gestured to in another scene in the film, where 
Aman arrives at the village where s/he is to work as a weaver. Aman is shown in a 
long shot walking on the road, with her gait mimicking a “man,” or the way she 
                                                        
321 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 2011), 25. Ever since the 
publication of this book, Butler has been at pains to distinguish her notion of 
‘performativity’ from ‘performance.’ For a critical appraisal of Butler’s notion of 
gender performativity see below. 
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imagines a man would walk, performing and enacting masculinity with her feet 
striding wide apart from each other.  
 
3.3 The Depressive Position and Melancholic Identification  
 
One of the consistent scenes throughout the Daughters of the Sun is the anguish and 
melancholia that is palpable on the face of Aman. In Kristeva’s deployment of 
Klein’s concept of the child’s normal psychic development, the child accepts the 
depressive position in the process of normalization; following this formulation, Aman 
seems unable to accept the depressive position due to her hair being shaved (the 
signifier of her femininity), and seems to persist in it. On the other hand, Aman’s 
melancholy throughout the film may recall Butler’s interpretation of melancholic 
identification (reinterpreted from Freud) with the lost object or the mother, and her 
desire for the reconstitution of gender identity or feminine self-identity. Indeed, what 
has to be problematized apropos Amangol’s identity is that she is forced into the 
transgender subject position. The new transgender identity is forced or imposed upon 
her form outside, by the father, perhaps with the logic that by becoming re-signified 
as a masculine subject, she may be less harassed in her new work environment 
(which of course does nothing to save her from the abuses and beatings of the master 
overseer). This is significant, since she has not chosen to go through the “gender 
reassignment right,”322 as Kheshti calls it, of her own accord. There is no agency 
here, but rather a forced choice. Unlike the standard categories of transgender identity 
in the West, in which trans subjects themselves choose to go through the transitioning 
process, either from male-to-female or female-to-male, Aman has had no choice but 
to go through the “transitioning” process as it were. This precisely stages the 
depressive dimension and melancholia writ large on the face of Aman as she leaves 
her village, and throughout the film. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari’s statement, “the 
face is a veritable megaphone,”323 applies perfectly to the face of Amangol, 
bespeaking the silent scream of her sorrow. Since Aman experiences symbolic 
                                                        
322 Kheshti, “Cross-Dressing,” 170. This critical dimension is not referred to by 
Kheshti, in whose reading the “gender reassignment right” is read as a subjective 
choice of Aman, which is clearly not the case. 
323 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi. (London and New York: Continuum, 2004) 
199.  
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castration through the Name-of-the-Father (or what Lacan often playfully calls the 
‘No’ of the father) by severing her attachment to the mother and denying her access 
to the object of desire, the father thereby inscribes Aman into the world of language 
and culture: in other words, into the Symbolic Order through this violent inscription, 
which is why she persists in the depressive position and internalizes the lost object 
(mother) via melancholic identification.  
Julia Kristeva in her discussion of “depression” deploys the psychoanalyst 
Melanie Klein’s notion of the “depressive position” at the origin of the subject’s 
entrance into the Symbolic Order.324 According to Kristeva, within the subject’s 
normative psychic development, “the ego takes shape by way of a depressive 
working through.”325 In this view of the child’s standard psychic development, as 
Elaine Miller notes, depression “is caused by the child’s gradual and necessary 
separation, as it grows older, from its “mother,” or primary provider, and its 
subsequent assumption of a subjective identity in the “father’s” realm of language 
and social interaction.”326 In this perspective, the subject must be installed into the 
world of language, law, and culture or the Symbolic order, and cannot go back to the 
earlier stage of being fused with the mother, though the child can often and does 
attempt to recover the mother, “along with other objects, in imagination and, later, in 
words.”327 Therefore, the depressive position, as Klein calls this transtionary phase, is 
effectively a necessary stage in the process of the child’s normative development. 
Miller then rhetorically asks why Kristeva would deploy the image of “decapitation 
and recapitation as a figure for this process?” She then states, “Decapitation has long 
been associated with castration in the literature of psychoanalysis.”328 Indeed, if we 
deploy the image of the “cutting of hair” rather than “decapitation” as the figure for 
this process, as Anderson’s psychoanalytic discussion of the cutting of hair as a 
symbol of castration demonstrates (see above), then we can see how Aman has gone 
through this process and persists in the depressive position. Hence, the 
transgender/transsexual subject in Iran may be said to persist in the “depressive 
position”, unable to accept it as the normal course of psychic development, since 
                                                        
324 Miller, Head Cases, 26-7. 
325 Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein, trans. Ross Guberman, Female Genius: Life, 
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328 Ibid, 28. 
 120 
normative Iranian society’s stigma on trans subjects (in this instance not the Law 
(sharia) but social customs) does not allow for an easy traversal of the depressive 
position by the transgender subject.  
A related question apropos Aman’s character is that of melancholia. Why 
does Aman seem to persist in melancholia throughout the film? It is possible that she 
persists in her attachment to the lost object, namely the mother. Given the gender and 
sexual undecidability operative in the very texture of the film related to Aman, the 
question is if her attachment to the mother is related to the Freudian incest taboo, or 
is it a prohibition of homosexual desire for the (m)other? In one reading, this 
melancholic identification with the lost object may be consititutive of her gender 
identity and sexuality, as Judith Butler notes:  
 
Consider that gender is acquired at least in part through the repudiation of 
homosexual attachments; the girl becomes a girl through being subject to a 
prohibition which bars the mother as an object of desire and installs that 
barred object as a part of the ego, indeed, as a melancholic identification (my 
emphasis). Thus the identification contains within it both the prohibition and 
the desire, and so embodies the ungrieved loss of the homosexual cathexis. If 
one is a girl to the extent that one does not want a girl, then wanting a girl will 
bring being a girl into question; within this matrix, homosexual desire thus 
panics gender.329  
 
Hence, for Butler gender identity is formed partially as the result of rejecting 
homosexual attachment (i.e., a girl’s attachment for the mother as the object of 
desire), and thus the identification contains both the “loss and the desire” which 
forms the melancholic identification. According to Butler heterosexuality is produced 
through the prohibition of homosexuality even prior to the prohibition of incest, as 
she states: 
 
This heterosexuality is produced not only through implementing the 
prohibition on incest but, prior to that, by enforcing the prohibition on 
homosexuality. The oedipal conflict presumes that heterosexual desire has 
already been accomplished, that the distinction between heterosexual and 
homosexual has been enforced (a distinction which, after all, has no 
necessity); in this sense, the prohibition on incest presupposes the prohibition 
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on homosexuality, for it presumes the heterosexualization of desire.330  
According to Butler then the homosexual attachment has a more originary or 
primordial prohibition then the incest taboo, since the first object of libidinal 
attachment for the child is the same-sex parent, whilst the price for becoming a 
“normal” heterosexual subject is to identify with the lost object, in order to become a 
“normal” subject. A girl identifies with maternal femininity, a boy identifies with the 
paternal masculinity, and in this way you accept the loss and symbolize it, since you 
identify with the lost object and become a normalized subject. In Butler’s reading, 
since homosexuals remain true to their love for the lost object (e.g., mother or father), 
and are unable to symbolize the loss, they internalize and incorporate the lost object 
within their psychic economy and in this way they persist with melancholic 
identification. But this line of argument by Butler seems to contradict her theory of 
gender as “performatively produced.”331 Butler provides a succinct definition of 
performativity: “In the first instance, performativity must be understood not as a 
singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by 
which discourse produces the effects that it names.” 332 If this is true, then how can 
the child identify with the same-sex parent prior to performative identification? It is 
as it were, the girl or boy experiences sexual difference (father or mother) prior to 
any performative constructions through discourse in society, and seems to indicate an 
essentialisation of homosexual identity before any performative enacting or 
construction of gender. This is one of the theoretical problems inherent in Butler’s 
gender theory of performativity. 
So the question to be properly asked here is: why does Aman persist in her 
melancholic identification? This question is answered within the pure texture of the 
film and especially at the film’s end, since the melancholy is due to the loss of her 
feminine identity, and the forced choice of embodying masculinity. In this way, the 
film may also be a subversive gesture to the possibility of enforced sexual 
reassignments in the Islamic Republic, as Naficy notes, “Significantly, this use of 
transsexual passing in fictional films was happening at the same time that transgender 
surgery as a social practice was on the rise among young men and women and dealt 
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with in documentary films.”333 Indeed, due to the prohibition on homosexual desire 
in Islamic Law (sharia) in the Islamic Republic, some men or women who are 
considered to be homosexuals have been persuaded to go through the transitioning 
process. 
Apropos the motif of cross-dressing, in one scene the blind girl is shown 
putting pieces of black wool threads as a mustache on Bibigol. Here the masculine 
gender masquerading has a comedic effect and the two girls start to laugh. The 
mustache of course stands for virility, masculinity and the phallus.334 It is as if, there 
is something inherently comical about the masculine subject. This comical effect 
recalls what Jaqcues Alain-Miller wrote apropos love stating, “One only loves from a 
feminine position. Loving feminises. That’s why love is always a bit comical in a 
man.”335 There is always a minimum of comedic effect with masculinity, with this 
imagined ‘thing’ protruding outward – the phallus – from the male figure. It is as if 
there is inherently a dimension of “imposture” to the male subject,336 to masculinity 
as such, and the female subject or femininity is the Real subject. As Žižek states in 
his analysis of Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1957): 
 
A subject is a partial something, a face, something we see. Behind it, there is 
a void, a nothingness. And of course, we spontaneously tend to fill in that 
nothingness with our fantasies about the wealth of human personality... To see 
what is lacking in reality, to see it as that, there you see subjectivity. To 
confront subjectivity means to confront femininity. Woman is the subject. 
Masculinity is a fake.337 
 
This is precisely what Lacan himself states apropos the female subject, “By and 
large, women is much more real and much truer than man…”338 What Lacan means 
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here by “more real” is that the female subject or the feminine position is closer to the 
Real, that is, femininity is at the inherent limit of signification; hence women are 
closer to the void at the heart of human subjectivity. Now the laughter of the girls 
draws the attention of the master overseer, who directs his threatening gaze towards 
them to see why they are laughing and enjoying themselves. The master figure 
represents the Iranian state apparatus at its purest – the figure of paternal authority 
always denying or controlling access to enjoyment, or jouissance. This figure of the 
master with all its patriarchal trappings, acts as the Lacanian Name-of-the-Father, 
namely the whole symbolic network of language, laws and customs (in this instance 
laws based on Islamic jurisprudence or figh) with its super-ego injunctions and 
prohibitions and its controlling machinery. The scene could also gesture to another 
ambiguity, the possibility of the girls’ knowledge of the gender masquerading of 
Aman, her cross-dressing: that is they may already know that ‘he’ is really a ‘she,’ 
and find the whole masquerade somewhat comical.  
In one of the most cinematically beautiful scenes in Daughters of the Sun, 
Aman is shown behind the weaving apparatus or loom, which thinly veils her like a 
curtain or screen. S/he begins to silently read a letter and one of the girls (Belghis) 
asks her if it’s a letter from her parents. Then in one of the most formally beautiful 
shots in the film the profile of the face of Belghis is foregrounded, whilst in the 
background the figure of Aman is framed with her shaved head, behind the screen of 
the carpet tapestry. The mise-en-scène separates the two of them with the weaving 
apparatus as we view Aman through the threads of the loom, while Belghis stands on 
the other side of the loom in the foreground. The screen not only gestures to the 
prison like reality of the weaving shop in which they live, but symbolizes the 
patriarchal and masculinist order of the Islamic Republic in Iran, not just for women, 
but for those whose gender and sexuality is not in line with the binary of male and 
female gender categories. At the narrative level, this division of Belghis and Aman 
via the screen of the loom, already formally gestures through the mise-en-scène that 
the love between the two is doomed at the outset, even before we learn of their erotic 




3.4 Female Homoeroticism and Objet petit a 
 
In an important scene, the beginning of the homoerotic relation between 
Belghis with Aman is staged while sitting alone in the room weaving on the loom. 
Belghis glances at Aman and says to him/her “come” (bia - both the English and the 
Persian word here have obvious sexual connotations), and Aman goes and sits beside 
her. The whole scene is shot from behind the loom, it is as if the loom acts as a 
protecting screen from the overflowing of erotic tension as they turn and glance at 
each other silently and longingly and we get a scene cut. Indeed, the loom as screen 
or veil also functions formally at the level of censorship imposed on visuality by the 
Islamic Republic on Iranian cinema, and foregrounds the tension that the only way to 
show the possibilities of an erotic relay of glances on screen is when both characters 
are literally female. This scene cut may be interpreted as the moment in which the 
two will have an erotic encounter, which for obvious reasons could not have been 
represented on screen due to the Islamic system of modesty (hejab). In this scene 
same sex or lesbian desire is staged through the gender ambiguity or cross-




Figure 3.2 The moment of erotic tension as Aman and Belghis gaze at each other 
through the screen of the weaving loom. 
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Being a girl gender masquerading as a boy in this way, s/he finds herself the object of 
Belghis’ desire – hence a full configuration of female homoerotic desire is staged. 
Therein resides Lacan’s lesson of objet petit a, or the object cause of desire. Here, 
gender ambiguity acts as a signifier for the arbitrariness of the signified, which acts 
as its own cause, namely as the object-cause of desire, where who one desires 
(regardless of which gender, sex etc.) is of little or no consequence – for the motif of 
misrecognition itself stages the ambiguity inherent in or constitutive of desire. This is 
the Lacanian objet petit a, at its most elementary. As Slavoj Žižek states:  
 
Objet petit a, the object-cause of desire [is]: an object that is, in a way, posited 
by desire itself. The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own 
cause, i.e., the object a is an object that can be perceived only by a gaze 
‘distorted’ by desire [like the distorted gaze of Belghis for Aman], an object 
that does not exist for an ‘objective’ gaze. In other words the object a is 
always, by definition, perceived in a distorted way, because outside this 
distortion, “in itself,” it does not exist, since it is nothing but the embodiment, 
the materialization of this very distortion, of this surplus of confusion and 
perturbation introduced by desire into so-called ‘objective reality.’”339   
  
In this sense, the gaze of Belghis is distorted by her desire, which is precisely why 
she sees in Aman what she desires (i.e., a man), not what Aman is in her/himself in 
objective reality. Therefore though Aman is misrecognized as male and desired by 
Belghis, but conversely Aman seems to desire Belqis precisely as woman, even 
though s/he is gender masquerading as male. But, things become even more complex 
and ambiguous here: since Aman was first misrecognized as a boy, after the erotic 
encounter (which all the formal elements of the scene indicated that they were 
intimate) Belghis could no longer have remained innocent of Aman’s true gender 
identity, or can she?340 Anna Vanzan in her reading of the relation of Aman and 
Belghis has also noted this ambiguity operative in the film, “It is true that Bilghis 
does not know (or does she?) that Aman is a girl, but Aman is well aware of being a 
girl: or isn’t s/he? Cross-dressing, in this case, opens a window onto gender 
                                                        
339 Žižek, Looking Awry, 12. 
340 According to Judy Stone, “To comply with those objections [by the censors], she 
cut all the ‘touching’ scenes in one night, which wreaked havoc with the editing to 
get it ready for the annual Fajr International Film Festival in Tehran.” DVD booklet  
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ambiguity, as it allows the film to suggest that “other” ways of love are also 
possible.”341 
Let us imagine the erotic scene, as it would have been staged had there been 
no censors to cut the scene, to prevent its enactment. The erotic encounter could have 
been structured like the scene in Freud’s description of the primal trauma of 
fetishism, as Žižek notes apropos the inversion of this primal scene and the failed 
sexual encounter in The Crying Game, “the child’s gaze, sliding down the naked 
female body towards the sexual organ, is shocked to find nothing where one expects 
to see something (a penis) - in the case of The Crying Game, the shock is caused 
when the eye finds something where it expected nothing.”342 But, in the case of the 
Daughters of the Sun, the shock would have been caused when Belghis finds nothing 
where she expected something. This is the inversion of the standard metaphysical 
question: Why is there nothing, instead of something? The metaphysical question 
being: why is there something, instead of nothing? If we were to gender this 
metaphysical question, then it is clearly on the side of femininity. This is why the 
primal scene of the trauma of fetishism, has something of the order of a metaphysical 
problem to it, not simply of masculinity or femininity but of sexuality as such.343  
It may be argued that the film continues with this formal ambiguity, because it 
allows the spectator to read Belghis’ continued desire for Aman, possibly as a sign of 
her love beyond the discovery of her gender identity as female. It is precisely here, 
after the potential revelation of Aman’s feminine gender that the dimension of true 
love emerges in Belghis, since she persists in her love of Aman perhaps despite this 
revelation. In another scene, in a moment full of fragility, Belghis exposes herself to 
Aman, in all her vulnerability, and says to her, “come let us go together to Tiva.” 
Then Belghis describes Tiva to Aman in all its ethereal beauty, as a paradisal place 
full of luxurious and verdant trees and fragrant groves and colorful flowers, where 
they can build a house together. Then in a moment of full pathos Belghis says to 
Aman, “marry me, I’ll make you happy.” Aman, welled up with tears, responds: 
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coupling. Slavoj Žižek, Disparities (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 17. 
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“Okay, I will.” Indeed, this is the sublime moment in which true love emerges, where 
the beloved one (Aman), returns the love of the loving one (Belghis), as Žižek has 
noted apropos the transvestite character, Dil, in The Crying Game: 
 
It is only at this point that true love emerges, love as a metaphor in the precise 
Lacanian sense: we witness the sublime moment when eromenos (the loved 
one) changes into erastes (the loving one) by stretching out her hand and 
'returning love'. This moment designates the 'miracle' of love, the moment of 
the 'answer of the Real'; as such, it perhaps enables us to grasp what Lacan 
has in mind when he insists that the subject itself has the status of an 'answer 
of the Real'.344 
 
Aman’s statement “Ok, I will” to Belghis’ proposal, is precisely the Lacanian 
“answer of the Real,” the moment where she stretches out her hand “returning love.” 
Perhaps in this instance what the other, namely Belghis, sees in Aman, is what there 
is in her/him more than himself/herself”, the objet petit a or object cause of desire; in 
this sense the asymmetry of the loving one (Belghis) who loves the beloved one 
(Aman) is that what she sees in the loved one, may be a “man”, whilst what the loved 
one knows of himself/herself is that s/he is a ‘woman.’ However, it may be that 
Belghis loves Aman regardless of the discovery of her gender identity as ‘woman,’ 
and it is precisely here that true love emerges when the object of love, also becomes 
the subject of love, that is, when the one who is moved by this gesture of love, the 
beloved, also returns love. Lacan states, “… the lover appears here as the desiring 
subject [le sujet du désir], with all the weight that the term “desire” has for us, and 
the beloved as the only one in the couple who has something.”345 This something is 
the objet petit a. Indeed, one evidence in the film that gestures to the possibility that 
Belghis may know Aman’s true female identity is gestured to when Belghis has 
found the letter that Aman’s parents sent, about her mother being sick. Since it is a 
private letter, which Belghis only accidentally discovers and reads, it is very unlikely 
that Amngol’s parents would have still pretended that she was a boy. Thus the letter 
would have been addressed to her as their daughter Amangol.  
                                                        
344 Žižek, Metastasis of Enjoyment, 103.  Žižek’s formulation here is derived from 
Lacan’s seminar on Transference.  
345 Jacques Lacan, Transference, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VIII, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 34. 
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Be that as it may, in this formulation, love is the “answer of the Real,”346 Real 
in the Lacanian sense of “the impossibility of symbolization” or that which is 
“beyond symbolization”, which causes the loving one to see the beloved one through 
the distorted prism of desire. Therein resides the instantiation of the Lacanian objet 
petite a. In this way, the gender and sexual ambiguity is still maintained as we are no 
longer sure if Aman is being proposed as a man or as a women, since if an erotic 
interlude did occur between them, then it is likely that this is an instance of female 
homoeroticism or same-sex desire, and especially after the revelation of the content 
of the letter. This formal ambiguity or formal tension must be maintained due to the 
censors, since Aman by masquerading and cross-dressing as a ‘man’ or as 
transgender would not be scandalous by displaying affection for Belghis, but what 
would be scandalous is if what is staged on screen is homoeroticism between two 
females, female homosexuality or lesbian love, which in the very formal texture of 
the film it is precisely what is staged, since both actors are literally women.  
This is the radical core of the Daughters of the Sun, its female homoeroticism 
or same sex desire, which is staged through the transgender move. Indeed, sexual 
reassignment in Iran which is approved and even encouraged by the state apparatus, 
should not be considered or thought as radical, for this procedure signifies nothing 
radical for the Islamic Republic, as through surgery what is still maintained is the 
distinction between the two genders, female and male, masculine and feminine. What 
is unacceptable, however, is to have subjects (male or female) that desire the same 
sex: that is the radical category, which the state would not be able to tolerate. You 
can transition from one sex to another, since you are still dealing with the accepted 
sexual difference, male vs. female, which remains within the coordinates of Shi‘i 
discourse in Iran, even sanctioned by its spiritual and political leader Ayatollah 
Rouhallah Khomeini, but once you have same sex desire, that is the unlawful 
category, since that is the disavowed kernel of the Iranian states sexual imaginary 
which is deemed illegal and even punishable by death.  
But where is Tiva, this paradisal space for which we would look for in vain in 
the geographical coordinates of Iran, since there is no such village that exists in Iran. 
Perhaps Tiva than is an imagined space, a utopian space beyond the Law – with all its 
super-ego injunctions and prohibitions – that stands for an autonomous zone of 
                                                        
346 Lacan, Transference, 103.  
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freedom, beyond the coordinates of the patriarchal order and the imposition of the 
sharia, exemplified by the authoritarian figures such as the master overseer, Aman’s 
father, and Belghis’ uncle, all of whom may represent the oppressive and repressive 
aspects of the Iranian state apparatus.  
 
 
3.5 Love beyond Law and Feminine Jouissance  
 
On an errand outside with the master overseer in the woods, Aman hears the 
sound of a musical instrument located in an off screen space, the tar (the instrument 
is played by the Persian master composer Hossein Alizadeh who has composed the 
musical score for the film), whose sound seems to fascinate Aman and s/he follows 
the sound of the diegetic music while the overseer stops to relieve himself. Then 
when the camera pans to her point of view, we see the village in a long distant shot, 
whilst the diegetic music echoes from the village. In the next scene, Aman is sitting 
in her/his dimly lit room beside her loom, in a medium shot, the camera zooms in and 
moves steadily closer to her face, and we hear the sound of instrumental music again 
that s/he heard whilst walking outside, but this time the instrument is setar (also 
played by Alizadeh), and Aman is shown slowly rubbing her hands and her face and 
her shaved head. At the level of the pure texture of the filmic text, it is as if the 
character of Aman is relishing her freedom from the injunction of the hejab, and 
through this formal strategy of unveiling, Shahriar seems to allude to this freedom 
being unavailable to women in Iran. The camera begins to move to a close-up of her 
face – with a look of a distinct enjoyment, an ecstatic enjoyment, which in Lacanian 
terms is called feminine jouissance.347 Then s/he is shown putting on a dress and 
begins to dance like a whirling darvish to the ecstatic undulations of the Sufi music 
and with her dress flowing like the garment of the Mowlavi whirling darvishes 
(Figure 3) – the Sufi order of the Persian Sufi mystic and poet Jalal al-Din Rumi 
mentioned in the introduction – she spins in ecstasy (what in Sufi discourse is termed, 
                                                        
347 The French term jouissance, means both ‘orgasm’, as well as ‘enjoyment’. In 
Lacan’s writings, this ambiguity of the term must always be retained, which is why it 
is often left untranslated.  
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hal).348 In fact, Lacan alludes to the Sufis in relation to the “knowledge of 
jouissance”, and speaking of Buddhism and Islam where such knowledge may be 
found, he states, “Need I mention the tantras, for one of these religions, and the Sufis 
for the other?”349 Now, this moment may be read as an instance of what Lacan calls 
“Love beyond the Law” and feminine jouissance, in which there is a feminine 
sublimation of the drives, through the ‘asexual’ or non-sexual ‘Thing’ (das Ding), 
such as music in this instance, as an enactment of ecstatic surrender that is 
emancipatory, as Žižek states: 
 
“Love beyond Law” involves a "feminine" sublimation of drives into love… 
love is here no longer merely a narcissistic (mis)recognition to be opposed to 
desire as the subject's 'truth' but a unique case of direct asexual sublimation 
(integration into the order of the signifier) of drives, of their jouissance, in the 
guise of the asexual Thing (music, religion, etc.) experienced in the ecstatic 
surrender. What one should bear in mind apropos of this love beyond Law, 
this direct asexual sublimation of drive, is that it is… beyond meaning: 
meaning can only take place within the (symbolic) Law; the moment we 
trespass the domain of Law, meaning changes into enjoy-meant, jouissense.350 
 
Through this feminine jouissance expressed through her body via music and dance, 
Aman reaches an experience of  “ecstatic surrender” and freedom. Aman seems to 
rise above the imperative of the Law symbolized by the oppressive master overseer 
and by extension the Law as symbolized by the Islamic Republic with its constant 
prohibitions and super-ego injunctions to obey the religious law (sharia), etc. 
However, here Žižek fails to go as far as Lacan himself, for Lacan equates this 
feminine jouissnace with mysticism or the ecstatic experience of the mystics. Indeed, 
this Lacanian notion of feminine jouissance is not unlike the experiences of the Sufis 
during sama’, which has a precise bodily component, in their acts of reaching ecstatic 
                                                        
348 See, Jean During, “Hal.” In Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 8. Ehsan Yarshater, ed. 
(New York: Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation, 2003), 580. Kheshti reads this 
moment in these terms, “Aman relishes in the joys of flowing fabric, billowing 
around legs that twirl like a little girl or a meditating Sufi, whirling around in a 
trance-like state to the sounds of mystical music” (172). For a Lacanian reading of 
Rumi’s mystical poetics, see Mahdi Tourage, Rumi and the Hermeneutics of 
Eroticism (Leiden: Brill, 2007).  
349 Jacques Lacan, ...or Worse: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XIX, trans. A. R. 
Price (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 148. 
350 Slavoj Žižek, “Love Beyond Law”, accessed March 20, 2015, 
http://www.lacan.com/zizlola.htm 
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states (ahwal) via dance and music.351 Lacan in the seminar Encore (meaning “again” 
which gestures towards the never ending or unsatifiability of desire or the circuit of 
jouissance in the derive, but also Lacan’s promise to return to the questions of his 
Seminar VII, the Ethics of Psychoanalysis), specifically articulates the idea of a 
feminine jouissance as “a supplementary jouissance,” beyond what the phallic 
function designates as jouissance, as he states, “There is a jouissance, a joussance of 
the body that is…‘beyond the phallus.”352 This feminine jouissance “of the body” is, 
according to Lacan, ineffable, since men and women may experience it, but know 
nothing about it.353 It is at the very limits of being and language, and therefore of the 
order of the Lacanian Real. As Žižek admits in one instance, “mysticism… is the 
encounter with the Real.”354 Again, here there is a homology between the ineffability 
of the experience of the Sufi mystics (and mystics of most religious traditions), which 
has been termed by Michael A. Sells as the “Mystical Languages of Unsaying.”355 
Indeed, later in the same text Lacan explicitly links this feminine jouissance with the 
experience of the mystics, exemplified by the female Christian mystic Saint Teresa. 
He writes, “There are men [mystics] just as good as women. It happens. And who 
also feel just fine about it. Despite – I won’t say their phallus – despite what 
encumbers them [men] that goes by that name, they get the idea or sense that there 
must be a jouissance that is beyond. Those are the ones we call mystics.”356 This 
                                                        
351 See Shahzad Bashir, Sufi Bodies: Religion and Society in Medieval Islam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 74-77. For general discussions of sama‘ in 
Sufi praxis see Fritz Meier, “The Dervish Dance: An Attempt at an Overview,” in 
Essays in Islamic Mysticism and Piety (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 23-48; Leonard 
Lewisohn, "The Sacred Music of Islam: Samā' in the Persian Sufi Tradition," British 
Journal of Ethnomusicology Vol. 6 (1997): 1-33 
352 Lacan, Encore, 74. 
353 In Encore Lacan states that some women may experience feminine jouissance, but 
not all, though all mystics do experience it. See Lacan, Encore, 74, 76. See also 
Lacan, Anxiety, 183-84.  
354 Žižek, Metastasis of Enjoyment, 117. 
355 Michael A. Sells and James Webb, “Lacan and Bion: Psychoanalysis and the 
Mystical Language of Unsaying.” Theory and Psychology 5.2 (1995): 195–215; cf. 
Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
356 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XX: Encore. Trans. Bruce Fink. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999) 76. Speaking of mystical texts, Lacan 
incredibly calls his own book Écrits a mystical text, “These mystical jaculations are 
nither idle chatter nor empty verbiage; they provide, all in all, some of the best 
reading one can find – at the botom of the page, drop a footnote, ‘Add to that list 
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jousissance that is beyond the phallus is feminine jouissance. Here, Aman’s 
experience is at once erotic and ecstatic - it is a perfect instantiation of what Lacan 
calls, feminine jouissance. In this way, Shahriar seems to deploy the various elements 
of this scene – Aman’s unveiled shaved hair, dancing, and enjoyment of music; all 
things which are forbidden to women in public spaces according to the logic of 
modesty laws or hejab in Iran – as a strategy to perform a critique of Iranian society 







Figure 3.3 Aman’s dancing as an instance of feminine jouissance 
 
                                                        




3.6 Misrecognition and Male Homoeroticism (shahed-bazi)   
 
One of the central elements of the Daughters of the Sun is the motif of 
misrecognition of identity, in which the motif of gender ambiguity and cross-dressing 
or transvestism are effectively deployed to stage this motif. This misrecognition can 
be linked to Badiou’s discussion of the “passion of the Real,” where taking up 
Lacan’s concept of “misrecognition” in the mirror stage, he suggests that there is a 
“power of misrecognition” (puissance de la meconnaissance) and moreover that 
“there is a function of misrecognition that makes it such that the abruptness of the 
real operates only in fictions, montages, and masks”357 In this way, the mask 
concealing Aman’s true gender, stages the Real of illicit desire (i.e., homoeroticism) 
repressed in the filmic unconscious and in the Iranian cultural imaginary. Now, in the 
midst of Aman’s dancing, at once the diegetic music abruptly comes to a halt, and the 
camera turns to a shot of an instrument hitting the ground, the instrument is clearly a 
setar. The shot shows a shadow across her small windowpane, and it gestures to the 
spectral presence of someone – the darvish who was playing the instrument has seen 
her/him put on a dress and dance. Does this scene stage an instance of homoeroticism 
(shahed-bazi) in which the darvish misrecognizes Aman as a male who is 
“effeminate,” especially by putting on the dress of one of the girls? Or is this an 
instance of recognition that Aman while masquerading as a “boy,” or gender passing 
as male, is in reality a ‘woman’? Here it seems that the masculine signifier is divided 
into the ‘feminine’ in the figure of Aman whose mask of “male” or “masculine” 
status is compromised. It is as if Aman as a “male” subject is now cross-dressing as 
“female.” This redoubling of the cross-dressing motif as it were further reinforces the 
gender and sexual undecidability in the filmic text, as well as the notion of desire as 
the erotic force that is beyond gender signification. The ambiguity is important here 
since it redoubles the narrative tension in which Belghis also misrecognizes Aman’s 
gender identity. In other words, just as Aman is misrecognized for being “male” by 
Belghis, s/he may also be misrecognized by the iterant darvish.  
                                                        
357 Alain Badiou quoted in Adrian Johnson, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental 
Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston, Illinois: North Western University, 
2008) 183.  
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Another formal element in the scene is that the darvish hidden behind the 
window-pane is like a voyeur gazing at Aman from outside the window, we never see 
his voyeuristic gaze, since to show him literally looking at Aman with an erotic gaze 
and voyeuristic pleasure, would have been another cause for censoring the scene, 
therefore the only strategy to gesture to his off screen presence and his voyeuristic 
gaze (other than the strategy Majidi took in Baran, namely by ‘veiling’ her behind 
the opaque window), is to have an abrupt break or jolt of the music ending with the 
shot of the instrument (setar) hitting the ground. This voyeurism or “looking” can be 
read through the prism of what is called shahed-bazi or homoeroticism and the logic 
of nazar-bazi (play of glances).358 Indeed, there is a long tradition of homoeroticism 
in Persian mystical poetry and in Sufi discourse called in Persian shahed-bazi or the 
“witness play”, which was the act of contemplating divine beauty in beardless youths 
or pubescent boys359 and has been interpreted as an instantiations of pre-modern 
“homosexuality.”360 Sirus Shamisa in his exploration of homoeroticism (shahed-bazi) 
in Iran through the lens of Persian poetry states, “Persian lyrical literature is 
essentially a homosexual [hamjens garaie] literature.”361 Similarly Janet Afary notes 
in her Sexual Politics in Modern Iran: “In nearly half of lyric poems, the love object 
is unquestionably an adolescent boy. In the other half, which is also often 
homoerotic, the distinction is lost to the reader because the same adjectives can apply 
                                                        
358 For nazar-bazi in Iranian cinema see Shahla Haeri, “Sacred Canopy: Love and 
Sex under the Veil,” Iranian Studies, Volume 42, 2009, 113-126.  
359 Shahzad Bashir writes apropos shahed-bazi, “The practice of contemplating 
young boys as beautiful forms that represent divine beauty is usually known through 
the term shahidbazi and has a controversial history in Sufi texts… while it is difficult 
to substantiate shahidbazi as a widespread practice, such “looking” is a common 
feature of Persian poetic rhetoric.” Bashir, Sufi Bodies 146.  
360 See Sirus Shamisa, Shahedbazi dar Adabiyat-e Farsi (Tehran: Ferdows Press, 
2002); for a valuable discussion of homoeroticism and homosexuality in Iran, see 
Janet Afary, Sexual Politics in Modern Iran (Cambridge: University of Cambridge 
Press, 2009). For homoeroticism in pre-modern Islamic sources, see Khaled El-
Rouayheb, Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500–1800 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2005), especially Chapter One: Pederasts and Pathics 13-52; 
Walter G. Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı, The Age of Beloveds: Love and the 
Beloved in Early-modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2005), 32-84. On homosexuality in Islamic law see, 
E. K. Rowson, “HOMOSEXUALITY ii. IN ISLAMIC LAW,” Encyclopædia 
Iranica, XII/4, pp. 441-445, available online at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/homosexuality-ii (accessed on 30 December 
2012). 
361 Shamisa, Shahedbazi 10, quoted in Afary, Sexual Politics, 88.  
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to either male or female objects of desire”362 What is of particular interest is that, as 
Afary states apropos Shamisa, there is a rich lexicon in Persian of homoerotic 
relations embedded in the language itself:  
 
The Persian language itself is rich with allusions to homoerotic relations. A 
wealth of words is used to refer to various stages of courtship, from flirtation 
(nazar bazi), to adoration of the beautiful (jamal parasti), to actual 
homosexual intercourse (lavat). As in the Greek tradition, there are different 
terms for the “active” partner (fa‘el [the doer], gholam bareh or gholam pareh 
[lover of pages] jamal parast or surat parast [one who loves beautiful faces] 
bache baz [pederast], luti [from the verb lavatat]. There are also terms 
referring to a “passive” man, such as ma‘bun or maf‘ul [the receiver], amrad 
[beardless adolescent], kudak [child] now khatt [one with a budding 
mustache] bi rish [beardless] and pesar [boy].363  
 
Indeed, throughout the film the overseer does not call Aman by name, but by the term 
pesar (boy). Aman also has no facial hair or is beardless (bi rish) and has the look of 
a now khatt, a boy with a budding mustache, or an amrad, a beardless youth. It is 
important to note that the motif of pederastic courting and the cult of the ephebe has a 
long genealogy that reaches back to classical Greece, in such institutions as the 
symposium, and through both the literary (poetry, philosophy, drama) and visual (art, 
vase paintings) cultural production of Greece, which reached as far as the Hellenistic 
Middle East.364 The motif of pederasty itself also goes back to the ancient Greeks, 
especially with the god of wine Bacchus365 and in the ways “boys” were 
contemplated as gods.366 In his Seminar VIII on Transference, where Lacan has an 
extended commentary on Plato’s Symposium, he states, “You’ll have to get used to 
the idea that Greek love was love for young pretty boys. And… that’s it.”367 
                                                        
362 Afary Sexual Politics, 87-88. 
363 Shamisa, Shahedbazi 10, quoted in Afary Sexual Politics, 88. 
364 For the literary evidence, see Andrew Lear and Eva Cantarella, Images of 
Pederasty: Boys Were Their Gods (London and New York, 2008). 
365 Interestingly, since Persian and Greek are both Indo-European languages, there is 
a lexical and linguistic relation between the Greek word Bacchus and the Persian 
bache, meaning “young boy, child, son; or a page and servant boy”. In fact, the 
Persian term bacha-bazi literally means, pederasty. 
366 “When they asked the poet Anacreon why he wrote hymns to boys instead of the 
gods, he replied, “because boys are our gods.” ‘Footnote to an ancient edition of 
Pindar’s second Isthmian Ode (iii 213 Drachmann).” Quoted in Andrew Lear and 
Eva Cantarella, Images of Ancient Greek Pederasty: Boys Were Their Gods (London 
and New York, 2008) 8. 
367 Lacan, Transference, 30. 
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However, such sexual practices in the pre-modern period should not be called 
homosexuality, as we understand it in the modern sense of the term, since 
homosexuality is related to the politics of identity, which is a modern category 
(Foucault already noted the construction of the category of homosexuality in the 
Europe of 19th century),368 and hence a more proper term in the older Iranian context 
would be homoeroticism. 
In the context of the emergence of Iranian modernity, Afsaneh Najmabadi has 
demonstrated the existence of a “pre-modern and early modern Persian homoerotic 
culture.”369 In the 19th and early 20th century the Qajar cultural imaginary was based 
on a preference for male homoeroticism, typified by such terms as amradparasti 
(love of young adolescent men), ghilman (youth or boys, slaves) and wildan (boys), 
all of whom did not yet show signs of adult masculinity or manhood, namely they 
were beardless, and were regarded as objects of desire by older men (Figure 4). 
Similar terms for youth or boys were deployed in Arabic with regards to homoerotic 
relations, such as shabb (youth).370 Indeed, Najmabadi contends that the encounter 
with the scornful “European gaze” at these practices, Iranians “began to reconfigure 
structures of desire by introducing a demarcation to distinguish homosociality from 
homosexuality.”371 Therefore the encounter with the European gaze resulted in the 
“disavowal” of the homoerotic culture in the Iranian past.372 In this sense, it could be 
said that this predilection for homoeroticism in pre-modern and early modern Iranian 
                                                        
368 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volum 1: An Introdoction (New 
York, Vintage Books, 1990) 43. 
369 Afsaneh Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards 
(California: University of California, 2005), 15. Also see, Willem Floor, A Social 
History of Sexual Relations in Iran (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2008), 
especially Chapter Four.  
370 As Khaled El-Rouayheb notes, “Homosexual relations in the early Ottoman Arab 
East were almost always conceived as involving an adult man (who stereotypically 
would be the “male” partner) and an adolescent boy (the “female”). The latter—
referred to in the texts as amrad (beardless boy); ghulam or shabbi (boy); or fata, 
shabb, or hadath (male youth)—though biologically male, was not completely a 
“man” in the social and cultural sense; and his intermediate status was symbolized by 
the lack of the most visible of male sex characteristics: a beard.”  El-Rouayheb, 
Before Homosexuality 26.  
371 Najmabadi, Women with Mustaches, 38. 
372 Ibid, 38. Interestingly Najmabadi often uses the psychoanalytic term ‘disavowal’ 
to characterize the denial of this past. 
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Figure 3.4 An example of homoerotic culture in the Qajar era: 
photo of “Naqi Khan and Taymur, with two others”, from theʻAli Khan Vali’s Album 
in Women’s Worlds in Qajar Iran.The description of the photo reads: “This picture is 
on page111 of the album. The writing under the picture reads:“Colonel Naqi Khan 
flirting with Taymur the dancer,Mirza Asad Allah and Abu al-Qasim Khan looking 




In the next shot we see Aman walking outside and s/he hears again the 
diegetic music whilst walking in the street, with a crowd gathered around the source 
of the music, and s/he goes to look and a man, perhaps a wondering darvish, is 
playing the setar and she looks at him and he returns her gaze, and there is an erotic 
relay of glances by the darvish as he recognizes Aman. In this scene she is holding a 
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collection of wool strings in her/his hand while the darvish is playing the strings of 
the instrument (setar). There is certainly a homology here between her character as 
weaver who works with “strings” knotting together the double meaning of the word 
tar as both strings of the weaving apparatus and the darvish’s playing of an 
instrument with the link being the string/tar, as Kheshti notes using Moallem’s 
linking of the two meanings of the term tar: 
Literally meaning ‘string,’ tar denotes many things in this film: Aman’s ‘lived 
material body’ is animated in a dialectic between the musical tar and the pood 
[weft] of hir workday existence, the strings of the instrument resonating 
through hir while the psychic burden of hir mother’s illness and the overseer’s 
panoptic gaze muffles its musicality; or, as a master weaver, the choreography 
(s)he daily enacts with the tar, the pood and hir hands is a reiterative 
performance that continuously weaves hir into the narrative of nation in the 
creation of the quintessential ‘Persian’ object.373  
 
However, one of the problems with Kheshti’s interpretation à la Moallem, is that she 
has conflated or blurred the distinction between several Persian instruments such as 
the tar, setar, and tambour for her interpretive purposes – calling all the instruments 
tar. Indeed, retaining the distinction is important as the setar for instance in Persian 
classical music is commonly known as ‘the instrument of the night’ (saz-e shab) due 
to its soft sonority, and is thought to be “well suited for spiritual music.”374 
Therefore, it is not insignificant that the night scene in which Aman was in the room 
listening to the instrument was not the tar, but the setar.  
In this outdoor scene, we get a shot of the darvish playing another instrument, 
the tanbour outside Aman’s window.375 A hand emerges from the windowpane and 
Aman gives him something to drink through the window. But the master overseer 
sees this and goes in and begins to beat Aman again complaining, “I brought you here 
                                                        
373 Kheshti, “Cross-Dressing,” 173. Kheshti has chosen to refer to Aman as ‘hir’ in 
order to gesture to the transgender subjectivity that the character has embodied.  
374 Jean During and Zia Mirabdolbaghi, The Art of Persian Music (Mage Publishers, 
1991) 122. For setar, see pages, 118-122; for tar, 127-133. For a study of writings on 
the theory and praxis of Persian music, see Mehrdad Fallahzadeh, Persian Writing on 
Music: A Study of Persian Musical Literature from 1000 to 1500 AD (Studia Iranica 
Upsalienisa-Uppsala Universitet 2005). 
375 The tanbour is an instrument that is considered sacred by the Sufis, especially 
among the Kurdish Sufis in Iran called Ahl-e Haqq (the People of Truth), who make 
ablutions before playing it; hence the instrument has a liturgical and ceremonial 
function in relation to the practices of zekr (remembrance), sama‘ (audition), and 
attaining mystical states of ecstasy (hal). 
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to work and to oversee the girls.” After being beaten, Aman looks up at the wool 
strings hanging from the rope in the room, and walks back and forth with her head 
bent backwards and rubs her face into the wool strings and smells their fragrance. 
The scene again gestures to the activation of the Lacanian feminine jouissance and 
ecstatic freedom. Incidentally, the unnamed musician that I have chosen to call a 
‘darvish,’ is often standing by her window or door, which is precisely what the 
etymology of the term darvish is derived from, namely “standing by the door.”376 
Indeed, there are many wandering darvishes or qalandars, itinerant Sufis who roam 
the Iranian country side and villages, often playing music or telling tales, though they 
are less prevalent in modern times, as Sufis are severely persecuted by the Iranian 
state apparatus, but it is still possible to find them wandering the remote villages in 
Iran.377 
In a later scene Aman suddenly wakes up when the wind slams the door of the 
room open, which was almost always locked by the overseer. Aman looks around the 
room, and then we see that the darvish is in the room and s/he becomes frightened.  
He grabs a bundle from where she sleeps, which seems to be Aman’s belongings. 
S/he hides behind the loom or weaving apparatus, afraid of his intentions. As he 
leaves, s/he looks at him with longing and trepidation, and he turns back to look at 
her, and she closes the door. With this act he is proposing to Aman to come with him, 
to go away with him from this prison, full of pain and suffering. This moment is 
filled with erotic ambiguity, does the male darvish recognize that Aman is a girl 
masquerading as a boy, or does he want to be with Aman as a “boy”? Thus, the 
question is: is his desire for Aman a heterosexual or a homoerotic desire? But Aman 
does not go after him and rejects his offer of love – in this instance the darvish’s love 
remains unrequited. In the morning she goes outside and brings back the sack that he 
took outside the house and we get a long shot of the darvish with his back to the 
                                                        
376 Carl W. Ernst, Sufism: An Introduction to the Mystical Tradition of Islam 
(Boulder, Colorado: Shambhala Publications, 2011), 3. 
377 For wandering darvishes and qalandars in Iranian history and thought see, 
Muhammad Reza Shafi’i-yi Kadkani, Qalandariyah dar Tarikh: Digarandisi-ha-yi 
yek Ide’olozhi (Tehran: Sokhan, 1386/2007); de Bruijn, J. T. P. “The Qalandariyyat 
in Persian Mystical Poetry from Sand'i Onwards” in Lewisohn, Leonard (ed.) in The 
Legacy of Mediæval Persian Sufism (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1992), 61–75; 
Ahmet T. Karamustafa, God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later 
Middle Period. 1200-1550 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1994). 
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camera leaving the village, an image that cinematically reverberates the film’s last 





3.7 The Lacanian Act and the Feminine ‘No!’ 
 
At the very end of Daughters of the Sun there is a double catch, a double 
ambiguity even operative at the last scene, as we see a shot of Aman(gol) leaving 
singing the same melancholic Azari song that she sang at the beginning of the film 
with her shaved head, but now she has donned her female dress (Figure 6).378 Is the 
final scene, then, to be read as the reassertion of her own agency and female 
identity?379 I would argue yes, and that indeed this is the ultimate lesson of the film. 
Aman’s gender re-signification or transgendering was not her choice, but an act that 
was imposed on her by paternal authority. This reading of the reassertion of her 
feminine identity is corroborated in Shahriar’s own statement regarding the film, as 
she states, “I never saw the shaving of the head as a physical thing…. It became a 
great metaphor for the loss of identity. What is your role now? How do you find out 
who you are? It’s NOT a cultural thing. Unfortunately all of us in the world have 
reached the same level… I wanted to say aside from our roles in society we should 
celebrate our femininity. No matter who you are or what you are, it’s wonderful to be 
a woman.”380 This gesture of Aman remaining faithful to the end to her femininity 
and female identity is itself the ultimate subversive act, and can be read as an instance 
of the Lacanian “authentic act” and the feminine ‘No!’ at its purest. In Lacanian 
ethics, the supreme ethical act or the “authentic act” is one in which the subject does 
not cede with respect to his or her desire.381 According to Lacan, the question that 
must be asked when speaking of the ethical act is, “Have you acted in conformity 
                                                        
378 According to Judy Stone, the sensors “wanted her [Shahriar] to cut the first and 
final scenes, but she adamantly refused. Her reaction was: ‘Over my dead body.’” 
See “Daughters of the Sun,” DVD booklet, 5.  
379 Moallem also reads the end of the film as Aman’s return to femininity. See 
Moallem, Between Warrior, 145.  
380 Maryam Shahriar cited in Judy Stone, DVD booklet, 4-5. 
381 Frances L. Restuccia, The Taming of the Real: Zizek’s Missed Encounter with 
Kieslowski’s Insight,” accessed April 01, 2015, http://www.lacan.com/white.htm 
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with the desire that is in you?”382 This is contrasted to “traditional ethics” of 
philosophers such as Aristotle or Kant. In traditional ethical theory, ethics revolves 
around a conception of the “Good,” where different kinds of “good” compete with 
the position of the “Sovereign Good.”383 In Lacanian ethics, this ideal of the “good” 
is seen as an obstacle to desire; hence in performing an authentic act, “a radical 
repudiation of a certain ideal of the good is necessary.”384 This ideal of the “good” is 
often what is purveyed as the Law in society. In this formulation, Aman burns the 
weaving sweatshop, which symbolically represents the patriarchal core of Iranian 
society and the state as the lynchpin of the Law (i.e., Islamic law), by remaining 
faithful to the end to her feminine self-identity (Figure 5). This is the enactment of 
the Lacanian “act” at its most subversive. 
This final act of Aman in which she burns the sweatshop, may be read in light 
of Žižek’s interpretation of Antigone’s suicidal act via Lacan (in Seminar VII, The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis), as the feminine act, and an instantiation of Lacan’s 
feminine jouissance. For Žižek the feminine character of the radical act is 
characterized in these terms:  
 
… every act worthy of this name is ‘mad’ in the sense of radical 
unaccountability: by means of it, I put at stake everything, including myself, 
my symbolic identity; the act is therefore always a ‘crime,’ a ‘transgression,’ 
namely of the limit of the symbolic community to which I belong. The act is 
defined by this irreducible risk: in its most fundamental dimension, it is always 
negative, i.e., an act of annihilation, of wiping out – we not only don’t know 
what will come out of it, its final outcome is ultimately even 
insignificant, strictly secondary in relation to the NO! of the pure act.385  
 
In this perspective Aman’s ‘No! of the pure act’ is a transgressive act that stands up 
to all that the overseer and the prisonlike sweatshop symbolize – the Iranian state 
apparatus as the Law.  Indeed, once the subject performs the act, s/he is no longer the 
same as before. This is precisely what Žižek formulates apropos Anigone’s act of 
saying “No!” to Creon (in Sophocles’ tragic play Antigone): 
 
                                                        
382 Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. New 
York: Routledge, 1996). 57. 
383 Dylan, An Introductory Dictionary, 57.  
384 Ibid, 57. 
385 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! (New York: Routledge, 2001) 44. 
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…the act is not simply something I ‘accomplish’ – after an act, I’m literally 
‘not the same as before’. In this sense, we could say that the subject 
‘undergoes’ the act (passes through it) rather than ‘accomplishes’ it: in it the 
subject is annihilated and subsequently reborn (or not), i.e., The act involves a 




Figure 3.5 Amangol burning the weaving sweatshop. 
 
This is how Aman returns to femininity from “masculinity,” she traverses or passes 
through masculinity as it were, via the passage through the act of burning the 
sweatshop. This act of using patrol to burn the weaving sweatshop is exactly how 
Lacan describes jouissance in Seminar XVII, where he states that jouissance,“Begins 
with a tickle and ends with blaze of petrol.” That’s always what jouissance is.387 
Through the act, Aman’s “masculine” subjectivity is “annihilated”, an aphanisis 
through the fire as it were, and she is subsequently “reborn” in her femininity as a 
woman, signified through her wearing of the dress once again, the marker of the 
reassertion of her femininity. Thus, like Antigone, Aman’s feminine ‘No!’ of the pure 
ethical act of burning the overseer’s sweatshop, is the eruption of the Lacanian Real 
                                                        
386 Žižek,  Enjoy Your Symptom!, 44. 
387 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis 
Book XVII, Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (New York/London: 
W.W.Norton & Company, 2007), 72.   
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into the Symbolic, and stands as a powerful symbol of the emancipatory potential and 
resistance of women in Iran to the authoritarian rule and patriarchal state of the 
Islamic Republic. In this instance, Aman’s character also represents or stands as the 
alter ego for Shahriar the director of the film herself, and her own act of defiance 
through the making of this film. It is little wonder then that the censors wanted the 
last scenes to be cut out of the film, since they were politically savvy enough to read 
the subversive core of the film’s message at the end, but Shahriar refused saying, 
“Over my dead body,” and we are left with one of the most memorable scenes of 










In this chapter I focused on the formation of the (Lacanian) subject through 
the figure of Amangol, and how the female subject may destabilize or transgress that 
subject positioning assigned to her or imposed on her in the (patriarchal) symbolic 
order. In Daughters of the Sun, Amangol’s journey of subject formation or 
constitution of self-identity goes through several Lacanian or psychoanalytic 
operations, the first of which is the installation of the subject, namely Amangol, into 
the symbolic order through symbolic castration and the ‘The-Name-of-the-Father,’ 
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(le nom-du-père), or the paternal metaphor, by re-signifying her from femininity to 
masculinity, indexed by shaving her hair and renaming her Aman. In the texture of 
the film Aman’s cross-dressing or gender masquerading results in a homoerotic 
configuration between her and Belghis, which I read via Lacan’s concept of objet 
petit a, or the object cause of desire, the object which is the remainder of the Real, 
and that resists symbolization. Here the subversive power of love was staged, in 
which regardless of gender or sexuality, the misrecognition of Aman as male by 
Bilghis and Aman’s reciprocation of this love, stages the fact that love is beyond 
normative conceptions of gender and sexuality. In this way, a full configuration of 
female homoeroticism or lesbian love was staged in the film, since Amangol and 
Belgis were literally women (played by female actresses). The beginning of Aman’s 
rebellion was theorized through the activation of feminine jouissance, an enjoyment 
beyond the limits of logic and reason, and in what Lacan calls “Love beyond the 
Law,” the sublimation of drives through the “Thing,” (das Ding)388 a mystical 
ecstatic surrender to the subversive core of her desire that is emancipatory. The motif 
of misrecognition in the film was also brought to the fore through Badiou’s use of 
Lacan’s concept of “misrecognition” in which it functions as the way the Real 
operates through masks, and in relation to Aman having to mask her gender identity 
through cross-dressing, in which the ambiguity of male homoeroticism (shahid-bazi) 
was staged through the figure of the darvish. Finally, the end of the film stages the 
Lacanian ethical act and the feminine ‘No’ – around which all the various elements of 
the chapter circulate – and the full activation of feminine jouissance, where Aman 
defies the demands of the symbolic imposed on her by figures of paternal authority 
(her father, the master-overseer), and traverses from masculinity back to femininity 
by sacrificing her embodied masculinity through the act of burning the carpet-
weaving sweat shop, representative of her bondage and captivity. In the end, the 
symbolic identification between Amangol and Shahriar as filmmaker resound a 
profound critique of the patriarchal order that is the Islamic Republic, in suppressing 
female self-identity and femininity.  
  
                                                        
388 Freud’s concept of ‘The Thing’ or das Ding (la chose) in Lacan is a complex 
topic, but for our purposes here, it refers to the object of desire or the primordially 
lost object, which is forever to be resought. It is the prehistoric and immemorial 




Unheimlich between the Weird and the Eerie: 


































Dreaming of a Nightmare in Tehran: The Fright of Real Desires in Atomic Heart 
  
If you are caught in another’s dream, you are done for. 
 
- Gilles Deleuze389 
 
Before the eve of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Michel Foucault, who was intensely 
engrossed with the events in Tehran, wrote a series of articles on the revolutionary 
events, in one of which he posed an uncharacteristically psychoanalytic inflected 
question: “What are the Iranians dreaming about?”390 After the events of the 2009 
presidential election and the subsequent protest movement, which functions as the 
backdrop for Atomic Heart, we may ask the question again today: what are the 
Iranians Dreaming of in Tehran? The cinematic answer provided by Atomic Heart, at 
least, seems to be: they are dreaming of a nightmare in Tehran. The nightmare is not 
only related to the fears and anxieties of a possible nuclear destruction of Tehran, but 
more precisely, to the totalitarian nightmare of the Islamic Republic, personified in 
the monstrous dictatorial figure of Toofan. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the double or two-part structure in Ali 
Ahmadzadeh’s “surrealist” road film Atomic Heart (Qalb-e atomi, 2015), in which 
the first part is considered as the realist and the second part as the surrealist half of 
the film. I will argue that the two parts of the film represent the world of fantasy in 
the first and the world of desire in the second that are staged horizontally as it 
were.391  This formal double-structure is advanced by the director’s own reading of 
the film, as he states in a post-screening of the film at the Berlin Film Festival, “The 
most important aspect of the film for me is that the first part and second part are 
                                                        
389 This is part of what Deleuze says in a lecture on cinema, see “Gilles Deleuze on 
Cinema: What is the Creative Act, 1987”, accessed October 16, 2016,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_hifamdISs 
390 For this article by Foucault, see Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and 
the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism  (Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 2005) 203-9. For a critical reassessment of Afary’s and Anderson’s 
reading of Foucault’s involvement in the Iranian Revolution, see Behrooz Ghamari-
Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution After the Enlightenment (Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016).  
391 Todd McGowan in his reading of Lynch’s Mulholland Drive (2001) also splits the 
two parts of the film into the world of fantasy (first part) and the world of desire 
(second part). See Todd McGowan, The Impossible David Lynch (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007) 194-219. 
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differentiated. The first part is reality and the second part, when the character of 
Mohammad Reza Golzar [Toofan] appears, is the surreal part. The film is a contrast 
between realism and surrealism.”392 However, this standard reading has to be turned 
around, as I will suggest that the first part of the film is the fantasy half, and the 
second part of the film is the reality half. By ‘reality’ here, I intend a very precise 
psychoanalytic notion of reality, that is: when reality is deprived of its fantasmatic 
supplement, reality itself turns into a kind of nightmarish surreality. When reality is 
stripped of its frame of fantasy, we do not just get reality as such, but what we get is 
“an ‘irreal’ nightmarish universe,” too traumatic to be approached directly, which is 
why we must fictionalize it. As Kant knew very well, we can never know the real 
kernel of reality in-itself. Kant made a distinction between phenomenal reality as 
appearance, to which we have access, and the noumenon as the thing in-itself, which 
we cannot access with our categories of reason; this is preicsley where our reason 
falls into antinomies or contradictions; in this sense, reality always requires a 
transcendental schema in order to be constituted as reality.393 The psychoanalytic 
name for the Kantian transcendental scheme is fantasy.394 As Žižek states apropos the 
notion of fantasy in Lacan:   
 
when the phantasmic frame disintegrates, the subject undergoes a 'loss of 
reality' and starts to perceive reality as an ‘irreal’ nightmarish universe with 
no firm ontological foundation; this nightmarish universe is not 'pure fantasy’ 
but, on the contrary, that which remains of reality after reality is deprived of 
its support in fantasy.395  
 
Indeed, although on the surface it appears that the first part of the film is reality, shot 
in a realist style, where there is the normal run of things and the second part is 
surreality; what I argue instead is that the first part is the fantasy narrative or the 
fantasmatic scenario, and the second part is reality deprived of its fantasmatic 
                                                        
392 Post-screening discussion with Ali Ahmadzadeh, “Iranian Film "Madare ghalb 
atomi" (“Atom Heart Mother”) @ Berlin Film Festival 2015”, accessed October 09, 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxA3wLhVs3E 
393 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer  and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998) 362. 
394 Žižek writes, “In order to experience something as part of our reality, it has to fit 
the frame that determines the coordinates of our reality; Kant’s name for this frame is 
the transcendental scheme, and the psychoanalytic name is fantasy.” Slavoj Žižek, 
Disparities (New York/London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016) 14.  
395 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (New York: Verso, 2008), 66. 
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support. It is precisely when reality is deprived of its frame of fantasy that we 
encounter the traumatic Real, the Real in the Lacanian sense, that which appears in 
reality more then reality itself and distorts it. In the film, this Real appears as the Real 
of desire, which acts as a distortion of reality, since the way “desire inscribes itself 
into reality, [is] by distorting it. Desire is a wound of reality.”396 In this sense, desire 
acts as a distortion of reality in the second half of the film and what we get is a kind 
of nightmarish reality, since the fantasy support that sustained the coordinates of 
reality has collapsed. Therefore, I argue that Atomic Heart is comprised of three 
ontological registers: fantasy, reality, and the Real.397 The first part is representative 
of the world of fantasy and the second part that of the world of desire. It is in the 
world of desire in the second part of the film that the Real in all its traumatic horror 
appears through the character of Toofan, and where Arineh and Nobahar are 
confronted not only with the fright of the Real of their forbidden desire– forbidden 
because it is a homoerotic desire; but also with the mystery of the Other’s desire 
(Toofan) in all its uncanny dimension. In another formulation the entire film is 
structured like a dream, where the first half is the dream as fantasy or the dream as 
wish fulfillment (in Freudian terms), and the second half of the film is where the 
dream sequence turns into a nightmare.  
 
4.1 Unheimlich between the Weird and the Eerie   
 
There is a notable shift in the films that are emerging from Iran today from the art-
house films of the New Iranian Cinema discussed in the previous chapter and that 
used to populate and dominate international film festivals with directors such as 
Kiarostami, Makhmalbaf, Panahi, Rasoulof, and Ghobadi; a shift which was even 
noted by the film scholar Kristin Thompson in her review of Iranian films at the 
Vancouver International Film Festival in 2014, including A Girl Walks Home Alone 
at Night by Ana Lily Amirpour (2014) and Shahram Mokri’s Mahi va gorbeh (Fish 
and Cat, 2013). Kristin Thompson states:  
 
                                                        
396 Slavoj Žižek, A Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (dir. Sophie Fiennes, 2006). Film. 
397 Frances Restuccia also considers Mulholland Drive (2001) to comprise the same 
three ontological levels. See Frances Restuccia, The Blue Box: Kristevan/Lacanian 
Readings of Contemporary Cinema (London/New York: Continuum, 2012) 95. 
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Maybe it’s just the particular selection of Iranian films at this year’s festival, 
but I sensed a shift from the ones we’ve seen in previous years…. all three of 
the Iranian fiction features this year depart from some conventions we’ve 
grown used to in the New Iranian Cinema of the past decades.”398  
 
Indeed, Ali Ahmadzadeh’s new ‘surrealist’ road film Atomic Heart (Qalb-e atomi, 
2015) also called Atomic Heart Mother (Madar-e qalb atomi), must be included in 
this band of new Iranian films where a visible shift can be detected between the New 
Iranian cinema of the mid 1990s and 2000s, with its unique style and recognizable 
conventions (i.e., the blurring of documentary and narrative fiction, the use of non-
professional actors, rural landscapes, etc.), and these emerging avant-garde and genre 
bending films. Despite some minor continuities between this film and the older 
generation of Iranian films, such as the well known motif of an entire film centering 
on characters driving and talking in a car, it is in its discontinuities that we may 
discern the shift away from the earlier New Iranian cinema.399 In order to theorize 
this new shift in Iranian cinema, I situate Ahmadzadeh’s film Atomic Heart, and 
Amirpour’s film A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night (analyzed in chapter 5), as two 
films that are part of a new filmic movement that I have termed: Unheimlich between 
the Weird and the Eerie. I rely on Mark Fisher’s theorizing of the two modes that he 
uncovers in certain instances of music, novels and films, and that he characterizes as 
“The Weird and the Eerie (Beyond the Unheimlich).”  
In his eponymous book, The Weird and the Eerie (2016), Fisher considers that 
although the weird and the eerie are two distinct modes, there is a common logic that 
structures them both, namely the logic of “the strange” and “the outside”, he states:  
 
“What the weird and the eerie have in common is a preoccupation with the 
strange. The strange — not the horrific. The allure that the weird and the eerie 
possess is not captured by the idea that we “enjoy what scares us”. It has, 
rather, to do with a fascination for the outside, for that which lies beyond 
standard perception, cognition and experience. This fascination usually 
involves a certain apprehension, perhaps even dread — but it would be wrong 
                                                        
398 See Kristian Thompson, “Iranian cinema moves on,” Thursday, October 9, 2014, 
accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2014/10/09/middle-
eastern-fare-at-viff/ 
399 Ahmadzadeh seems to be influenced mostly by Abbas Kiarostami’s aesthetics in 
this respect, especially Kiarostami’s Taste of Cherry and Ten with much of the action 
set in a car. Another example may be in the way that one film acts as a catalyst for 
another film, such as Kirostami’s Koker trilogy and Ahmadzadeh’s own previous 
film Kami’s Party (2013), which acts as a catalyst for Atomic Heart. 
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to say that the weird and the eerie are necessarily terrifying. I am not here 
claiming that the outside is always beneficent. There are more than enough 
terrors to be found there; but such terrors are not all there is to the outside.”400 
 
This concern with the strange rather then the horrific is what distinguishes the weird 
and the eerie. The two modes are highly refined in this sense, since they are not 
simply to be collapsed with another genre, namely ‘horror’, although they can evoke 
affects such as dread and terror often associated with horror films (and novels), but it 
is a peculiar sense of a terror that is to be found in the ‘outside’, something that 
gestures to an outside in our common existing reality, which does not sit comfortably 
with our common-sense notions of reality: this is what is evoked by the weird and the 
eerie. Fischer claims that he came late to discover the particularity of the two modes 
of the weird and the eerie because they were obscured by Freud’s concept of the 
uncanny (unheimlich) (meaning ‘unhomely’ in the original German and translated by 
James Starchey as ‘uncanny’). He notes that, “The unheimlich is often equated with 
the weird and the eerie — Freud’s own essay treats the terms as interchangeable. ”401 
In a moment of pure inspiration it should be said, Fisher considers “psychoanalysis 
itself as an unheimlich genre; [since] it is haunted by an outside which it circles 
around but can never fully acknowledge or affirm.”402 The examples of the 
unheimilch that Freud discusses in his essay are “doubles, mechanical entities that 
appear human, prosthesis” all of which “call up a certain disquiet”.403 Indeed, Fisher 
does consider that the weird and the eerie do have something in common with the 
unheimlich, since “They are all affects, but they are also modes: modes of film and 
fiction, modes of perception, ultimately, you might even say, modes of being. Even 
so, they are not quite genres.”404 Although Fisher makes a strong case that the weird 
and the eerie are beyond the Freudian uncanny (unheimlich), I would argue that the 
weird and the eerie may be considered as the two poles of the experience of the 
uncanny, rather then beyond it. In this sense, unheimlich is situated between the 
weird and the eerie. 
                                                        
400 Mark Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie (London: Repeater Books, 2016), 8. 
401 Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, 9.  
402 Ibid, 10.  
403 Ibid, 10. 
404 Ibid, 9. 
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Fisher then sets out to provide the qualities or characteristics that distinguish 
the weird from the eerie, or what is particular and peculiar to each mode. According 
to Fisher the weird concerns what does not belong. “… the weird is that which does 
not belong. The weird brings to the familiar something which ordinarily lies beyond 
it, and which cannot be reconciled with the “homely” (even as its negation). The form 
that is perhaps most appropriate to the weird is montage — the conjoining of two or 
more things which do not belong together.”405 For Fisher, the experience of the weird 
has something to do with “a particular kind of perturbation. It involves a sensation of 
wrongness: a weird entity or object is so strange that it makes us feel that it should 
not exist, or at least it should not exist here.”406 According to Fisher, what the weird 
stages is that the sense of wrongness is not with the weird thing as such, but what it 
renders palpable is the very inadequacy of our conceptions and categories to account 
for it.407 The film director that he exemplifies as the master of the weird mode is none 
other than David Lynch, especially the uses of curtains, doorways and gateways in 
Lynch’s cinematic oeuvre. Indeed, as we shall see, the Lynchian universe is a point 
of reference both for Ahmadzadeh and Amripour (Amirpour directly cites Lynch as 
an inspirational source not just for A Girl, but as an artist). For Fisher, the 
predilection for weird juxtapositions is what links the weird to surrealism, which 
rendered the unconscious into a montage machine. In this respect Fisher considers 
Lacan to be the exponent of “a weird psychoanalysis, in which the death drive, 
dreams and the unconscious become untethered from any naturalisation or sense of 
homeliness.”408 Although, it is true that Lacan was close to the surrealist movement 
and drew inspiration from surrealism early in his career, but it should be said that 
psychoanalysis did not need to wait for Lacan to come along for it to be weird, since 
Freudian psychoanalysis was already weird enough from the beginning.409 The 
weirdness of psychoanalysis itself may account for why the surrealists were attracted 
to psychoanalysis in the first place. 
                                                        
405 Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, 10-11.  
406 Ibid, 15. 
407 Ibid, 15. 
408 Ibid, 11. 
409 The London Freud Museum video introduction to psychoanalysis begins with the 
question: “What is Psychoanalysis? Part 1: Is it Weird?” accessed May 09, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pxaFeP9Ls5c 
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Apropos the eerie, Fisher notes that although the eerie may at first glance bear 
a closer resemblance to the uncanny (unheimlich) than the weird, what the weird and 
the eerie have in common is a relation to the ‘outside.’ In case of the eerie, the 
‘outside’ can be understood both at an “empirical as well as a more abstract 
transcendental sense.” According to Fisher the sense of the eerie is never evoked by 
enclosed or inhabited domestic spaces, but we can discover the eerie “more readily in 
landscapes partially emptied of the human.” The questions that may be evoked at 
looking at desolate landscapes or abandoned buildings, emptied out streets and ruins 
evoke the sense of the eerie, “What happened to produce these ruins, this 
disappearance? What kind of entity was involved? What kind of thing was it that 
emitted such an eerie cry?”410 For Fisher what marks the weird is an exorbitant 
presence or over presence of something, but “The eerie, by contrast, is constituted by 
a failure of absence or by a failure of presence. The sensation of the eerie occurs 
either when there is something present where there should be nothing, or there is 
nothing present when there should be something.”411 According to Fisher the eerie is 
related to the unknown, once we obtain sufficient knowledge of a thing or 
phemnomenon, the eerie disappears.412 The films of Kubrick, Tarkovsky and Nolan 
are all characterized by the eerie, according to Fisher, since they often evoke a radical 
alterity so align to our ordinary sense of reality that we cannot properly symbolize it 
within the coordinates of our signification. In this sense, although Fisher does not 
make the connection, the eerie can be correlated to “the inertia of the Real, this mute 
presence beyond meaning.”413 It is this mute presence of the Real that resists our 
attempts at symbolization.  
  One of the Iranian authors whose influence may be said to haunt this new 
avant-garde film movement like a spectral presence, is the modernist fiction writer, 
essayist and folklorist Sadeq Hedayat (1903-1951) – the Iranian Kafka (it should be 
recalled that Hedayat translated Kafka’s Metamorphoses into Persian and wrote a 
literary analysis of Kafka called, “the Message of Kafka (1948)”). The work of 
Hedayat may indeed be said not only to contain aspects of the Freudian Unheimlich 
or the uncanny, but also the two modes of the weird and the eerie, particularly in the 
                                                        
410 Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, 11. 
411 Ibid, 11. 
412 Fisher, The Weird and the Eerie, 62. 
413 Žižek, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology. 
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group of his works categorized by Homa Katouzian as “psycho-fiction.” Katouzian 
considers this group of works by Hedayat to be influenced more by Jung rather than 
Freud, but I would argue that contrary to Katouzian’s suggestion,414 it is in Freudian 
(and Lacanian) psychoanalytic theory that we can discover the key to Hedayat’s 
psycho-fiction. Indeed, the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis on Hedayat has 
been demonstrated by the Iranian psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Mohammad Sanati 
and discussed in his book on Hedayat.415 In a piece that Sanati wrote on the history of 
psychoanalysis in Iran for the Iranian newspaper Farhang-e Emrooz (Today’s 
Culture), he writes: “…the oldest writing that I have encountered that has dealt with 
psychoanalytic theories is the satirical piece called, ‘The Case of Freudism’, 
published by Sadeq Hedayat in the book, ‘Vagh Vagh Sahab,’ in 1313/1934, the 
same year of the establishment of the University of Tehran.”416 Hedayat was perhaps 
one of the first Iranian authors who was directly influenced by Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and as Katouzian notes by the “techniques of French symbolisme and 
surrealism in literature, [and] of surrealism in modern European art, and of 
expressionism in the contemporary European films…”417 This last aspect of the 
influence of German expressionist cinema on Hedayat’s work is profoundly 
significant as well, in light of the new avant-garde film movement exemplified by 
Atomic Heart, and especially A Girl.  
In a documentary-drama film directed by Khosrow Sinai called Goftegoo ba 
Sayeh (Talking with a Shadow, 2000), the influence of German expressionist cinema 
is foregrounded in relation to Hedayat’s work, specifically the influence of three 
                                                        
414 Homa Katouzian, “Introduction: The Wondrous World of Sadeq Hedayat,” in 
Sadeq Hedayat: His Work and His Wondrous World, ed. Homa Katouzian (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 10. 
415 Mohammad Sanati, Sadegh Hedayat va Haras az Marg (Tehran, Markaz, 1380).  
416 See Mohammad Sanati, “Vorood-e Ravakavi be Iran va Ertebat Yaftan an ba 
Adabiyat/ Az Freud ta Kalemat-e Hedayat.” Wednesday 23 Esfand, 1396, accessed 
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films that Hedayat saw whilst in Europe, Paul Wegener’s Der Golem (1915), F. W. 
Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922), and Tod Browning’s Dracula (1931). In the film, one of 
the characters says to the another (Mehdi Ahmadi) that the motif of the shadow 
(sayeh) has become really intriguing for him and quotes from Hedayat’s The Blind 
Owl, “If I have now made up my mind to write it is only in order to reveal myself to 
my shadow, that shadow which at this moment is stretched across the wall in the 
attitude of one devouring with insatiable appetite each word I write.”418 Then he 
states that he has found the films – der Golem, Nosferatu, and Dracula – and watched 
them and that in all the films the shadow plays a central role. In response, Mehdi 
Ahmadi’s character says, “ yes, all these films are related to that period, the art of 
expressionism, expressionist cinema and psychoanalytic debates were very 
prominent, and it was a topic of intense interest, which was precisely around the same 
time when Hedayat was in Europe. But the role of the shadow is also very interesting 
to me.” Ahmadi also quotes from Hedayat’s work called, ‘Some Notes on Vis and 
Ramin,’ where Hedayat states, “parallel to water, which is the glory and honor of the 
material world, the shadow has an importance in the non-material world (ghayr-e 
madi)…etymologically, the shadow (sayeh) has the meaning of the double, and 
shadow-stricken (sayeh zadeh), and Jinn-stricken or possessed by jinn (jinn gerefteh), 
and also it refers to a spiritual essence (seresht-e rohani), which appears in a material 
body (heykal-e madi).” All of these motifs not only bear a clear resemblance to 
Freud’s Unheimlich or the uncanny, but also gesture to the possibility of reading his 
work, especially his psychoanalytically inflected fiction, as the privileged site of the 
weird and the eerie. Therefore, Hedayat’s work must be seen as the spectral presence 
that haunts this new avant-garde film movement theorized in this section.  
What distinguishes and characterizes the films of this new film movement that 
I have called the weird and the eerie is their evocation of the menacing environment 
of post-2009 Iran (which includes diasproic or exilic films like A Girl), and a number 
of thematics that they commonly share. For example, among the various components 
shared by this movement, and discussed in the following two chapters at various 
points, are such motifs as political and ideological critique through the deployment of 
supernatural elements or occult phenomenon (devil/satan, vampires, jinn, Aal and 
                                                        
418 Sadegh Hedayat, The Blind Owl, trans. D.P. Costello (New York: Grove Press, 
2010), 2. 
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zaar, etc.). They also touch on such taboo subjects as (female and male) 
sex/sexuality, homosexuality or queerness in Iran. They are often pervaded by 
doubles or Doppelgängers, dreamlike worlds, nightmarish landscapes, paranoid and 
menacing atmospheres, invisible threatening forces, and a sense of pervading fear and 
terror or impending doom. Some of these thematics appear in the film form or style 
which share certain formal features with the universe of German expressionism and 
film noir that includes such techniques as contrasts of light, dark, and shadows; 
evoking a sense of mystery, dread, existential angst, moral corruption and crime; 
these are evident especially in their use of color, light and darkness (low-key lighting, 
or chiaroscuro lighting), the mise-en-scène, setting, objects and spaces; and camera 
techniques such as strange unbalanced (tilted) off angle shots (Dutch angle) or 
oblique angle shots, long takes, extreme long takes, and even the entire film as a 
single take (especially Shahram Mokri). The soundtrack or musical score of the films 
may also contain subversive Iranian undergraound music (A Girl is emblematic in 
this respect, although it is not one of the thematics that I discuss in the chapter). This 
is precisely why I consider these films to constitute a new movement, since beyond 
embodying the two modes of the weird and the eerie, they share a common set of 
motifs that evoke the menacing and suffocating atmosphere of post-2009 Iranian 
society.419 
Ahmadzadeh’s film seems to be inspired and influenced not only by Iranian 
cinema and literature, but also by transnational cinema and literature. Among some of 
the literary works that seem to be a visible influence on the film is Mikhaiel 
Bulghokov’s novel The Master and Margarita as the lead character of that novel is 
the Devil (the Judeo-Christian and Islamic concept of the Devil, itself has an Iranian 
provenance and is influenced by Zoroastrianism through the figure of Ahriman), and 
the novel deploys the supernatural as an allegory of the totalitarian structure of the 
                                                        
419 Aspects of this new cinematic movement theorized here may resonate with 
cultural elements in contemporary Iran, which has seen a rise in interest in classical 
Islamic occult sciences (‘ulum-e khafiyya or ‘ulum-e ghariba) with an amalgamation 
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Princeton University Press, 2018); cf. “Hollywood Cosmopolitanisms and the Occult 
Resonance of Cinema” (unpublished article, forthcoming in Comparative Islamic 
Studies); cf. “Portrait of an Iranian Witch”, The New Inquiry Magazine Volume 21, 
October, 2013, pp. 36-43. 
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Soviet State with the Devil as Stalin. Another important influence is George Orwell’s 
book 1984, in which the figures of Big Brother or Ministry of Truth function as 
important points of reference. The influence of the works of Kafka such as the Trial 
are also evident, as well as  Dostoevsky’s The Double, especially the logic of the 
double or Doppelgänger operative in it, since it is one of the instances of the Freudian 
unheimlich. However, it is perhaps to the cinema of David Lynch, the emblematic 
cinema of the weird, that Ahmadzadeh’s film has the most striking resemblance. In 
its formal structure Atomic Heart, more than any other Iranian film, has an uncanny 
resemblance to the two-part structure of the two masterpieces of the Lynchian 
universe: Lost Highway (1997) and Mulholland Drive (2001), but especially to the 
latter. 
 
4.2 Reality Structured by Fantasy or Fantasy as an Ideological Category 
 
On the surface the first part of Atomic Heart has a straightforward narrative 
realism that does not require any explication. The first part of the film’s narrative 
story can be summed up briefly. After a night of partying in one of the underground 
house parties in Tehran, two upper-middle class girls in their 20s Arineh (Taraneh 
Alidoosti) and Nobahar (Pegah Ahangarani) leave, half drunk, in their car after 
midnight. Once they are on the road they run into their friend Kami (Mehrdad 
Sedighiyan) (the absent character of Alizadeh’s previous film, Kami’s Party (2013)) 
who is walking home at night wearing a pair of sunglasses. After a short ride the 
three of them stop by the side of the road overlooking Tehran, with the implication 
that they have just smoked a joint. They start conversing about subjects ranging from 
the history of the structure of Western toilets (see below) to the nuclear issue; from 
ridiculous male pickup lines, to Kami’s nightmare about the nuclear destruction of 
Tehran (which incidentally was not called Tehran in the dream, but Atomic Heart 
Mother, after the title song of the same name by the British rock’n’roll band Pink 
Floyd). After this they cruise the highway in Tehran, like other bored Iranian youth, 
and start to sing together the song by Michel Jackson, “We are the World,” after 
which they get into an accident (as I will discuss later, this is not incidental, since the 
accident functions as the abrupt jolt that concludes the film’s first fantasy half and 
inaugurates the second part of the film, where we are confronted with reality devoid 
of fantasy; the appearance of the Real in all its monstrosity).  
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After the accident which inaugurates the second half of the film, they meet a 
mysterious stranger named Toofan, who pays for the damages to the owner of the 
other car and does not accept to be reimbursed, but asks for a ride. It is here that the 
story turns into the weird and the eerie, since Toofan is not what he seems. Soon 
after, whilst driving through Tehran at night, Arineh and Nobahar are introduced to a 
nightmarish world of dead dictators and parallel worlds, and cannot seem to escape 
the hold of Toofan who becomes ever more menacing, and who seems to bend time 
and space and reappear at will. I will come to an analysis of the second part of the 
film later. 
The narrative story of the first part of the film has a clear and straightforward 
realism, which is why Alizadeh himself considers it to be the realist half of the film. 
After leaving the party and looking for where they may have parked their car (since 
they are drunk they can’t really remember where they parked the car), one of the girls 
says, “I will now divide the street into two parts, before the revolution, and after the 
revolution.” And the other girl says, “I’ll go to before the revolution.” Beside an 
allusion to the two part structure of the film again, this is one of the narrative clues as 
to the formal logic of the film, where the first part represents in a way pre-revolution 
Iran, or the Pahlavi era, but again a fantasmatic pre-revolutionary Iran where the 
middle and upper class youth imagine it to be a time of unfettered freedom, 
enjoyment and pleasures, and the second half as post-revolutionary Iran, a kind of 
nightmarish universe in which the two girls are terrorized by Toofan who is the 
embodiment of the State (or as we shall see a figure that simultaneously embodies 
diabolical evil or the Devil, the figure of a dictator, and Mahmud Ahmadinejad), and 
hence the Lacanian Real in all its terrifying dimension.  
Now what is crucial at the formal level is that the film structures the 
difference between the first fantasmatic part and the second surreality half 
representing reality deprived of its fantasy frame. The first part of the film, in 
contrast, produces a scenario in which Nobahar and Arineh can enjoy themselves: 
they are coming from a party, drunk, joking and laughing; the mood is light and 
jovial, comedic and peaceful; and the first part of the film concludes with them 
singing the song, “We Are the World.” This song itself functions as emblematic of 
the atmosphere of the first half of the film. This is precisely the fantasy frame that 
supports the coordinates of their reality in Tehran, without all these fantasmatic 
elements (such as parties, drinking, smoking drugs, incessant jokes and laughter), 
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reality itself would disintegrate and what we get is a nightmarish world – which is 
precisely what we get in the second part of the film. It is here that fantasy functions 
as an ideological category, disguising a deadlock or antagonism in reality, as Žižek 
states apropos the fantasmatic structure of ideology, “Ideology is not a dreamlike 
illusion that we build to escape insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a 
phantasy construction which serves as a support for our “reality” itself; an “illusion” 
which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some 
insupportable, real, impossible kernel…”420 What this ideology or fantasy 
construction masks represented by the first half of the film is the impossible Real 
kernel embodied in the figure of Toofan (typifying the figure of Ahmadinejad) that 
appears in the second part of the film, and who stands for the traumatic Real kernel of 
their situation, a situation that Ahmadzadeh wishes to equate with violence and 
repression in the Islamic Republic and its homology with the dictatorial logic of 
totalitarianism. 
In the film, this separation between the experience of fantasy and reality (and 
the Real of desires) is rendered through changes in the lighting, camera work, editing, 
and the overall character of the shots between the first and second parts of the film. In 
the first part, all the shots of the camera are even and the lines are straight and the 
camera is stable, but in the second part, after the accident scene, already the camera 
angle becomes skewed, we get a dutch angle shot throughout the scene, gesturing 
towards the uncanny dimension of the world which we have entered not unlike the 
world of film noir – a world without the support of fantasy and the appearance of the 
Real, the Real in all its traumatic dimension. As soon as the mysterious figure of 
Toofan appears within the frame, the lighting visibly becomes darker and the 
atmosphere of the film changes. A filter is placed on the camera lens and from this 
moment onwards this world is sufficed with an aura of darkness with dark blue tones. 
Just before Toofan appears the colors are bright, with lighter tones and bright lighting 
that bring out the tones in natural colors that accentuate the sense of the light mood 
and brightness in the texture of the first half (happy, boisterous, peaceful, etc.). This 
mood is even gestured to by Nobahar’s whistling of the theme song of the cartoon 
television show that they discussed earlier in the film. But, when the figure of Toofan 
suddenly leaves the frame, the police appeares on the scene of the accident (this 
                                                        
420 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, (New York: Verso, 1989) 45. 
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disappearance of Toofan at the appearance of the police also suggests a link between 
the Law and Toofan), it is as if he represents the obscene underside or double of the 
police/law, and they cannot be framed together since they are both one entity, which 
is why after the police leaves, Toofan mysteriously reappears again (strangely the 
name of the police is Ahmadzadeh, which is the same as the director’s last name: this 
is a bizarre moment of self-reflexive identification that can only makes sense in light 
of the police’s comments to Arineh where he states, “even you guys with your looks 
are sometimes in agreement with the regime”). In this sense, the police acts as 
Ahmadzadeh’s alter-ego who also finds himself in agreement with the regime at 
times, (i.e., this is gestured to in the scene where Arineh and Nobahar agree with the 
police on the stereotypical and demonizing depictions of Iran and Iranians in 
Hollywood films such as Argo (2012), etc). During Toofan’s absence the filter is 
removed again from the lens and we get the bright lighting back, but when he returns 
again later, the dark filter is placed back on the camera lens and the lighting of the 
diegetic reality of the world is baptized in darkness. 
 In the second part of the film, the lighting is not only much darker, but the 
editing also undergoes a radical shift. For example, in the second part, in an 
important scene when Arineh runs from the apartment staircase with the camera 
following her, we get a continuous steady-camera long-take without a cut, which at a 
formal level, stages the fear and anxiety of Arineh. The same shot is re-doubled when 
she comes back up the stairs, and the camera follows her in a continuous shot or 
single-take without a cut to the roof. This editing technique suggests that there is an 
ontological difference between the two worlds of fantasy and reality; and when 
reality is deprived of its fantasmatic supplement the uncanny dimension of the Real 
manifests itself.  
 
4.3 Ideology and the Structure of Toilets 
 
One of the elementary lessons of cinema studies and film theory is the 
analysis of the formal structure of the beginning and endings of film. Films often 
begin with an establishing shot which stages within the mise-en-scène some of the 
motifs that may often play a significant role in the film, and can contain key elements 
that illuminate the film text when read retroactively. Therefore, the proper theoretical 
question to be asked here is: why does Atomic Heart early on begin with a shot of 
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Nobahar sitting on the toilet? Lets examine this first scene in some detail. The film 
effectively begins with a shot of Nobahar sitting on the toilet. The camera slowly 
tracks vertically from her shoes, which are incidentally two different colors, one blue 
and the other red,421 and finally the camera moves to a close-up of her face. The first 
thing to be noted about this scene is that it would certainly have been considered 
inappropriate to the censors, since showing a woman sitting in the toilet is beyond the 
limits of the modesty system (hejab), not least that we get a close-up of her face in 
this most private of spaces. It is likely that this scene was among the many scenes 
that the censors found objectionable and for which the film has never been granted 
permission for screening in Iran. Indeed, the film was denied initial screening in 
Iran’s most prestigious film festival, the Fajr Film Festival. In the semi-official 
Iranian news agency called Fars News, one of the so-called purported objections to 
the film was its discussion of the nuclear issue.422  
This scene already adumbrates a number of motifs that runs throughout the 
film. First, the same toilet scene is repeated in the second part of the film, this time 
with Arineh sitting on the toilet. Then there is repeated reference and discussion of 
toilets in the film or the need of the characters (Nobahar and Arieneh) to avail 
themselves of the toilet. But, more crucially the first instance of the dialogue in the 
film is from Nobahar who exclaims to Arineh, “Whoever invented the Western toilet 
certainly created the most important invention in human history!” Indeed, this first 
line of dialogue and the first scene on the toilet takes on added significance later in 
the first part of the film, where Kami provides the cultural history of the structure of 
Western toilets and how they were originally Persian in ancient times. Nobahar asks 
Kami saying, “Kami, do you know who invented western toilets?” and Kami 
responds, “The western toilet was Iranian at first (originally). Then they changed its 
name.” Then Nobahar says in characteristic naivety, “seriously?” And Kami states, 
“Yes, the ancient Achaemenids really took care of their joints. Because they were 
mostly warriors, and engaged in a lot of physical activities. So, they built a stone 
platform with a cesspool in the middle. They would sit on it and do their thing. Later, 
its name was changed to western toilets.” Then Nobahar asks: “My question is why 
                                                        
421 Given the oneiric dimension of Atomic Heart and references to another parallel 
world, an allusion to the two pills in The Matrix (1999) films is not impossible. 
422 “‘Qalb-e Atomi’ Saranjam Roonamai Shod”, Fars News, accessed July 09, 2016, 
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13931121000045 
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were the [original] western toilets replaced by the Iranian squat toilets?” And Kami 
replies, “That’s because the Mongols attacked Iran. They would shit in a hole and 
pour soil on it. That’s how Iranian – or rather originally Chinese toilets came to be.” 
The obvious point to be noted here is that even though Kami’s tone is ironic, even 
comedic, nonetheless the whole narrative still functions as an instance of nationalist 
ideology. It is here that the toilet scene at the beginning of the film can be read 
retroactively as a comment on the relation between nationalist ideology (fantasy) and 
the structure of toilets. Here we are confronted with two other objects among the list 
of the Freudian-Lacanian partial objects, namely the feces and the urinary flow. As 
noted in previous chapters Lacan links the objet petit a to all these partial objects, and 
the anal objet a is the fecal object. The objet petit a at its most elementary refers to 
those anchoring points of the Real, or those parts of the body that seem to be attached 
to an organ or are produced by an organ. They can effectively be detached from the 
body (feces or urinary flow) and which can be imaginerized as detachable. 
In The Plague of Fantasies, Žižek has noted that even within the structure of 
toilets we can find “the exemplary case of how ideology is at work precisely where 
you don’t think you will find it.” He goes on to distinguish between the German, 
French and Anglo-Saxon (English) versions of toilets as instances of how the most 
utilitarian objects can often function as unconscious sites of nationalist ideologies.423 
So if we were to add to Žižek’s triad of the German, French and Anglo-Saxon 
lavatory, the missing fourth Iranian lavatory, we can complete the logical set, or to 
put it in Aristotelian terms, the Iranian toilet functions as the formal cause of the 
other three toilets. According to this logic the Iranian lavatory functions as the 
originary or Ur-lavatory that influenced the very form of this triad. In this way, 
Kami’s primordialization of the Iranian toilet that influenced the structure of Western 
toilets is the Iranian nationalist ideology par excellence. In other words, the logic 
goes something like this: “whatever western civilization thinks it has accomplished, it 
is we (Iranians) who invented or achieved it first and this is even evident in the very 
structure of their toilets, and without it they would be back in the dark ages knee deep 
in their shit.” In this way, the scene of the girl(s) sitting on the toilet stages the fact 
                                                        
423 “It is clear that none of these versions [of the toilet] can be accounted for in purely 
utilitarian terms: a certain ideological perception of how the subject should relate to 
the unpleasant excrement which comes from within our body is clearly 
discernible…” Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 3. 
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that we are already knee deep in ideology (as Žižek would have put it). Thus, the 
cultural history of the structure of toilets in the film functions as the fantasmatic 
narrative of nationalist ideology.  
In his classic text, The History of Shit (Histoire de la merde) Dominique 
Laporte provides another theoretical reading of the history of the excremental 
function that is relevant to Kami’s narrative. In his book Laporte conceptualizes a 
link between the individual and the destiny of human waste, where “the history of 
shit becomes the history of subjectivity.” And as the subtitle of the book suggests, the 
history of shit functions as a prologue or proglomena to “a prehistory of modernity 
and the modern subject.”424 In this sense the cultural history of the structure of 
Western toilets recounted by Kami is not incidental, since by claiming that Iranians 
were the first to invent the toilet, which later influenced the structure of Western 
toilets, it claims for itself the history of the formation of subjectivity (à la Laporte) 
and consequently of modernity itself. According to this logic Persian civilization not 
only preceded the Euro-American civilization, but even taught them the rudimentary 
elements of hygiene and gave them the very form of their toilets. The ideology here is 
one that is related to the history of the influence of Iranian civilization on the culture 
of Western civilization that is largely unknown or disavowed outside the academy 
and the scholarly public. However, in this context it is irrelevant whether there has 
been such a history of influence, which scholars have amply documented; but the 
important point to note here is the nationalist ideological narrative. It is this sort of 
nationalist ideology, which is often bordering on racism, and which developed in the 
early 20th century on certain racist tendencies in Iranian nationalist discourse,425 
which unwittingly, aligns middle and upper middle class Iranians (such as the 
Nobahar, Arineh and Kami) with the ideology of the Islamic Republic. In this way 
                                                        
424 Dominique Laporte, The History of Shit (Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
2000), viii. For an earlier forgotten classic on this subject see John G. Bourke, 
Scatalogic Rites of All Nations, (Washington, D.C.: W. H. Lowdermilk & Co, 1891). 
Incidentally Freud wrote an introduction to the German publication of the book and 
Laporte wrote the forward for the French publication.  
425 For this racist dimension in the emergence of Iranian secular nationalist discourse, 
see Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the 
Politics of Dislocation (New York: Columbia University, 2016), especially chapter 3, 
“Pre-Islamic Iran and Archaistic Frenzy,” chapter 4, “Of Lizard Eaters and Invasions: 
The Importance of European Racial Thought,” and finally chapter 6, “Aryanism and 
Dislocation.”  
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the older nationalist ideology becomes co-incident with the Islamic community 
(‘ummat) of the Islamic Republic, which is why the policeman who gets into the car 
to question Arineh and Nobahar, says that “even you guys with your looks 
[presumably modern or western looks], are at times in agreement with the regime.” 
This emblematizes the paradoxical coming together of Iranian nationalist ideology 
(exemplified in the pre-revolutionary period by the Pahlavi regime), and the ideology 
of the Islamic Republic that positions Iran as an “Islamic nation” (keshvar-e islami). 
This excremental dimension or lavatory logic that pervades both the formal 
and narrative logic of the film can also be read as a reference to the ideology of the 
Islamic Republic, which is even interested in the most intimate domains of the life of 
its citizens, such as in the way (female and male) subjects are to avail themselves of 
the toilet. Ayatollah Khomeini had composed a jurisprudential treatise (resalah) 
called Tawzih al-Masail, in which he goes into graphic and obsessional detail as to 
how a Shi’i believer is to properly go to the lavatory (i.e., they must not be facing 
Mecca, they should wash their anus with their left hand and enter the toilet with their 
right foot, etc.). For example, Khomeini states:  
 
After urination, one must first wash the anus if it has been soiled by urine; 
then one must press three times with the middle finger and the base of the 
penis; then one must put his thumb on top of the penis and his index finger on 
the bottom and pull the skin forward three times as far as the circumcision 
ring; and after that three times squeeze the tip of the penis.426  
 
Indeed, the writing of a Tawzih al-Masai was not peculiar to Khomeini, as many of 
the Shi’i ‘ulama had their own similar treatises (resalahs), much of which pertained 
to delineating the laws of cleanliness (taharat) and impurity (nejasat), and formed 
part of what is called ahkam-e ab or commandments of water. It is interesting that 
just before the 1979 revolution Khomeini had published the treatise with illustrations 
that describe how to use western toilets (Figure 1), but after the revolution and the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic and its anti-western stance, especially towards 
the US, the publication of this treatise with the reproduction of the images of western 
                                                        
426 Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini, An Unabridged Translation of 
Resaleh Towzih al-Masael, Translated by J. Borujerdi, with a Foreword by Michael 
M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, (Westview Press/ Boulder and London, 1984), 42.  
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toilets and how to use them ceased.427 This brings us to the curious fact that in the 
two scenes where Nobahar and Arienh are sitting on a toilet, the actual toilet is never 
shown on screen, but only implied. The western toilet remains invisible throughout 
both scenes. In this sense, the toilet itself is never shown in the film, likely in order to 
not fall foul of the censors. Despite such precautions, the film was never granted 
screening permission.  
Finally, it seems that Ahmadzadeh is symbolically equating the State with the 
excremental function, with feces and the toilet. Indeed, Laporte in a provocative turn 
equates the State with the sewer, “Surely, the State is the Sewer. Not just because it 
spews divine law from its ravenous mouth, but because it reigns as the law of 
cleanliness above its sewers.”428 Laporte’s formulation here can almost 
isomorphically be mapped onto the theocratic State that is the Islamic Republic, 
namely that not only does it ‘spews out divine law’, but  ‘it reigns as the law of 
cleanliness,’ where every aspect of cleanliness and impurity is enumerated in 
obsessional detail. Similarly, Sadeq Hedayat had already referred to Iran and its 
political system during his life under the first Pahlavi regime as a “latrine” (kala),429 
and Ahmadzadeh may well be alluding to this excremental dimension of the State 
and its ruling ideology. 
                                                        
427 Pamela Karimi, “Secular Domesticities, Shiite Modernities: Khomeini’s 
Illustrated Tawzih al-Masail,” in Visual Culture in the Modern Middle East: Rhetoric 
of the Image, edited by Christiane Gruber and Sune Haugbolle (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), 39-41. 
428 Laporte, History of Shit, 57. On the same page, Laporte goes on to quote Lacan 
and writes, ““Civilization,” says Lacan, “is the spoils: the cloaca maxima [Roman 
sewage system].” We could easily substitute State here for civilization…” 
429 Homa Katouzian and EIr, “Sadeq Hedayat,” Encyclopedia Iranica, accessed 





Figure 4.1  Reproduction of a page from Khomeini’s Tawzih al-Masail describing 
how to use foreign toilets. From Khomeini’s New Risaleh, 1:54.” Image in Karimi, 
“Secular Domesticities, Shiite Modernities”, 40. 
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4.4 Repetition or The Double as the Thing (das Ding) 
 
In Atomic Heart, the double structure of the film is mirrored in the structure 
of the double in the film. It is apparent in the redoubling or repetition of events and 
motifs that appear in the first part, and are repeated again in the second part, 
sometimes in their nightmarish traumatic dimension in the second repetition, often 
representing the dark underside or double of the first part. It is as if the film follows 
the Freudian logic of the compulsion to repeat or repetition compulsion 
(Wiederholungszwang), where events are repeated in their traumatic dimension. For 
example, in the first part of the film, the mise-en-scène in the car is staged with Kami 
in the back seat (background) and the women in the front seats (foreground); the 
same mise-en-scène is repeated in the second part of the film, but with Toofan taking 
the place of Kami in the back seat in the same triangular formation. In this formal 
way the three figures in the car are doubled and the first and second half mirror each 
other.  
This formal structure suggests a subterranean parallel between the character 
of Kami and Toofan, where Toofan represents the dark, obscene underside of Kami, 
his double or doppelgänger. In this sense, what the figure of the double mirrors forth 
is a spectral obscene dimension in ourselves that we wish to repress or disavow. In 
this way the double always functions as the uncastrated dimension of ourselves, it is 
the Thing in us more than ourselves. As Žižek notes apropos the double, “…the 
double embodies the phantom-like Thing in me… the dissymmetry between me and 
my double is ultimately that between the (ordinary) object and the (sublime) Thing. 
In my double, I don’t simply encounter myself (my mirror image), but first of all 
what is ‘in me more than myself’: the double is ‘myself,’... under the modality of the 
other, sublime, ethereal body, a pure substance of enjoyment exempted from the 
circuit of generation and corruption.”430 This is an almost exact description of the 
figure of Toofan, a sort of terrifying sublime ethereal body, who drives obscene 
enjoyment (jouissance) from the anxiety of the two girls and whose existence is 
beyond the circuit of generation and corruption, where like an atemporal phantom-
like Thing he can appear and reappear anywhere, which is why Nobahar and Arineh 
are unable to escape from him. In the second part of the film, the basic problem of the 
                                                        
430 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!, 21.  
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two girls is how to get rid of Toofan. It is much easier to get rid of a real person, you 
can evade them or run away from them, which is precisely what the girls try to do 
(they drive away when Toofan puts the fake Sadaam in the limousine), but it is 
impossible to get rid of a fantasam, a spectral presence that sticks to you like glue. 
This inescapability from the fantasmatic figure of Toofan, represents the all-pervasive 
presence of the State in the life of Iranians.  
This logic of repetition or doubling proliferates throughout the film. For 
instance, the lookout point that they drive to and which looks over Tehran appears 
both in the first and the second part of the film, once with Kami where he relates his 
dream, and then with Toofan when they pickup the figure of Sadaam (who himself is 
referred to by Nobahar as perhaps a body double of the real Sadaam). The elevator 
scene at the beginning of the film has a light and comedic dimension in the first half, 
but a similar elevator scene appears again in the second part in a more nightmarish 
and foreboding dimension. In the first part at the beginning of the film, we get a 
close-up of Nobahar sitting on the toilet, and in the second part we get an exact shot 
of a close-up of Arineh in the toilet. The motif of C-27 is also repeated twice in the 
film (the so-called club of those who have died at age 27, which Kami explains to 
Nobahar in the car, which includes inter alia, Jim Morrison, Jimi Hendrix and Janice 
Joplin among others), again with the second repetition becoming more ominous 
(alluding to an otherworldly place where Toofan is about to take Nobahar). This 
structure of the double, which is repeated throughout the film, both at the level of 
form and narrative, gestures to another characteristic of life in Tehran under the 
Islamic Republic, namely the double-life led by many of its subjects. This structure 
of a double-life, where you dissimulate the truth in order to survive is part of the 
technique of taqiyya (dissimulation) in Shi’ite doctrine, which has permeated social 
and political relations in Tehran. 431 In her book City of Lies: Love, Sex, Death and 
                                                        
431 On taqiyya in Shi‘ism see Etan Kohlberg,“Some Imami-Shi‘i Views on Taqiyya”, 
Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. 95, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1975), pp. 395-
402; Etan Kohlberg, “Taqiyya in Shi‘i Theology and Religion,” in Secrecy and 
Concealment: Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions, 
edited by Hans Hans Gerhard Kippenberg, Guy G. Stroumsa (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 
345-80. L. Clarke, “The Rise and Decline of Taqiyya in Twelver Shi‘ism,” Reason 
and Inspiration in Islam: Theology and Inspiration in Islam, ed. Todd Lawson 
(London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2005), 46-63; 
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the Search for Truth in Tehran, Ramita Navai refers to this structure of a double-life 
in Tehran and states: 
 
In order to live in Tehran you have to lie. Morals don’t come into it: lying in 
Tehran is about survival. This need to dissimulate is surprisingly egalitarian – 
there are no class boundaries and there is no religious discrimination when it 
comes to the world of deceit. Some of the most pious, righteous Tehranis are 
the most gifted and cunning in the art of deception. We Tehranis are masters 
at manipulating the truth. Tiny children are instructed to deny that daddy has 
any booze at home; teenagers passionately vow their virginity; shopkeepers 
allow customers to surreptitiously eat, drink and smoke in their back rooms 
during the fasting months and young men self-flagellate at the religious 
festival of Ashura, purporting that each lash is for Imam Hossein, when really 
it is a macho show to entice pretty girls, who in turn claim they are there only 
for God. All these lies breed new lies, mushrooming in every crack in 
society.432 
 
Due to the strict controls, surveillance and policing of society by the State apparatus, 
Iran is a janus-face society, with everyone leading a double-life as a survival strategy. 
The outward (zahir) reality of their lives is never what it seems, and the inner (batin) 
reality is never co-incident with outward appearances. However, this does not mean, 
as Navai has noted, that “Iranians are congenital liars,” but on the contrary that these 
lies are “a consequence of surviving in an oppressive regime, of being ruled by a 
government that believes it should be able to interfere in even the most intimate 
affairs of its citizens.”433 As noted already, this interference extends into the most 
intimate domains of life such as monitoring (sexual) desires and even the use of 
toilets. In this sense, the logic of the double in the film is a subtle critique of the way 
the regime has created a sort of totalitarian nightmare where the people in Tehran 
lead a double life, in order to keep up appearances before the watchful eye of the big 
Other (or to put it in Orwellian terms, Big Brother). 
  
                                                        
432 Ramita Navai. City of Lies: Love, Sex, Death, and the Search for Truth in Tehran 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014), 1. 
433 Navai, City of Lies, 2 
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4.5 Che Voui? or the Desire of the Other 
 
The narrative coherence of the opening section becomes especially 
pronounced when we contrast it with what follows. The second part of the film is 
structured around the incessant mystery of desire, around the question of the role of 
desire and its surveillance in Iran by the State, embodied in the monstrous figure of 
Toofan (as we shall see in the case of the two female protagonists it is the forbidden 
same-sex desire). Arineh and Nobahar, as well as the spectator, do not know what 
Toofan really wants from them, at first it appears that he wants money that he paid on 
their behalf for the accident, but later at the end of the film in the rooftop scene when 
Arineh finally gets the money to give to him, he says, “money isn’t everything,” and 
Arineh, in visible distress and anxiety, finally states: “what do you want”? This is 
precisely the logic of desire formulated by Lacan in the famous interrogative in 
Italian, “Che voui?” What do you want? Lacan expanded the psychoanalytic notion of 
desire in several stages, adding to his earlier formulation “do not compromise with 
respect to your desire,” (discussed in Chapter 3), another famous formulation: desire 
is the desire of the Other. For Lacan, our desires do not emerge spontaneously from 
some unfathomable abyss of human subjectivity, but rather our desires are learned, 
we have to learn how to desire. In order for us to desire for example chocolate ice 
cream we must first be properly installed within the symbolic order where chocolate 
ice cream is already an object of desire. In this sense, our desires emerge through the 
Other’s desire, as Lacan states,  
 
man’s desire is the Other’s desire, in which the de /of/ provides what 
grammarians call a ‘subjective determination’ – namely, that it is qua /as/ 
Other that man desires. … This is why the Other’s question – that comes back 
to the subject from the place from which he expects an oracular reply – which 
takes some such form as ‘Che vuoi?’, ‘What do you want?’ is the question 
that best leads the subject to the path of his own desire.434 
 
In this sense the subject’s desire is not self-generating, it is always constituted 
through the desire of the Other. The question of desire is not what do I want? But 
rather, what does the other want from me? What is it that the other sees in me and 
thereby desires me? As Žižek states: 
                                                        
434 Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (New York: W.W. Norton), 1981. 
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One should always bear in mind that the desire ‘realized’ (staged) in fantasy 
is not the subject's own, but the other's desire: fantasy, phantasmic formation, 
is an answer to the enigma Che vuoi?-…The original question of desire is not 
directly 'What do I want?, but 'What do others want from me? What do they 
see in me? What am I to others?'435  
 
Following this formulation, the desire ‘realized’ or staged in fantasy (the 
dream/fantasy as the film) is not the desire of the two female characters (Adrineh and 
Nobahar), but rather the Other’s desire, namely the desire of Toofan, whom we may 
equate with the mysterious voice/text that directly addresses the spectator at the 
beginning of the film. In other words, the dream/film is a fantasy formation where we 
encounter the desire of the Other in all its traumatic dimension. So what does the 
Other, as in Toofan, want? In a sense, what Toofan desires in the two girls is what 
Lacan calls the objet petit a, that illusive unfathomable X in them, that makes them 
the object of his desire. This is similar to Lacan’s formulation: “I love you, but, 
because inexplicably I love in you something more than you, the objet petit a, I 
mutilate you.”436 This is the destructive passion of the Real that seeks to annihilate 
you in order to get at the real kernel of your being. 437 This is why the encounter with 
the Other’s desire is always traumatic, anxiety inducing; since what the Other 
(Toofan) desires is this impossible Real kernel in them (Nobahar and Arineh), and he 
is ready to destroy them in order to extract it. Lacan referred to this unfathomable X 
with the Greek term agalma, a luminous and “shining” precious object that was 
hidden inside Socrates and which functioned as the object cause of Alcibiades’ 
desire.438 A correlation can be made between the Greek agalma and one of the most 
sublime concepts in Zoroastrianism, the Avestan concept of Khvarnah, meaning 
‘splednour’ or ‘glory’ (Old Persian farnah, middle Persian khwarr, new Persian 
                                                        
435 Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 9. 
436 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 263.  
437 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf (Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 
2003) 59.  
438 Jacques Lacan, Transference: The Seminar of Jaques Lacan, Book VIII, trans. 
Bruce Fink (London: Polity Press, 2015), 135-148.  
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khurrah or farr), derived from khvar, ‘to shine, to illuminate’,439 which was 
translated into Greek as doxa, but could very well be rendered as agalma.440  
Conversely, if we read Toofan’s behavior as a way to contain the inherent 
destabilizing dimension of the Real of their (same-sex) desire, it can be seen as a 
reaction to contain and control the revolutionary force of desire as such. Perhaps no 
one was more aware of this revolutionary dimension of desire than Deleuze and 
Guattari, as they state: 
 
If desire is repressed, it is because every position of desire, no matter how 
small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a society: not 
that desire is asocial, on the contrary. But it is explosive; there is no desiring-
machine capable of being assembled without demolishing entire social 
sectors. Despite what some revolutionaries think about this, desire is 
revolutionary in its essence – desire, not left-wing holidays! – and no society 
can tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of exploitation, 
servitude and hierarchy being compromised. [my emphasis]441  
 
Here despite the apparent differences between Deleuze and Guattari and 
psychoanalytic theory, their formulation of desire as revolutionary is compatible with 
psychoanalysis, since in psychoanalytic theory there is something always inherently 
destabilizing about desire, that can erupt and derail the order of things, which has led 
to the efforts of its containment or domestication via mechanisms of repression both 
psychic and societal. Even Deleuze and Guattari’s locution “real desire,” recalls the 
                                                        
439 See Gherardo Gnoli, “Farr(ah)/ xᵛarəənah,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, IX, 1999, pp. 
312-19, also available at www.iranicaonline.org/articles/farrah. On the Khvarnah also 
see H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1971, 1943), 1-77. On the etymology see Alexander Lubotsky, 
“Avestan xᵛarəənah-: the etymology and concept”, in Meid, W., Sprache und Kultur. 
Akten der X. Fachtagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft Innsbruck (Innsbruck: 
IBS, 1998), 479–488. For the transmission of the concept of Khvarnah into 
Islamicate philosophy, see Henry Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From 
Mazdean Iran to Shi‘ite Iran, trans. Nancy Pearson (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977).  
440 Lacan concluding a long list of etymological roots states, “In short, the idea of 
sparkle [éclat] is hidden in the root [of agalma]. And aglaos [related to Aglaia, the 
youngest of the three Graces or Charites], which means “shining” or “splendor,” is 
there to provide us with a familiar echo.” Lacan, Transference, 141. 
441 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 118. It should be recalled here that Gauttari 
was a student of Lacan and was a practicing psychiatrist as well. For a fruitful 
encounter staged between psychoanalysis and Deleuze see, Aaron Schuster, The 
Trouble With Pleasure: Deleuze and Psychoanalysis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016). 
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Lacanian formulation of the Real of desire. Indeed, this insight of Deleuze and 
Gauttari is even more apropos with respect to authoritarian or totalitarian societies, 
which is precisely how Atomic Heart casts the Islamic Republic – as a totalitarian 
state that represses erotic desire at every turn and not only in its same-sex iteration 
but desire in all its radical possibilities.  
From this perspective, the name Nobahar, becomes a signifier of 
revolutionary force since in Persian her name means New Spring (it must be recalled 
the whole rise of the Arab Spring, was preceded by the Iranian Spring which was 
brutally suppressed), and alludes to the new revolutionary protest movement, the so-
called Green Movement, that erupted in Tehran in June of 2009 after the disputed 
presidential election of Ahmadinejad, and whose participants were captured via video 
and photographed by Basiji agents of the state dressed in civilian clothing; many of 
the youth that participated in the protest were subsequently haunted down, beaten, 
tortured and jailed in the aftermath of the uprising. This is precisely why Toofan 
wants to take Nobahar to another world. The character of Nobahar or New Spring is 
sick and dying (she has MS), which symbolizes the sickly and dying condition of the 
protest movement. Toofan says, “I am here to take you, you are dying anyways.”  
 
4.6 The Fright of Real Desires 
 
Apropos the double structure of Atomic Heart, there is an important relationship 
between Ahmadzadeh’s two films, Kami’s Party and Atomic Heart, not only in that 
Kami’s character appears in the second film, who was absent throughout the entire 
duration of the first film, but more crucially, what was only verbally gestured in the 
first film is visually staged in the second film, namely the existence of same-sex 
desire in Iran. In this formal sense, the films are two versions of the same film. 
In the first film, Kami’s Party, one of the female characters (which not 
incidentally happens to be played by the same actress that plays Nobahar in Atomic 
Heart) who has divorced her husband, states that her husband had turned out to be 
gay, and the male character says in some-what mock surprise but “we don’t have any 
gays in Iran.” This formulation of course is a comedic reference to the (in)famous 
statement of Mahmud Ahamdinejad in his response to a student question at his talk in 
Columbia University in 2007, where he stated: “In Iran we don’t have homosexuals 
like you have in your country” (dar Iran ma methl-e shoma ham-jens baz 
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nadarim).442 The female character responds that “yes we have a few,” (he says, “no I 
swear to God we don’t have any,” and she retorts, “I am telling you we do.”) have 
gay people in Iran. In this way, what was initially verbally gestured to in Kami’s 
Party is formally staged in the same-sex relationship between Nobahar and Arineh. 
This disavowal of the existence of homosexuals in Iran is again part of the janus-
faced structure of contemporary Iranian society, where on the face of it, or to keep up 
the order of appearances, it must be pretended that homosexuals do not exist; but the 
question is for whom should appearances be maintained since everyone knows very 
well that homosexuals do exist in Iran? The answer is, to put in Lacanian terms, for 
the big Other. It is for this virtual big Other as the agency of appearances for whom a 
façade must be maintained. For example, something is prohibited (homosexuality, 
alcohol, etc.), but it is not simply enough that it is prohibited, what is important is that 
it should not exist in the eyes of the big Other, even if we already know that it does 
exist out there in social reality.  
As it was demonstrated in chapter one in the analysis of Daughters of the Sun, 
the shaving of the female hair was a strategy that was deployed not only as a 
technique of unveiling but more importantly as a technology of undecidability for 
staging same-sex desire or female homoeroticism in the New Iranian Cinema. For 
instance through shaving the head and cross-dressing an ambiguity of gender and 
sexuality was produced whereby same-sex desire and more specifically lesbian desire 
could be staged visually. Through the technique of shaving the head it was possible 
to represent sexual desire in all its radical ambiguity, since all non-heterosexual 
desire is forbidden and punishable by death in the Islamic Republic,443 it can never be 
explicitly staged on screen (recall the trans imagery in Daughters of the Sun where it 
is precisely through the operation of the shaved head that a palpable sense of same-
sex desire or female homoeroticism is evoked), they can only be gestured through the 
technique of shaving the head. But, in the shift away from the older generation of 
New Iranian Cinema exemplified by Atomic Heart, a new formal procedure is 
enacted to represent same-sex desire outside the semiotics of the shaved head, 
                                                        
442 For Ahamdinejad’s reply, please see his speech, accessed April 12, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-sC26wpUGQ 
443 In Article 131 of the Islamic penal law it is written: “If the act of lesbianism is 
repeated three times and punishment is enforced each time, [the] death sentence 
will be issued the fourth time.” Article 129 states that “the punishment for lesbianism 
is a hundred lashes for each party.” 
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through other visual and narrative cues, especially through the dialogue, namely 
through double entendre, in the clever verbal locutions of the young hip upper middle 
class Tehranis that are the protagonists of this film.  
There are several subtle visual and narrative clues throughout the film that 
suggest that Arineh and Nobahar are not just close friends who live together, but are 
within a same-sex or lesbian relationship. There is a certain ambiguity operative in 
the often close nature of female friendships in Iranian society that the film exploits, 
since female friends can even appear in public spaces holding hands or walk arm in 
arm, without raising any suspission as to the possible erotic dimension of their 
relationship (the same is true for young men who also can be seen to hold hands with 
their friends or walk arm in arm, though this has become less prevelant in recent 
years, since there is a more visible pressure on moral policing by the Basiji’s of the 
heterosexuality of male relationships).444 This ambiguity is explored in one early 
scene, for instance, when Kami asks Arineh how do you wake up Nobahar in the 
morning, and Arineh lovingly puts her hand on Nobahar’s face and caresses it saying, 
“I turn and say, wake up my dear (‘azizam).” In this instance there is a clear reference 
to them sleeping together in the same bed.  
In another reference to Nobahar and Adineh’s sexuality, while talking about 
how girls are more sexually aggressive these days, Kami states, “but at least you two 
are not dangerous.” In other words, signaling that they are a lesbian couple, and 
therefore pose no danger to him. In the second part of the film as well, we get more 
clues as to the lesbian relationship of Arineh and Nobahar. Whilst in the car, Toofan 
in a sort of subtle sexual interrogation of the girls says in a double entendre, “I can 
tell, you girls must like ice cream cones,” suggesting that they like phallic oral 
copulation or fellatio, and Arineh retorts, “we don’t eat ice cream cones – never”; 
meaning they have never been with men sexually or like to give fellatio to men, in 
other words they are lesbians. In one of the crucial scenes after Toofan has made 
evident his sexual interest with each of the girls, he says to Arineh that he likes and 
wants her friend Nobahar, and Arineh says, “You should know by now that, that is 
impossible,” meaning, you should know very well by now that we are a same-sex 
                                                        
444 The Article 112 of Islamic penal law on the sexual relations between men and 
boys states that: “If a mature man of sound mind commits sexual intercourse with an 
immature person, the doer will be killed and the passive one will be subject to ta’azir 
of 74 lashes if not under duress.”  
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couple. The logic here is strictly that of the perverse heterosexual male chauvinist 
universe in which it is thought that the lesbian couple can be ‘rehabilitated’ or 
‘converted’ back into heterosexuality through ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse: in 
other words, according to this obscene logic all that lesbians need is heterosexual 
copulation and they would then be normalized. Juynboll refers to how the subject of 
lesbian desire is dealt with in Islamic jurisprudence within Muslim societies and 
provides its meaning: “Lesbian (sihaka meaning rubbing). Male authors feel 
uncomfortable with the subject matter, because they lack knowledge about lesbian 
practices, and thus, it is an alien subject. Usually, they argue in favor of ‘converting’ 
these women to normal male-oriented heterosexual behavior and the use of judicial 
discretion (ta’zir) rather than the recommended death penalty.”445 Such is the way 
Toofan acts towards the two girls, where he consistently terrorizes them; in other 
words in this instance the enigma of the Other’s desire (Toofan) is that he wants to 
render them heterosexual by copulating with them.  
 It is precisely here, that not only the two female protagonists encounter the 
Real of the Other’s desire (Toofan), but are also confronted with the deadlock of the 
Real of their own desire, a desire that is unsymbolizable (“illicit,” “deviant”) within 
the heterosexual matrix of the Islamic Republic. Thus, the figure of Toofan (in 
another formulation) stages the Real of their forbidden and outlawed erotic desire, he 
is the materialization of the impossible Real of their desire, and since same-sex desire 
is prohibited in the Islamic Republic, Toofan becomes the very embodiment of this 
prohibition. This is the fright of Real desires: when the traumatic kernel of your 
innermost desires become manifest.  
 
4.7 The Collapse of the Fantasy and the Lacanian Real 
 
The second half of the film is the collapse of the fantasy, and represents reality 
stripped of its fantasmatic supplement, where the figure of Toofan (Mohammad Reza 
Golzar) functions as the appearance of the traumatic Real and the disintegration of 
                                                        
445 G. H. A. Juynboll, “Siḥāḳ,” in EI2 IX, pp. 565-67. For an analysis of same-sex 
relationships in Islamic jurisprudence, see Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam: 
Feminist Reflections on Qur’an, Hadith and Jurisprudence (London: Oneworld 
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the fantasy exemplified by the first part. In other words what we get in the second 
part is the appearance of the Real in all its horror, where reality becomes deprived of 
its fantasy support, and we get an irreal or surreal nightmarish universe. This cut 
between the dimension of fantasy and the world of reality is embodied in the figure 
of Toofan, who is the materialization of the excess of the traumatic Real. The Real 
has gone through several permutations in Lacan’s work, but one of the fundamental 
aspects of the Real emerges at the point at which Symbolization fails. It is the limit 
inherent in Symbolization itself, where the symbolic malfunctions or breaks down. 
We come close to encountering the Real at moments of trauma, anxiety, aversion, 
and disorientation. As Glyn Daly states:  
 
The Real is experienced in terms of the Symbolic (dis)functioning itself. We 
touch the Real through those points where symbolization fails; through 
trauma, aversion, dislocation and all those markers of uncertainty where the 
Symbolic fails to deliver a consistent and coherent reality. While the Real 
cannot be directly represented… it can nonetheless be shown in terms of 
symbolic failure and can be alluded to through figurative embodiments of 
horror-excess that threaten disintegration (monsters, forces of nature, 
disease/viruses and so on).446 
 
In the film, the Real is represented as monstrous: through the monstrous figure of 
Toofan; the eerie and ominous figure who is the embodiment of the patriarchal State 
or the totalitarian regime of the Islamic Republic. The name Toofan in Persian 
literally means tornado, which precisely fits in with Lacan’s notion of the Real and 
represents one of the forces of nature whose catastrophic dimension brings us face to 
face with the horror of the Real. Just as a tornado appears like a sort of monstrosity 
from the depths of nature destroying everything in its wake, so Toofan also seems to 
suddenly appear from no-where, like a monster from the depths of inner space, and 
begins to terrorize the two girls until the very end of the film. Also it should be 
recalled that in a later scene when Toofan is asked by Arineh about his father, he 
states, “My father is a monster”.  
In the second part of the film the traumatic Real embodied in the figure of 
Toofan is not disclosed all at once, but we are confronted with it only gradually. At 
first Toofan seems to be just a hip, stylish but excentric character who is full of wit 
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and humor, but slowly we discover that there is a dark and sinister dimension that 
lurks beneath his apparent humorous façade. This is the logic of the Freudian 
uncanny (das Unheimliche), when at first glance Toofan appears as an excentric 
funny nice guy who just wants to help the girls (he pays for their car accident), but 
upon closer inspection all of a sudden a more terrifying dimension begins to emerge. 
It is here that Toofan takes on a dark and sinister aura, and turns from a witty and 
humorous character, into one who identifies and associates with dictators (Hitler, 
Sadaam), and incessantly terrorizes the girls and physically abuses them. As Žižek 
states apropos the notion of the Freudian uncanny:  
 
a perfectly "natural" and "familiar" situation is denatured, becomes 
''uncanny," loaded with horror and threatening possibilities, as soon as we add 
to it a small supplementary feature, a detail that "does not belong," that sticks 
out, is "out of place," does not make any sense within the frame of the idyllic 
scene. This "pure" signifier without signified stirs the germination of a 
supplementary, metaphorical meaning for all other elements: the same 
situations, the same events that, till then, have been perceived as perfectly 
ordinary acquire an air of strangeness”447  
 
It is in this precise sense, that the same situation and character (Toofan) which at first 
seemed perfectly ordinary and funny becomes all of a sudden “denatured” and 
“uncanny” and takes on a horrifying and traumatic dimension. In this way the 
Freudian uncanny and the Lacanian Real are mutually linked, since there is always an 
uncanny dimension to the Real. This is also why, as Žižek has noted, there is always 
an Unheimliche dimension to the double, as he states, “the double is ‘the same as 
me,’ yet totally strange; his sameness all the more accentuates his uncanniness.” In 
this sense the double always has the structure of the Unheimliche.  
If there is a figure in theological terms that personifies the fantasmatic 
dimension of the Real in all its horror, it is the devil. In the film there are several 
visual and narrative clues that links Toofan with the figure of the Devil, not unlike 
the Devil in Bulgokov’s novel The Master and Margerita. Indeed, there are a number 
of Christian or demonological motifs that runs through the film that are significant 
(from Arineh exclaiming that she is Christian and hence can drink alcohol, up to the 
scene in the Church where Toofan reappears again mysteriously, including the police 
asking the girls and Kami, “are you Satan-worshipers?”) as they gesture towards the 
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diabolical dimension of Toofan and his supernatural powers; but this supernatural 
dimension should not deceive us, as this is not a theological devil but a political one, 
with all the force of the theologico-political role of the totalitarian leader or the State 
exemplified in Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Republic. In one instance in the car 
Toofan states, “I am in Syria right now.” The two girl’s look of puzzlement is 
mirrored in the confusion of the spectator: How can a person be in two places at 
once? This reference to the fact that he is in Syria at this moment is an allusion to the 
entanglement of the Islamic Republic in the politics of Syria. It is one of the most 
explicit statements in the film that gestures towards the figure of Toofan as being the 
embodiment of the Iranian State or the Islamic Republic.  
 Freud in his text called, A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis 
(1922), analyses the story of Christoph Haizmann the painter, who purportedly had 
the devil appear to him and where the devil figures in several of his paintings. In his 
analysis of this case Freud conceives of the devil as a father-substitute, and the evil 
obverse or double of God as the father figure.448 In this sense, the devil is one of the 
Names-of-the-Father in Lacanian parlance  (for the Name-of-the-Father, see chapter 
on Daughters of the Sun) and stands for the totalitarian leader or the State. The 
character of Toofan is in a way representative of what Immanuel Kant called 
diabolical Evil and is similar to the diabolical killer Anton Chigurh played by Javier 
Bardem in in the Coen brothers film No Country for Old Men (2007). In his reading 
of the film, Žižek equates Bardem’s character to the Kantian figure of diabolical evil, 
especially in how he decides to kill his victims through a flip of a coin.449 Regarding 
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this figure Žižek states, “the figure of the pathological hired killer played by Javier 
Bardem - a ruthless killing machine, with an ethics of his own, sticking to his word, 
[is] a figure of what Kant called diabolical Evil.”450 About the fantasmatic nature of 
this figure Žižek writes: 
 
The key to this figure is the fact that it is not a real-life person, but a fantasy-
entity - the embodiment of the pure object-obstacle, that unfathomable Y of 
blind fate - which always, in a weird mixture of chance and inexorable 
necessity, as the necessity of a chance (a stroke of bad luck), intervenes to 
undermine the fulfilment of subjects’ plans and intentions, guaranteeing that, 
one way or another, things will always somehow go wrong.451 
 
In this way Toofan also function as a fantasy-entity whom, like a weird co-incidence 
of chance and inexorable destiny, the two girls are unable to escape from. At the end 
of Atomic Heart there is a scene in the rooftop that is one of the hermeneutic keys to 
the figure of Toofan. Toofan tells Nobahar to jump with him over the rooftop as it 
represents one of the gates through which they can enter the other parallel world. 
Arineh refuses and Toofan states, “okay we will decide by playing 
rock/paper/scissors, and if I win we all have to jump and if I loose then I will jump.” 
This image of the game of rock/paper/scissors with the figure of Toofan that will 
decide the destiny of the girls, is precisely the Kantian figure of diabolical Evil, and 
recalls the character of Bardem (Anton Chigurh) in No Country For Old Men (the 
main difference between the two is Toofan’s at times sadistic humor), such is the 
nature of the will of diabolical Evil, where the arbitrary flip of a coin or 
rock/paper/scissors, will determine who lives or dies. At the end when Toofan loses 
the rock/paper/scissors game, he sticks to his word (demonstrating an ethics of his 
own, a diabolical ethics), and does not make the two girls jump off the roof, but 
prepares to jump himself. 
 
4.8 The Enigma of Desire and the Dream within a Dream 
 
Atomic Heart like Mullholand Drive is a film that splits the realms of fantasy 
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and desire, where the first part depicts the world of fantasy, and the second part 
stages desire in all its radical mystery. Through the procedures of clearly 
distinguishing the visual register of the first part of the film from the visual world of 
the second part, the filmic text gestures respectively to the two worlds of fantasy and 
desire that are being posited as it were side by side. Indeed, the film opens up the 
sense of mystery through a direct textual address to the spectator that inaugurates the 
oneiric world, which we are about to enter: 
 
This film is about one of the most important characters of our time. This film 
is about me. About one of my dreams whose events occur on the night the 
subsidy payments were being distributed. I will never tell you who I am or 
what my name is, and you will never find out. 
 
From this direct textual address to the spectator in the prelude before the film, what 
we get effectively is that the film is one of the dreams of this mysterious figure 
addressing us from the cinematic text, in other words the film is the addressor’s inner 
fantasy space projected onto the cinematic screen. In this way the spectator or 
addressee is put in the position of a desiring subject, since the addressor remains 
undisclosed and the possibility of knowing who is addressing us from behind the text 
is foreclosed and our desire is thereby aroused from this sense of mystery. We want 
to know who is this mysterious figure addressing us from the screen, but are left 
desiring for an answer – as Žižek notes, this is “the perverse art of cinema, it does not 
give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire.”452 In this sense the film text is 
the portrayal of a dream and the dream text is the portrayal of the film.  
 The dream logic of the film comes to the fore when in the first part just before 
delving into the history of the structure of toilets, Kami recounts a dream (or more 
precisely a nightmare) to Arineh and Nobahar that he has had the night before, which 
he remembers in a kind of déjà vu whilst overlooking Tehran with lights of the city 
stretching into the horizon. Kami says that in the dream he was looking for Omid to 
light his cigarette when all of a sudden an atomic bomb destroys the city and its 
flames light his cigarette. Then he states that the city was not called Tehran but 
Atomic Heart Mother, a reference to the 1970 Pink Floyd record of the same name. 
The dream of course alludes to the anxiety over the nuclear program in Iran and the 
                                                        
452 Žižek, The Pervert’s Guide To Cinema. 
 181 
hardline stance on the issue by Ahmadinejad. This is the oneiric logic of the film in 
which the interpretation of the dream is in the dream within a dream. It is here that a 
Freudo-Lacanian logic of dreams becomes operative, in which censored material 
from waking reality return in the dream content as the Real. As Žižek states, “The 
situation is similar to that of the Freudian logic of the dream, in which the Real 
announces itself in the guise of a dream within a dream.”453 Indeed, the Real that 
discloses itself in the dream within the dream (film) is the Real of the atomic bomb 
and the possibility of nuclear disaster in Tehran. From this perspective a Freudo-
Lacanian reading of the film is certainly justified, since the logic of fantasy and 
dreams structure the entire film (both of which fall within the theoretical coordinates 
of psychoanalysis). There is even a reference to Freud himself in the film, when in 
the car Kami, while making fun of an Iranian diasporic news anchor in the U.S., 
refers to Arineh as “Dr. Freudian.” In fact there is a hint that Arineh may be a 
practicing psychoanalyst, as she is asked by Kami and Nobahar to provide an 
interpretation of Kami’s dream, where in good psychoanalytic fashion she corrects 
them saying “analysis” (borrowed from English) rather than “interpretation” (ta’bir), 
to distinguish psychoanalytic dream interpretation from the older manuals of Islamic 
dream interpretation, such as Ibn Sirin’s book on dreams, that proliferate in Persian 
translations and are popular among Iranians.454 In this connection Elizabeth Sirriyeh 
states:  
 
It is not unusual to find sections in bookshops containing works on dream 
interpretation by psychoanalysts placed next to medieval dream manuals. 
Sometimes there are also attempts to claim that oneirocrits such as Ibn Sirin 
prepared the way for the modern discovery of psychoanalysis. It is also not 
unusual for the introductions to books of Muslim dream interpretation to 
contain lists of great authorities on dreams, beginning with the classic Muslim 
authors and ending with Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams.455 
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Although Sirriyeh’s discussion is on Egypt, the same can be said of Iran, where the 
older Islamic manuals on dream interpretation can be found in bookstores in Tehran 
alongside Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. 
One of the philosophical lessons of Atomic Heart, then, is that reality itself is 
structured like a dream, a dream/fantasy/fiction that is mistaken for reality but 
through interpretation the dream character of reality can be revealed. As Žižek states, 
“The ultimate achievement of film art is not to recreate reality within the narrative 
fiction, to seduce us into (mis)taking a fiction for reality, but, on the contrary, to 
make us discern the fictional aspect of reality itself...”456 Perhaps this is the ultimate 
achievement of Atomic Heart as film art, since it stages the fictional or dreamlike 
structure of reality itself, and not only reality within the coordinates of 
authoritarianism or totalitarianism, but that reality itself would be non-existent 
without the fictions or dreams that structure it. 
 
4.9 Dreaming of a Nightmare in Tehran 
 
In Atomic Heart there is a traumatic truth or Real that the film as dream has 
concealed and it is not in reality that we would uncover it, but in the dream (as the 
film) itself. Atomic Heart is a film where the fiction –or in this instance the dream– 
provides the means of accessing this traumatic Real instead of functioning as an 
obstacle to it. Although the film provides a sense of reality, particularly in the first 
half, this is only to juxtapose it to the second half of the film, where the logic of the 
dream world is foregrounded and privileged. At the end of the film Ahmadzadeh sets 
up the possibility that waking up is a way of escaping this traumatic Real, rather than 
confronting it. Lacan in his Seminar XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 
provides a perfect illustration of this notion between the desire to wake up and its 
relation to the traumatic truth. He states, “A dream wakes you up just when it might 
let the truth drop, so that the only reason one wakes up is so as to continue 
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dreaming—dreaming in the real or, to be more exact, in reality.”457 To explicate the 
logic of this formulation, Lacan turns to his earlier seminar, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, where he refers to a famous dream recounted by Freud, 
where a father dreams that his son is burning and exclaims, “Father don’t you see I 
am burning.”458 This traumatic moment makes the father wake up from his dream but 
only to discover that the coffin of his deceased son has caught fire by candles. Lacan 
provides an incisive interpretation of this dream that goes beyond Freud’s point that 
the dreamer is often aware of external reality while still dreaming. For Lacan, the 
father wakes up precisely at the crucial moment where the dream is about to reveal 
the horror of his own desire, namely the desire for his son’s death. In this way the 
father waking up to the reality of the burning coffin functions as a defense 
mechanism against the traumatic truth of the horror of his own desire that the dream 
is about to reveal, and he thereby wakes up in order to escape confronting the 
traumatic truth of his desire.459 This escape into reality from the horror of the 
traumatic truth revealed in the dream provides a sense of relief, since it protects us 
from the horror of our desire, whilst the logic of the dream asks us to confront our 
desire(s), regardless of how traumatic its disclosure may be. We wake up in order to 
escape the traumatic Real of our desires revealed in the dream.  
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud alludes to the nightmare ‘Alptraum’ 
only on two occasions in chapter 1 and does not develop a full theory of the 
nightmare. But towards the end of chapter 7, Freud refers to the nightmare with an 
interesting term “‘Schreckgespent’, which would be classically linked to the 
Alptraum – ‘incubus’ or, literally, ‘frightful specter’.”460 This frightful specter that 
emerges from the depths of inner space is precisely the Real in all its horror, which 
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once confronted in our dream, the dream quickly turns into a nightmare. Indeed, it is 
in the second half of the film that we are confronted with this ‘frightful specter’, the 
horror of the Real in the form of Toofan whose jouissance becomes the cause of the 
two girls’ anxiety, as Lacan states, “… the nightmare’s anxiety is felt, properly 
speaking, as that of the Other’s jouissance.”461 The Other’s jouissance or enjoyment, 
namely Toofan’s enjoyment, is the source of anxiety for the two girls, but their 
anxiety is precisely the source of his enjoyment (jouissance). In The Pervert’s Guide 
to Cinema, Žižek provides another name for what occurs after fantasy that structures 
our reality disintegrates, as he states, “When fantasy disintegrates, you don’t get 
reality. You get some nightmarish real, too traumatic to be experienced as ordinary 
reality. That would be another definition of nightmare.”462 It is often in the dream 
that turns into a nightmare that we encounter some repressed truth of our desire that 
appears as the traumatic Real in all its horror. In this sense the end of Atomic Heart 
stages the need to wake up back into reality from the horror of the Real confronted in 
the dream, embodied in the figure of Toofan. The logic here is effectively Lacanian, 
at first you dream in order to escape the unbearable reality, but then what you 
discover in the dream is (even) more horrifying than reality, hence you escape your 
dream in order to get back to reality. This is the elementary logic of the Lacanian 
insight, we do not only avoid a deadlock in reality by escaping into our dreams 
(fantasies), but more crucially we escape into reality from the nightmare of our 
dreams. But more crucially, we wake up in order to continue to dream, that is, to 




In this chapter I theorized that there is a shift away from the New Iranian Cinema of 
the 1990s and early 2000s, through a detailed textual analysis of Ali Ahmadzadeh’s 
film Atomic Heart, and situated the film (along A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night in 
the next chapter), as an exemplary instance of the logic of unhimelich between the 
weird and the eerie. I demonstrated that the formal structure of the film was based on 
a double or two-part structure – the motif of doubling and repetition throughout the 
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film itself functioned as instances of unhimelich – where the first part was theorized 
as the world of fantasy rather than reality, despite the realist style and technique, and 
the second part or surrealist half of the film was the world of desire, where reality 
deprived of its fantasy supplement, turned into a nightmarish surreality. It is in the 
second half, when reality loses its grounding in the frame of fantasy, that we 
encountered the traumatic (Lacanian) Real in all its horror, in the figure of Toofan, 
whose link with totalitarian and dictatorial figures (Sadam, Hitler) symbolized the 
Islamic Republic itself, or the former Iranian president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. It is at 
this point that the Real of desire also manifested itself, since desire functioned as a 
distortion of reality and de-naturalized it, rendering it irreal and nightmarish. It is in 
the world of desire that we encountered the Lacanian Che vuoi? The enigma of the 
Other’s desire, of desire as the desire of the Other, and the question of what does the 
Other (Toofan) want? In the second half of the film Nobahar and Arine’s homoerotic 
or lesbian desire appeared as the fright of the Real of their desire, since it is a 
forbidden desire in the Islamic Republic that can bring one into confrontation with 
the law, typified in the figure of Toofan.  
In the final analysis, the entire logic of the film was structured like a dream, 
where the first half functioned as the dream-fantasy or the dream as wish fulfillment 
of Nobahar and Araneh (and Kami), and the second half of the film was where the 
dream sequence swerved into a nightmare (swerved is an appropriate metaphor here 
since it was precisely at the moment of the car accident that the two worlds of dream 
and nightmare, fantasy and desire became separated), the nightmare being the dream 
of the figure that textually addressed the spectator from the screen at the beginning of 
the film, which stated that the film is one of his dreams. It is in this sense that the 
epigraph by Gilles Deleuze with which we began this chapter must be understood: “If 
you are caught in another’s dream, you are done for.” In this way Nobahar and 
Arineh stand as symbolic representations of young Iranian women, and perhaps all 
young people living in Tehran, who are ‘caught in another’s dream,’ the figure of 






The Return of the Repressed: The Real of Feminine Sexuality in A Girl Walks 
Home Alone At Night 
 
What is refused in the symbolic order re-emerges in the real.  
 
– Jacques Lacan463  
 
 
If Atomic Heart in the previous chapter was about the nightmare of people living 
under the totalitarian structure of the State (Islamic Republic), the diasporic Iranian 
film under analysis in this chapter, A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night (dir. Ana Lily 
Amirpour, 2014), is about the nightmare of the State itself. I argue that the nightmare 
of the Islamic Republic staged in the film is none other then the fear and anxiety of 
uncontrolled and autonomous female sexuality and desire. In this sense, the vampiric 
Girl is the embodiment of the nightmare of the State, as she is literally the figure of 
the nightmare itself, namely succubus, which in Persian is called bakhtak or kabus. 
The film stages the return of the repressed Real of feminine sexuality, the Real in its 
Lacanian sense of a traumatic core, that once confronted, is the source of horror to the 
ideology of the Islamic Republic. Since what the state apparatus or the Islamic 
Republic represses is feminine desire, specifically female sexuality, this is why 
women are to be veiled, for according to this logic women are possessed by an excess 
or surplus of (sexual) desire and enjoyment (jouissance) which must be contained and 
controlled, hence the logic of the veil (hejab). In effect, the veil is meant to cover 
over this surplus enjoyment (plus-de-jouir), this excess of jouissance (enjoyment) in 
women. Therefore, the female vampire, the Girl (Sheila Vand), represents the 
Freudian return of the repressed par excellence. The return of repressed feminine 
sexual energy, or libido, is represented by the figure of the vampire Girl, who haunts 
and kills the male inhabitants of Bad City. To put it in Lacanian terms, what is 
refused in the Symbolic order (i.e., female desire) returns in the Real embodied in the 
chador-clad female vampire.  
In this chapter, I will briefly provide an analysis of the concept of the return 
of the repressed in psychoanalysis and its articulation in psychoanalytic horror film 
theory, but with a Lacanian twist to the standard theory. I will then analyze the 
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concept of female desire and sexuality in Shi’ism and the logic of the veil and 
provide some contextualization of the film and its reception and its place in Iranian 
horror cinema – where I theorize it as an instance of the uncanny between the weird 
and eerie. In the next section I will analyze the film’s aesthetics and site of 
enunciation through Hamid Naficy’s theory of accented cinema. Finally, I will end 
with an analysis of aspects of the film through a Freudo-Lacanian prism,464 
foregrounding those aspects that stage the return of the repressed, and will conclude 
with a formal analysis of the writing found in the diegetic reality of the film (i.e., 
graffiti, signs, posters, tattoos, etc.), through coupling Michel Chion’s concept of 
athorybos with the inscription of desire in Lacan.  
 
5.1 The Return of the Repressed (with a Lacanian Twist)  
 
According to Slavoj Žižek, “the first key to horror films is to say, let’s imagine the 
same film [but] without the horror element,”465 that is to say, let us subtract or 
abstract the element of horror from the cinematic fiction and see what remains. In 
another instance referring to Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963) Žižek similarly 
states, “We must imagine The Birds as a film without birds.”466 Following this logic, 
the question to be asked here is: if we imagine A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night, 
without the horror element (i.e., a chador-clad female vampire), what are we left 
with? What we are left with is “the return of the repressed” in the form of the Real of 
female sexuality (i.e., the Girl) taking its vengeance on the patriarchal socio-symbolic 
order for its repression 
Freud famously states that the “return of the repressed,” the repressed truth of 
a traumatic event, can appear either as symptom, or as fetish. For instance, the subject 
has a traumatic experience and subsequently “represses” it, trying to erase the 
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traumatic memory or event by suppressing it, consigning it from the conscious to the 
unconscious, but the repressed trauma always returns in distorted forms such as 
symptom(s), jokes, slips of the tongue or pen, etc. (parapraxis). As Freud puts it in his 
essay on “Repression” (1915), “the essence of repression lies simply in turning 
something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious.”467 However, the 
repressed never stays in its place and always threatens to return, subverting the 
repressive narrative. Indeed, the logic of the Freudian return of the repressed is what 
returns in the form of the Real of female sexuality, exemplified in the figure of the 
female vampire, the Girl. This is why Lacan states, “What is refused in the symbolic 
order re-emerges in the real.” 468 The Real of female sexuality is nothing but the Real 
of its traumatic dimension, its disturbing element that perturbs the smooth 
functioning of the (patriarchal) symbolic order. Therein lies the reason that this Real 
or traumatic excess in female sexuality has to be repressed. 
There is a well-established history of the deployment of the logic of the return 
of the repressed in psychoanalytic film theory. One of the earliest film scholars to 
argue for this reading of the figure of the “monster” in horror films as the return of 
the repressed is Robin Wood, particularly in the now classic collection: The 
American Nightmare. Wood’s combination of Marxism, feminism, psychoanalytic 
theory and post-structuralism, proposed that the figures of horror cinema are  “our 
collective nightmares ... in which normality is threatened by a monster.”469 Some 
have critiqued Wood’s Freudian reading of horror films and the figure of the monster, 
but as Wood states: “Freudian theory is vulnerable to attack on many points, but not, 
in my opinion, on the one that formed The American Nightmare’s psychoanalytic 
basis: the theory of repression and the “ return of the repressed.”470 In that seminal 
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text, Wood (following Horowitz) divides the logic of repression into basic and 
surplus repression, with surplus repression rendering the subject “into monogamous 
heterosexual bourgeois patriarchal capitalists…” Wood provides a list of what is 
repressed in western culture, such as “sexual energy itself,” bisexuality, female 
sexuality/creativity, and infantile/child sexuality; as well as, “the particularly severe 
repression of female sexuality/creativity, the attribution to the female of passivity, 
and her preparation for her subordinate, dependent role in our culture.”471 Here Wood 
considers female sexuality emblematic of the most severe form of repression in 
western culture, and following Freud, attributes passivity to the feminine position 
(although this is a misreading of Freud, which I address in the next section). 
However, as we shall see there is a different libidinal economy operative in the 
Islamic-Shi‘i conceptualization of female sexuality, which conceives it as active 
rather than passive, and this is exactly why it must be repressed so as to contain the 
excess of erotic energy or libidinal surplus inhering in it. Others have similarly 
argued that at “the heart of cinematic horror lies a patriarchal fear of female sexuality. 
In order to tap into this fear, it is held that the genre defines female sexuality “as 
monstrous, disturbing, and in need of repression.”472 Whether this logic holds any 
longer in contemporary western societies is debatable (and irrelevant to the context of 
my argument), but as I argue here, this formulation of the return of the repressed as a 
patriarchal fear of female sexuality is operative in Iran under the Islamic Republic, 
especially in the Shi’ite juridical conception of female sexuality (see below). 
According to Lacan, there is a time paradox operative in the structure of 
repression. The repressed cannot be heard at the point of its repression but only when 
the repressed returns, it is only at that point the repressed begins to speak. This is why 
Lacan points out that “repression and the return of the repressed are the same 
thing.”473 In light of the film this can be formulated in this way: the thing repressed 
(female sexuality/desire) returns in the form of its repression (chador/veil). It is 
through the return that we are able to retroactively hear what the repressed was 
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saying in the past. It is only by listening to the return of the repressed via 
interpretation that the act of repression can be uncovered in the past. This is why 
psychoanalytic theory focuses on the construction of the primal traumatic scene, 
instead of striving to access a memory of it. The primal scene of trauma is therefore 
only traumatic retroactively, it is in the future anterior that it will have been 
traumatic, that is why Žižek states, “The Lacanian answer to the question, from 
where does the repressed return, is then paradoxically: from the future.”474 In this 
sense, the figure of the veiled female vampire is the return of the repressed not from 
the past but from the future. This is why as the embodiment of the Real of female 
sexuality the chador-clad Girl represents a point of trauma for the Islamic Republic, 
since she embodies and adumbrates the revolt against the patriarchal symbolic order 
for its repression of women. 
 
5.2 Veiling over Feminine Desire: Shi‘ism and the Real of Female Sexuality 
 
In order to properly theorize the significance of the Islamic veil (hejab), the 
Islamic/Shi‘i conception of female sexuality must be briefly analyzed. In her 
influential text, Beyond the Veil (1975), Fatima Mernissi theorized the way the veil 
functions in Islamicate societies. According to Mernissi in Judeo-Christian western 
societies, as well as Freudian psychoanalytic theory, femininity is perceived as 
passive whilst masculinity is active. Mernissi argues, on the contrary, that Islamic 
doctrine is a reversal of this standard theory and is based on the logic of an implicitly 
active female sexuality. If female sexuality is not contained and controlled, this 
potent force has the power to destabilize society and cause “fitna (disorder or chaos) 
(Fitna also means a beautiful woman – the connotation of a femme fatale who makes 
men lose their self-control)”475 (indeed the chador-clad vampire is a sort of horror 
version of the femme fatale in the universe of film noir), and to threaten the civic and 
religious universe of men. In this way, the hejab and the structurally related gender 
segregation are strategies for the control and containment of female sexuality in 
Islamicate societies. Therefore, the patriarchal logic operative in Islamicate societies 
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is predicated on the “fear of unrestrained female sexuality,”476 hence the logic of the 
veil. Though this reading of female sexuality as active in Islamic theory is generally 
apt, its reading of Freudian theory of female sexuality as “passive” has to be 
problematized, since as Lacan reminds us, what has to be “remembered [is] Freud’s 
often repeated warning not to reduce the supplement of feminine over masculine to 
the complement of passive to active…”477 In other words, though the logic of passive 
and active may be operative in the conceptualization of traditional Islamic notions of 
femininity/passive and masculinity/active (and for that matter in Christianity/western 
society), this cannot be predicated on a reversal of these notions in Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
In Shi’i Islam, especially in contemporary Shi‘i jurisprudence (fiqh) in Iran, 
women are viewed as an object for the sexual pleasure of their husbands – their 
sexual and reproductive organs are an object or “a commodity – actually and 
symbolically – that is separated from the woman’s persona and that is at the core of 
an individual, social, and economic transaction – an object that is abstracted, reified, 
and then treated as a separate entity.”478 This abstraction of sexuality from the 
feminine body is thereby conceived by the ruling male (Shi’i) ideology in Iran as 
representative of a woman’s entire being. In this way woman is no longer a person 
but an object for the (sexual) pleasure of men. As Shahla Haeri perceptively puts it: 
 
Women are thus ideologically perceived not only as symbols of sexuality but 
as the very embodiment of sex itself; woman and “it” become almost 
indistinguishable. Collapsing the symbol into what it stands for, Shi’i Islam 
views women as objects to be owned and to be jealously controlled, objects of 
desire to amass, to discard, to seclude, and to veil, objects of indispensible 
value to men’s sense of power and virility.479 
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This collapsing of sex itself with the being of women and the ontological structure of 
femininity is what foregrounds the threatening dimension of female sexuality. 
According to this logic, the threatening power of female sexuality lies in the very 
equation of women/femininity with sex/sexuality, with the thing-itself. Haeri, 
deploying a Levi-Strassian binary model of culture/male vs. female/nature, suggests 
that women are perceived as embodiments of nature, and “thus are perceived to be 
irresistible, indispensible, capricious, powerful, and fearsome.” For instance, a whole 
set of legal prescriptions and cultural beliefs forewarn men of the sexual power of 
women, and forbid men “to look at their wife’s vagina, for otherwise their progeny 
will be born blind”.”480 This is not peculiar to Shi‘ism, as a hadith reported in Sunni 
sources states, “The sight of the [female] sexual organ engenders oblivion.”481 This 
threatenting, almost magical power of the female sexual organ, perfectly exemplifies 
the (Lacanian) Real of female sexuality within the Shi’ite legal imaginary. According 
to Shi’i doctrine then, female sexuality is seen as a radical threat to men and the 
social-symbolic order, and if unveiled, women are liable to lead men astray from the 
so-called “straight path” (sirat al-mustaqim) by arousing their sexual desires,482 since 
it must be recalled that an unveiled woman is effectively nakedness itself (‘awra). 
Khomeini in one of his declarations, whilst castigating the Pahlavi regime states, 
“they regard the civilization and advancement of the country as dependent upon 
women’s going naked in the streets, or to quote their own idiotic words, turning half 
the population into workers by unveiling them (we know only too well what kind of 
work is involved here).”483 Here Khomeini equates women going out unveiled with 
nakedness, and he insinuates that where women are unveiled in public for their 
employment, the kind of work involved is effectively prostitution. Thus, in the 
masculinist economy of Shi’i legal theory women are to be controlled and contained 
through segregation and veiling, so that men can be guarded against the threatening 
power of female sexuality. 
 In order to properly draw out (the traumatic dimention of) the Lacanian Real 
in the Shi’i conception of female sexuality, we cannot provide a better example of 
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what came to be called the “boob quake” among Iranians. In a Friday sermon in 
2010, the Friday prayer leader in Tehran, a cleric named Hojjat al-Islam Kazem 
Sediqi stated that, “Many women who do not dress modestly lead young men astray 
and spread adultery in society which increases earthquakes…”484 This is the perfect 
instantiation of the definition of the Real of female sexuality in its Lacanian sense, 
since, “While the Real cannot be directly represented… it can nonetheless 
be shown in terms of symbolic failure and can be alluded to through figurative 
embodiments of horror-excess that threaten disintegration (monsters, forces of nature, 
disease/viruses and so on).”485 What causes the earthquake in this instance is exactly 
the Real of female sexuality, without the proper veiling to contain and control it the 
earth itself shudders. In this sense, what is so traumatic about the veiled female 
vampire, the Girl, is that what was to effectively function as a protective screen (i.e., 
the veil), covering over the Real of feminine sexuality (its disturbing and traumatic 
dimension), becomes co-incident with this very traumatic excess in female sexuality. 
In other words, the signifying system of the veil becomes scrambled, it no longer 
functions as a signifier for containing the excess of female sexuality but becomes its 
exact opposite, the signifier of its imminent threat. This is what Lacan means by 
repression is the same thing as the return of the repressed: in this instance the thing 
repressed (female desire) is returned in the form of its repression (the veil/chador). 
This is the nightmare of the Islamic Republic embodied in the figure of the chador-
clad female vampire, which is why, this film was immediately deemed against the 
Islamic veil (zid-e hejab).  
 
5.3 The Reception of the Film in Iran 
 
Unlike its critical success and positive reception in the West, the reception of A Girl 
Walks Home Alone At Night in Iran, especially in the state backed media, was 
extremely negative. The film is officially banned in Iran and various Iranian news 
websites, such as the state backed farsnews agency have condemned the film as “anti-
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Iranian” (zid-e Iran).486 The term or concept “anti-Iranian” is an interesting one and 
has its origins in totalitarian societies. Noam Chomsky, the American political 
dissident and philosopher, who has been condemned as “anti-American” on many 
occasions, provides a succinct explanation that is relevant here:  
 
The concept “anti-American” is an interesting one. The counterpart is used 
only in totalitarian states or military dictatorships… Thus, in the old Soviet 
Union, dissidents were condemned as “anti-Soviet.” That’s a natural usage 
among people with deeply rooted totalitarian instincts, which identify state 
policy with the society, the people, the culture. In contrast, people with even 
the slightest concept of democracy treat such notions with ridicule and 
contempt.487 
 
In this sense, the term “anti-Iranian” is an ideological term that has been deployed by 
the Islamic Republic as a way to condemn anyone or anything that they perceive to 
be critical of the Islamic Republic and its value system. Several other state run sites 
have appeared forewarning Iranians who would download the film, stating that the 
“downlowding of the anti-Iranian film A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night is 
religiously forbidden” (haram).488 Therefore, downloading this film could bring one 
into confrontation with the law in Iran. Another site called Aviny Artistic Cultural 
Institute – a site dedicated to the filmmaker Morteza Avini (d. 1993), who was killed 
in the Iran-Iraq war and is hailed by the state as a “martyr”, as are almost all those 
who lost their life during the war – besides calling the film “anti-Iranian,” states that 
the film is “against the hijab”489 (zid-e hejab), by which the black chador that the 
female vampire wears in the film is intended.  
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A number of similar objections to A Girl are discussed in a fascinating video 
in which a state sponsored film critic, Ali-Reza Pour Masoud, provides a critique of 
the film that is extremely interesting, and stages the paranoiac logic that is operative 
in condemning the film as anti-Iranian and anti-hijab. In the video Pour Masoud 
states, “the reason for the need to analyze and critique this film arises from the fact 
that in this film, a girl who is wearing a full chador and veil becomes a vampire, but it 
is not clear how she becomes a vampire in the film. The film creates an image of an 
Islamic-Iranian identity (huviyat) that may mislead those who lack any information 
about Iran, and who may therefore form a false opinion of the country.”490 Pour 
Massoud then goes on to provide several interpretations as to why the film is anti-
Iranian. First he states that, “In this film, a story is told of a city, which is called Bady 
City, and the city stands as the symbol for Iran….”491 According to him, the film 
provides a dark portrayal of family life in Iran, by negatively depicting a Muslim 
family and particularly a father with a Shi’i name, “In the film family has no 
meaning, and we only see one family that has very negative qualities…. For example, 
the Iranian father in the family is represented as ordinary, a gambler, a womanizer 
and a junkie, who uses drugs to numb his pain…. Arash, and his father Hossein, and 
by the name of Hossein, it is clear that they are Muslims and that they belong to the 
Shi’i faith….”492 The name of Hossein given to the junkie father is considered 
offensive by Pour Masoud, and represents a critique of the Shi’ite faith, the Muslim 
family and all Iranian fathers. But the name Hossein seems to have been chosen 
simply as a common Iranian name, and nothing more. He then further discusses the 
films portrayal of moral and social corruption represented in the figure of the pimp 
and prostitute stating, “The film portrays a deeply frightful image of Iran… there is 
also a pimp in the film who is a despicable character, and whose body is filled with 
tattoos of profane words that cannot even be uttered. Another character in the film is 
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a prostitute who is saving money in order to leave Bad City, its meaning is that so she 
can leave Iran and that Iran is not a livable place.”493 The drug-dealing pimp has 
obscenities tattooed on his face in Persian such as “pimp” (kos kesh, the English word 
“pimp” does not convey the obscenity of this term in Persian, which literally means: 
‘vagina stretcher’) and “sex” transliterated into Persian.  
Pour Masoud then tries to highlight the prostitute’s immoral character by 
referring to a scene where she dances with a balloon, but he mistakes or confuses the 
prostitute with the figure of the silent mysterious transvestite character in the film (it 
is interesting that the figure of the male transvestite has successfully passed as female 
for Pour Masoud, or else he would have likely condemned the male cross-dressing as 
well). According to this perspective a woman dancing is further proof of her 
immorality, since it is forbidden for women to dance in public in Iran, and for which 
they can get arrested and receive 70 lashes. Then Pour Masoud turns his attention to 
the negative depiction of the Islamic veil or chador in the film stating, “It is 
interesting that the only individual in the film with a full body hejab [chador], is the 
vampire girl, which is a fully Islamic hejab and chador… And it is clear that the film 
has targeted its attack against the hejab, and has portrayed all the negativities [in 
Iran] through the hejab. And it is possible for whoever has no knowledge of the hejab 
or any understanding of the Iranian hejab, to become completely against it.”494 This 
is another misreading, as there is another chador-clad female at the hospital, when 
Arash goes to get a cast for his broken hand, we see her at the helpdesk behind a 
window glass.  
Finally, Pour Masoud discusses the representation of social and economic ills 
of society via reference to the oil industry and states, “This film is through and 
through an insult to the Islamic-Iranian identity…. It constantly shows the oil 
industry, implying that Bad City is very wealthy, with a strong economy but does not 
spend any of the wealth on its people, and therefore the majority of people are either 
poor or prostitutes.”495 Indeed the scenes of oil drills in the city function like 
vampires sucking the oil out of the earth, oil itself as a commodity is one of the 
biggest exports of Iran, and also the very foundation of economy and of modern 
capitalism in general. In this sense, the true vampire is the state (and capitalism itself) 
                                                        




with its eternal cycle of consumption and reproduction, it is as it were, the oil drills 
are vampire-capital sucking the life force of the earth turning the earth into a dead 
corpse, as Marx puts it famously in Das Capital, “Capital is dead labour which, 
vampire-like, lives only by sucking living lanour, and lives the more, the more it 
sucks…”496 In this sense the drills are the vampiric dimension of the Islamic 
Republic who are like the real vampires sucking the blood (wealth and resources) of 
the Iranian people, it is no wonder then that the corpses that are strewn into the ditch 
at the opening scene of the film, gesture not only towards the trail of corpses left 
behind by the vampiric Girl, but more crucially by the state, represented in the film 
by the figure of the Boss (ra’is), (who represents a spectral presence that haunts the 
subjects of Bad City with the Girl functioning as the obverse of that spectral presence 
who takes revenge) who often functions only as a voice (an acousmatic voice), and 
we only see him a few times on the television set. 
Apropos the hejab, it is not the first time in Iranian cinema that extreme 
sensitivity has been shown by the state (irshad or state censors) towards films that 
portray a chador-clad woman in a way that could be perceived negatively. A film 
made by Bahram Bahramian called Parinaz (2012), has a female lead (Fatemeh 
Motamed-Aria) who is a traditional woman that wears the chador that was banned in 
Iran, as it was said to depict a veiled woman with “moral and psychological issues.” 
The films producer, Abdolhamid Najibi stated:  
 
This woman is very religious and suffers from deep personal issues which 
cause problems inside the home. Although these issues get resolved at the end 
of the film, the cinema authorities have said that a chadori woman [woman 
wearing the long-black veil] should never be shown with moral or 
psychological issues…497 
 
Here “moral issues” can be related to female sexuality, since uncontrolled female 
sexuality is often considered the essence of immorality (fesad-i akhlaqi) and hence 
punishable by Law. In this way, it is little wonder that the state media have taken 
issue with a film representing a female vampire donning the Iranian black chador, a 
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vampire who is at once imbued with an aura of eroticism, power and violence, 
subverting the often religious and pious associations of the black chador in Shi’i 
religious consciousness, and Muslim female propriety, and is thereby repeatedly 
condemned. 
 
5.4 An Iranian Nightmare  
 
When Ana Lily Amirpour was asked during the Q&A at the BFI London Film 
Festival in October 2014 where she got the idea for the nightmarish Bad City, she 
said that she saw it in a dream;498 in other words, in a nightmare. Though A Girl 
draws from the history of the vampire genre in both Anglo-American fiction and 
cinema, yet the film also taps into the vast reservoir of Iranian folklore and myths 
about a female vampire-like creature, namely the figure of bakhtak or kabus, 
otherwise known as the nightmare (Figure 5.1). In ancient Iranian folklore there is a 
female creature possessing a horrifying form that is the personification of the 
nightmare. Some of the legends associated with bakhtak consider her to have been 
one of the slave girls of Alexander the Great, who accompanied him in his search for 
the water of life (ab-e hayat). According to this legend, after the water was 
discovered it was placed in a goatskin; but it was punctured by a crow and the water 
spilled onto the ground. Bakhtakk then scooped the water and drank it, and thus she 
and the crow became immortal. Alexander, enraged, ordered her nose be cut off and 
replaced by a clay nose. The immortality of bakhtak already gestures to the 
possibility of the origins of immortality for the vampire in later folklore. It is said that 
a nightmare occurs when bakhtak/kabus throws herself on the sleeper’s chest in the 
dark, and if the sleeper wants to stop the nightmare and to drive bakhtak away, he 
must wiggle his finger. Bakhatak has also “been described as a massive, perspiring 
black bundle, which falls upon the sleeper and tries to suffocate him.”499 The image 
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of a black-veiled immortal female vampire in the film who falls on the chest of her 
victims and suffocates them with her fangs and drinks their blood is a perfect 
cinematic image of the bakhtak or kabus.500 (Figure 5.2). 
This incubus or kabus/bakhtak that emerges from the depths of inner space is 
the Real in all its horror, which once confronted in our dreams–the dream quickly 
turns into a nightmare. Indeed, in the film we are confronted with this figure in the 
form of the vampire Girl, whose jouissance becomes the cause of Arash’s anxiety by 
the film’s end, as Lacan states “… the nightmare’s anxiety is felt, properly speaking, 
as that of the Other’s jouissance.501 This is why at the end of the film, Arash stops the 
car and gets out and paces about, whilst the vampire Girl sits in the car; this is the 
anxiety induced by the Other’s jouissance (e.g., the vampire’s) 
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Figure 5.1 “Demons: Kabus, the incubus. Demon portrait. From a 15th-century 
Arabic collectaneous manuscript known as Kitab al-bulhan” or “Book of Wonders,” 
held at the Bodelian Library, University of Oxford, MS. Bodl.Or.133, fol.28r. The 
Arabic at the top of the page reads, “On the Nightmare (kabus) and his followers.” 





Figure 5.2 The Nightmare (1781), John Henry Fuseli. An incubus or the figure of the 
nightmare sitting on the chest of a woman in sleep. Wikimedia Commons. 
 
The figure of the nightmare in European folklore is the subject of Henry 
Fuseli’s famous painting, The Nightmare (1781) (Figure 5.2). This image of The 
Nightmare by Fuseli, evoked and invoked by Carl Theodor Dreyer in his 
expressionist masterpiece Vampyr (1932) (Figure 5.3), may be originally related to 
the Iranian bakhtak or kabus. In the European folkloric tradition, the nightmare was 
described as a horrifying creature, the incubus or succubus that would bear down on 
the sleeper’s chest at night. As noted in the previous chapter Freud does not develop a 
theory of the nightmare in The Interpretation of Dreams, but alludes to the nightmare 
through the term ‘Schreckgespent’, which is classically linked to the Alptraum – 
‘incubus’ or, literally, ‘frightful specter’.”502 Indeed, the other name for bakhtak, 
namely kabus, literally means “nightmare” in Persian and Arabic, and may well be 
                                                        
502 John Forrester, “Introduction,” in Sigmund Freud, Interpreting Dreams, trans. J. 
A. Underwood (London: Penguin Books, 2006), li.  
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related to the Latin incubus. Ernest Jones, in his classic text, On the Nightmare, 
provides a sexual interpretation of the nightmare, and dedicates a chapter to the 
incubus and the vampire respectively. In the section on the incubus Jones states: 
 
We have already commented on the interesting circumstance, so significant 
for our sexual theory of the Nightmare, that the scientific name for this 
condition in the Middle Ages also denoted a lewd demon who visits women at 
night, lies heavily on their chest and violates them against their will. These 
visitors of women were called Incubi (French follets\ Spanish duendes\ Italian 
folletti] German Alpen); those of men were called Succubi (French 
souleves).503   
 
Bakhtak is also sometimes related to another figure in Iranian folklore, namely a she-
devil or demon called Aal. Aal is a creature that personifies perpetual fever, and has 
been described as a child-stealing witch or demon.504 One of the ways bakhtak has 
been related to Aal is that both creatures are said to possess a clay nose, and each 
share a similar name called bingeli or clay nosed. Similarly, in certain parts of Iran 
the Aal is referred to as Aal-e bakhtak.505 The German term Alb or Alp (the German 
word Alptraum is the conjoining of Alp = goblin, demon, with Traum = dream), from 
which meaning a demon or goblin that is thought to give the sleeper a nightmare by 
pressing down on its chest, may be related to the Iranian Aal as well. This is not at all 
unlikely as both Persian and German are Indo-European languages and share a 
common linguistic heritage.  
 
                                                        
503 Ernest Jones, On the Nightmare, (London, 1931), 82.  
504 A. Shamlu and J. R. Russell, “Al,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. I, Fasc. 7, pp. 
741-742, accessed September 12, 2015, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/al-
folkloric-being-that-personifies-puerperal-fever 




Figure 5.3 The female vampire in Carl Theodor Dreyer’s Vampyr (1932). 
Dreyr’s iconography here gestures towards Fuseli’s painting, The Nightmare (1781). 
 
In this connection Lacan (à la Freud and Jones) provides an important 
elaboration between the relation of the nightmare and the incubus or succubus, 
especially as a questioning being: 
 
The correlative of the nightmare is the incubus or the succubus, the creature 
that bears down on your chest with all its opaque weight of foreign jouissance 
[enjoyment], which crushes you beneath its jouissance. The first thing that 
appears in the myth, but also in the nightmare such as it is experienced, is that 
this creature that weighs down with its jouissance is also a questioning being, 
and even reveals itself in the developed dimension of the question as the 
riddle. The Sphinx, don’t forget, who in the myth arrives on the scene prior to 
all of Oedipus’ drama, is both a nightmarish figure and a questioning 
figure.”506  
 
There is an important scene in A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night that stages the Girl 
as both a nightmarish and questioning figure. In the scene the Girl follows a young 
boy with a skateboard and as the boy turns to look back she disappears; then 
suddenly as the boy turns back to walk, the Girl appears in front of him, and looking 
down at him asks, “Are you a good boy?” It is significant that the first time the Girl 
                                                        
506 Lacan, Anxiety, 61. 
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speaks in the film, it is as a questioning being. Indeed, just as Lacan has noted, the 
Girl, much like the figure of the incubus or kabus (bakhtak) is both a nightmarish and 
questioning figure, and exemplifies the dimension of the question as riddle. In 
another vampire film called Let the Right One In (2008) directed by Tomas 
Alfredson, Eli the vampire appears for the first time, when Oskar fantasizes about a 
confrontation with his would-be bullies at school by stabbing at a tree, repeating 
“what a good piggy you are.” It is clear Oskar is fantasizing about vengeance, at 
which moment his fantasmatic wish is fulfilled when the vampire Eli appears and 
asks him, “What are you doing”? In the end Eli kills all the boys that were bullying 
him in the swimming pool – the lesson is clear: Eli is Oskar’s revenge fantasy 
realized. In both films, the vampire first appears as a questioning being, a being that 
is the correlative of the nightmare, kabus or the incubus both in Iranian and European 
folklore traditions. 
In his seminar on Anxiety, Lacan relates the figure of the vampire to the 
maternal breast in the oral-relation and to anxiety (l’agnose). For Lacan anxiety is an 
affect that does not deceive, it is one of the truest psychic affects, and it arises 
through the desire of the Other, and in the question, what does the Other want? As 
Lacan phrases it cryptically, anxiety is not without an object. In other words, anxiety 
has an object, but this is not an object in any ordinary sense, but the objet petit a or 
object-cause of desire. Apropos the figure of the vampire Lacan states, “As mythical 
as it is, however, the vampire image reveals to us through the aura of anxiety that 
surrounds it the truth of the oral relation to the mother.”507 According to Lacan what 
the message in the mythic image of the vampire accentuates is “that of a possibility 
of lack, a possibility that is realized beyond what anxiety harbours by way of virtual 
fears over the drying-up of the breast.”508 For Lacan, the breast as partial object 
functions as the point of anxiety, and the fantasmatic figure of the vampire 
materializes this anxiety through its relation to the drying up of the breast. Lacan 
states further, “The relation to the mother, inasmuch as it stands out in the image of 
vampirism, is what allows us to distinguish between the anxiety-point and the point 
of desire. At the level of the oral drive, the anxiety-point lies at the level of the 
Other.”509 Lacan’s point is not that the baby functions as a little vampire, seeking to 
                                                        
507 Lacan, Anxiety, 236.  
508 Ibid, 236. 
509 Ibid, 236. 
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pierce the innards of the mother’s breast and draw out the milk, or that the baby at the 
mother’s breast is what elicits anxiety, but rather that what is anxiety inducing is the 
over-presence of the objet a; this is what renders its status (the breast) as a partial 
object and which conjures the image of the vampire. As Joan Copjec notes, “The 
danger that anxiety signals is the overproximity of this object a, this object so 
inalienable that like Dracula and all the other vampires of Gothic and Romantic 
fiction it cannot even be cast as a shadow or reflected as a mirror image, and yet so 
insubstantial that like Murnau’s Nosferatu it can disappear in a puff of smoke.”510 
This is the danger that is signaled by the chador-clad female vampire in the film, the 
overproximity of objet petit a, especially at the film’s end when Arash realizes that 
she is the one who killed her father. This moment is full of anxiety and indecision 
and is rendered in one of the last images of the film where Arash get’s out of the car 
and paces about, since he knows full well the vampire Girl is the figure of death, the 
Hegelian negativity. In this sense, Arash’s final act to leave with the knowledge that 
to tarry with the Girl will mean certain death, is, to put it in Hegelian terms: “tarrying 
with the negative.”511  
 
5.5 Iranian Horror Films (between the Weird and the Eerie) 
 
The tag line for A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night as the “first Iranian 
vampire-western film,” provides an opportunity to explore and situate the film in the 
history of Iranian horror films, although the film deploys some of the conventions of 
the vampire genre, it is not a conventional horror genre film and as indicated before, 
falls within the coordinates of the uncanny between the weird and the eerie, since the 
film does not evoke a sense of horror, but rather a more profound sense of the 
‘strange’ that is characteristic of the two modes of the weird and the eerie. The 
incongruous juxtaposition of a vampire wearing the traditional long black veil 
(chador) is itself a weird image. There is also a palpable sense of the eerie to the film, 
not only in the empty dark streets at night, or the industrial noise that reverberates in 
                                                        
510 Copjec, Read My Desire, 119. 
511 Hegel states, “Spirit … [looks] the negative in the face [i.e., death] and [tarries] 
with it.” See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 19; see also, Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the 
Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993). 
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many scenes (evocative of the same industrial soundscape in David Lynch’s similarly 
monochrome Eraserhead (1977)), but to a more invisible menacing force that 
pervades the atmosphere of the film that suggests someone else is watching beyond 
the vampire Girl’s watchful eyes – the eyes of the big Other. Such images of spectral 
eyes that seem to be watching is gestured by several close ups of the cat’s (Masuka) 
eyes looking, as well as the silent figure of the transvestite who also often watches 
the goings on in Bad City. 
Among the various genres that populate Iranian cinema such as comedies or 
melodramas, there is a paucity of examples of the horror genre in Iranian cinema. 
Indeed, only a handful of horror films have been made in Iran in the pre and post-
revolutionary period, many of which are of poor or uneven quality, with only a 
couple of examples of high quality films. But, A Girl’s promotion as the first vampire 
film has to be problematized at the outset, since that distinction goes to a rather 
derivative film that goes back to the pre-revolution era in the Pahlavi period, called 
Zan-e khun asham (Vampire Woman, 1967) directed by Mustafa Usku’i.512 However, 
among the first higher quality films that should be mentioned is Dariush Farhang’s 
Telesm (The Spell, 1988), a gothic tale set in 19th century (Qajar) Iran where the 
carriage of a newlywed couple breaks down during a storm, forcing them to seek 
refuge in a haunted mansion. Hamid Rakhshani’s, Shab-e bist o nohom (The 29th 
Night, 1990) tells the story of a married couple, Mohtaram and Haj Esmail, where an 
evil female spirit named Atefeh haunts the mind of Mohtaram. Mohammad Hoessein 
Latifi’s, Khabgha-e dokhtaran (Girl’s Dormitory, 2004), deploys “popular Muslim 
beliefs and practices where a young woman becomes the target of a crazed killer 
claiming to be under the command of the jinn.”513 Although Partovi provides an 
excellent reading of this film and its context, a crucial element is missing from his 
analysis of the killer’s possession by the jinn, namely that there is an allusion to a 
sexual intercourse between the jinn and the murderer.514 Mehrdad Mirfallah’s Khab-e 
Leila (Leila’s Dream, 2010), is the story of a young woman who lives alone in her 
                                                        
512 Mehrabi, Tarikh-e sinema-yi Iran, 120. 
513 Pedram Partovi, “Girls’ Dormitory: Women’s Islam and Iranian Horror,” Visual 
Anthropology Review, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 186–207. 
514 See Pierre Lory, “Sexual Intercourse Between Humans and Demons in the Islamic 
Tradition,” in Hidden Intercourse Eros and Sexuality in the History of Western 
Esotericism, ed. Wouter J. Hanegraaff and Jeffrey J. Kripal (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 
2008) pp. 49-64. 
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inherited family home, and is haunted and attacked by a 6 year old girl possessed of 
supernatural strength. All these films fall within the conventions of the horror genre 
and none of them are part of the new genre bending avant-garde movement that is 
part of the two modes of the weird and the eerie. 
One of the most artful horror films to appear from Iran is Shahram Mokri’s 
Fish and Cat (2013), which has been described as an Iranian slasher film. Indeed, 
Mokri’s Fish and Cat can be said to have inaugurated the genre bending film 
movement that I have called the uncanny between the weird and the eerie. Mokri’s 
more recent film, the apocalyptic vampire film Hojoom (Invasion, 2017), also fits 
perfectly into the coordinates of these two modes. Fish and Cat is formally 
innovative, and is among a handful of films in the world to be shot in a single long-
take, such as Bela Tarr’s Macbeth (1982) and Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark 
(2002). The camera follows elliptically a number of students in the camp who have 
traveled to the Caspian region to participate in a kite-flying competition during the 
winter solstice. Nearby their camp is a small restaurant, whose three cooks seem to be 
serial killers using human meat for their restaurant. They are out on the hunt for new 
meat for their restaurant with plenty of students around to serve as the next meal. The 
film never actually shows a single murder, and throughout, the film is pervaded by an 
eerie sense of looming violence, a violence that always remains virtual but never 
realized on screen. The constant threat or virtuality of violence in the film creates a 
profound sense of terror and anxiety that metaphorically comments on the way 
Iranian society is under a constant threat of violence from state authority. This is the 
structure of symbolic authority as such, in order for it to “function as an effective 
authority, it has to remain not-fully-actualized, an eternal threat.”515 Both Fish and 
Cat and Invasion evoke the menacing, dark and threatening atmosphere in 
contemporary Iran.  
Besides Atomic Heart and A Girl, other filmic examples of the weird and the 
eerie may be mentioned, although a full discussion of each film is beyond the scope 
                                                        
515 Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2004), 4. This is precisely why the brief actualization of 
violence by the state in June 2009 in Tehran was so traumatic; but on the other hand, 
whenever the threat of symbolic authority passes from virtuality to actuality, the true 
impotence of its power is displayed. This is the moment of emancipatory 
consciousness, to see that beneath the façade of its power and authority: the “emperor 
has no clothes.”  
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of this chapter. These films include Keywan Karimi’s Drum (2016), Nima Farahi’s 
Zar (2017), Farid Valizadeh’s The Mirror of Lucifer (2016), and Aal (2010) by 
Bahram Bahramian. Indeed, Bahramin’s Aal is an early proto-example of the weird 
and the eerie, since its subject matter of the figure of the nightmare, Aal (discussed 
above), places it within the thematic coordinates of this movement. Similarly Farahi’s 
Zar also deploys the supernatural wind or zaar (see below), as a way to evoke the 
paranoid and menacing atmosphere of post-2009 Iranian society. 
 Perhaps inspired by the success of A Girl, another critically acclaimed 
diasporic Iranian horror film was made in the past year, this time in the UK, namely 
Babak Anvari’s Under the Shadow (2016).516 The film is set during the Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988), and centers on the life of a married couple, Shideh and Iraj, and their 
young daughter Dorsa. After the father (Iraj), who is a doctor, leaves to offer medical 
aid at the frontlines, an Iraqi missile hits the roof of their apartment building but does 
not explode – a scene that seems to have been inspired by the Spanish-Mexican 
ghostly horror film directed by Guillermo del Toro, The Devil’s Backbone (2001). It 
is after this incident that the daughter and mother are haunted by the appearance of 
the jinn (as noted above the jinn folklore was also used in the Girl’s Dormitory), who 
relentlessly attack them until they finally escape their building. There is a formal 
connection made in the film between the unexploded missile and the appearance of 
the jinn (a similar connection is drawn in The Devil’s Backbone between the 
unexploded bomb and the appearance of the ghost) on the building that serves as a 
political allegory for the horrors of the Iran-Iraq war, and the nightmarish universe 
created by the new Islamic regime after the revolution. The influence of the motif of 
zar or evil wind in southern Iranian folklore on the film is also evident especially as 
much of the imagery linked to the jinn is gestured through the motif of the wind 
                                                        
516 At the premiere screening of Under the Shadow at the Cameo cinema in 
Edinburgh in 2016, during the Q&A session I asked Babak Anvari whether A Girl or 
any other Iranian horror films were an influence on his film, but he was not very 
forthcoming on the influence of A Girl, but mentioned the Iranian horror film Girl’s 
Dormitory. For other filmic and directorial influences both western and Iranian, see 
“Under the Shadow: the films that influenced this creepy Iranian horror,” interview 




(baad) in the film may be related to beliefs pertaining to zaar.517 This film however 
cannot be considered to belong to the new film movement that evokes the two modes 
of the weird and the eerie, since it is strictly a horror genre film that does not break 
away from horror conventions, and its themes are not related to contemporary Iran, 
but Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.  
 As discussed earlier, the reception of A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night in 
Iran was overwhelmingly negative (not public reception but state reception, since the 
film was never screened in Iran and is categorically banned). Indeed, it is not 
incidental that a new popular film about vampires was filmed for the first time in Iran 
by Reza Attaran called, Derakula (Dracula, 2016).518 The comedy-horror film tells 
the story of a drug-addicted family man that is kidnapped by a vampire who is a 
descendant of Dracula, whose ancestors emigrated to Russia and eventually fled to 
Iran after World War II. The kidnapped man (played by Reza Attaran himself) slowly 
turns the descendent of Dracula (Levon Haftvan) into a drug addict, by convincing 
him that it will help him overcome his blood addiction. In the end Dracula finally 
kills the man, as he realizes that he has been turned into a junkie. In the film, the 
figure of bakhtak is directly mentioned and correlated with the vampire. In one scene, 
when Dracula and the character of Reza Attaran are visiting the doctor to seek help 
for their drug addiction, the doctor berates Dracula in a moment full of irony, saying, 
“You are like a bakhtak who has fallen upon society, and will not allow it to breath; 
like a bunch of parasites that feed on the blood of human beings. You are blood-
suckers.” The comedic irony here, of course, lies in the fact that the doctor does not 
know that he is literally speaking to a bakhtak or a blood-sucking vampire. Though 
the film is a parable of the problem of drug addiction in Iranian society, yet the 
subtext of the film effectively functions as an ideological response to A Girl, since it 
                                                        
517 “Zār, harmful wind (bād) associated with spirit possession beliefs in southern 
coastal regions of Iran. In southern coastal regions of Iran such as Qeshm Island, 
people believe in the existence of winds that can be either vicious or peaceful, 
believer (Muslim) or non-believer (infidel). The latter are considered more dangerous 
than the former and zār belongs to this group of winds.” Maria Sabaye Moghaddam, 
“ZĀR,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, accessed October 22, 2016, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/zar  
518 For the popularity of Reza Attaran and how he serves the maintenance of the 
status quo in Iran, see Babak Tabarraee, “Rationalizing the Irrational: Reza Attaran’s 
Popularity, Stardom, and the Recent Cycle of Iranian Absurd Films,” Iranian Studies 
Volume 51, 2018 - Issue 4, Pages 613-632.  
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locates the vampire as a foreigner (the Dracula family in the film are Russian 
aristocrats who came to Iran). In this sense the vampire or Dracula is not native to 
Iran (unlike the chador-clad female vampire in A Girl), but a foreign intruder. 
Linking the Dracula family to Russia (and let’s not forget the British origins of the 
novel Dracula) may also allude to Russia’s (and Britian’s) imperial interests in Iran 
in the 19th century, and thereby renders the vampire or Dracula into a foreign intruder 
who lives on the life-blood of Iranians.519 In this way, it seems that the state may 
have been eager to support the making of Dracula, as it provides a filmic counter-
narrative to the so-called “anti-Iran” (zid-e Iran) film A Girl Walks Home Alone At 
Night.  
 
5.6 A Vampire’s Accent or Accented Cinema 
 
A Girl Walks Home Alone At Night was submitted to the Vancouver International 
Film Festival and the Sundance Film Festival as an Iranian film. The theoretical 
question to be asked here is: can a film made in America, which is effectively an 
independent American film, be considered an Iranian film? Indeed, the film scholar 
and critic Kristin Thompson writing about the film in David Bordwell’s website on 
Cinema, notes this ambiguity in the categorization of A Girl as an Iranian film. She 
writes, “Whether A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night (2014) is actually an Iranian 
film is debatable, though it is listed as such in the program… Amirpour is of Iranian 
descent, and the film is in Farsi, which may be enough to have it considered 
Iranian.”520  
                                                        
519 For Russian and British imperialist projects in Iran, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia 
and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (Yale University Press, 
1968). Also, during the reign of Reza Shah in World War II in 1941, when the Shah 
chose neutrality in the war against Nazi Germany, the British and Russians invaded 
Iran, and deposed Reza Shah and sent him into exile, and in his stead placed his son 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as the new Shah of Iran. Finally, the 1953 Coup was 
instantiated by the British MI6 and the American CIA, in order to oust the 
democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh (d. 1967) for 
nationalizing Iranian oil. See Ervan Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the 
Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: The New Press, 2015). 
520 Kristian Thompson, “Iranian cinema moves on,” Thursday, October 9, 2014, 
accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2014/10/09/middle-
eastern-fare-at-viff/ 
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In order to theorize the film’s cultural location, especially its hybridity or 
liminality, I will deploy Hamid Naficy’s concept of accented cinema to illuminate the 
film’s aesthetics. An accented cinema is structured by a complex relationship to 
home or homeland by directors working outside their country of birth. These films 
are defined as diasporic, exilic, and migrant, and are often very diverse, but still share 
a common style:   
 
Accented films are interstitial because they are created astride and in the 
interstices of social formations and cinematic practices. Consequently, they 
are simultaneously local and global, and they resonate against the prevailing 
cinematic production practices, at the same time that they benefit from them. 
As such, the best of the accented films signify and signify upon the conditions 
both of exile and diaspora and of cinema. They signify and signify upon exile 
and diaspora by expressing, allegorizing, commenting upon, and critiquing 
the home and host societies and cultures and the deterritorialized conditions 
of the filmmakers. They signify and signify upon cinematic traditions by 
means of their artisanal and collective production modes, their aesthetics and 
politics of smallness and imperfection, and their narrative strategies that cross 
generic boundaries and undermine cinematic realism.521  
 
Amirpour’s A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night fits well within the theoretical 
coordinates of accented cinema, in some respects but not in others. The film was not 
made in Iran but was shot and produced in the US in Tufts/Westwood California, 
with the dialogue entirely in Persian with an Iranian cast and characters. The 
director’s parents are Iranian, and left Iran after the 1979 revolution and immigrated 
to England, and Amirpour eventually moved to the US with her family. In other 
respects the film is not a perfect fit. For example, A Girl is a generic film made 
within some of the conventions of the vampire film, and largely (although not fully) 
operating within the codes and conventions of that genre, although as Kristian 
Thompson states regarding the film, “the genre is the vampire film, though this one is 
hardly conventional;”522 but many of the films within the aesthetics of accented 
cinema function often outside generic modes and conventions. In other ways A Girl 
fits within the conceptual framework of accented cinema, as it is a film that stages the 
(dis)location of the filmmaker, and deals with the deterritorialized conditions of the 
director, who represents a hybrid generation of Iranian-Americans, and who although 
                                                        
521 Hamid Naficy, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking 
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001), 4-5. 
522 Thompson, “Iranian cinema moves on.” 
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ethnically Iranian, are culturally hybrid (American and Iranian). In this sense, the 
director’s own liminal identity and status is perfectly mirrored through the most 
liminal of creatures, the nameless female vampire, the Girl. Amirpour’s film also 
bears relation to other accented Iranian female directors such as Shirin Neshat and 
Marjane Satrapi, and especially to Satrapi’s work, since her graphic novel memoir 
Persepolis and its film adaptation, seem to be particular influences on the film’s 
chador (veil) iconography. Neshat’s black and white photographic series, Women of 
Allah, is another visible influence on the black-chador aesthetics of the film.  
Another aspect of the film’s hybridity or liminality that contributes to its 
accented aesthetic is the way Bad City is visualized in the film. Bad City is a kind of 
amalgamation of Tehran and Los Angeles, a sort of hybrid city. The film 
symbolically comments on the underbelly of Iranian society, especially Tehran and 
which form together a nightmare like noir city baptized in darkness, as we often see 
the city through the vampire’s eyes, like an endless night filled with drug dealers, 
pimps and prostitutes–the unwanted underside of the city. In this sense the noir like 
city – Bad City – is a liminal space, a nightmarish interzone between dream and 
wakefulness, between reality and fiction, a world which is double in its uncanny 
formation, which is why Amirpour has called it ‘Tehrangelis,’ (a hybrid term coined 
by Iranians living in Los Angeles long ago, due to its large Iranian immigrant or 
diasporic population), since it was shot in a suburb of Los Angeles (the film was shot 
in Tuft), the quintessential noir city, by rendering it into a stylized Tehran 
underworld, the two cities become one in this dreamscape of a city that effectively is 
the materialization of the psyche of their characters, like the masterpiece of German 
expressionism The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920). 523  
Similarly all the actors in the film are diasporic or exilic subjects living 
outside Iran, which is why the Persian spoken by the female vampire (played by 
Shiela Vand) and many of the characters in the film (except Marshal Manesh) have 
an accent that is discernable to a native Persian speaker. At times the Persian spoken 
by the central characters, especially the Girl, is even ungrammatical. For instance, 
where the Girl (Shiela Vand) says to Arash “you don’t know me,” Amirpour has the 
                                                        
523 See Ron Kelley, Irangeles: Iranians in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1993). See also, Nazanine Naraghi, “‘Tehrangeles,’ CA: The 
Aesthetics of Shame,” in Psychoanalytic Geographies, edited by Paul Kingsbury and 
Steve Pile, (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), 165-180.  
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Girl say in Persian “to mano nemidooni,” which is grammatically incorrect in Persian 
and should be “to mano nemishenasi”. It is clear that Amirpour has translated the 
English word “don’t know” back into Persian as nemidooni. In this sense, the film 
literally has an accent for native Iranian audiences, but again this fits well with the 
concept of an accented cinema as it stages an ‘aesthetics and politics of smallness and 
imperfection.’  
 
5.7 The Female Vampire as Castrator  
 
One of the motifs of A Girl Walks Home Alone at Night is castration anxiety and the 
disavowal of castration. Throughout the film the female vampire, the Girl, is 
associated with the image of castration and scenes and images that allude to 
castration and emasculation pervade the film. Indeed, the vampire – the Girl – is the 
figure of castration par excellence. In her book, The Monstrous-Feminine, Barbara 
Creed conceptualizes a psychoanalytic feminist theory of the horror genre, wherein 
she locates the figure of monstrosity in the female reproductive body. Creed argues 
that many horror films reveal that the fear of the (monstrous) woman is related to 
castration or woman as the castrating threat. Creed writes:  
 
Whereas Freud argued that woman terrifies because she appears to be 
castrated, man’s fear of castration has, in my view, led him to construct 
another monstrous phantasy – that of woman as castrator. Here woman’s 
monstrousness is linked more directly to questions of sexual desire than to the 
area of reproduction. The image of woman as castrator takes at least three 
forms: woman as the deadly femme castratrice, the castrating mother, and the 
vagina dentata.524  
 
Here Creed proposes that feminine/female monstrosity in horror films are related to 
issues of sexual desire rather than to reproduction. The three forms of the figure of 
the castrating woman in horror films: femme castratrice, the castrating mother, and 
the vagina dentate are also embodied in the figure of the veiled female vampire.  
There are several scenes throughout the film that stage this logic of castration, 
and I will take each of them in turn. For example, in one of the emblematic scenes in 
which the Girl represents the femme castratrice is in her encounter with the pimp, 
                                                        
524 Barbara Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 7.  
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who invites the Girl to his home, but she pauses at the entrance to be invited inside – 
a conventional formula of the vampire genre, alluding to the necessity of having to 
invite the vampire inside before they can enter. As they enter, the Girl looks around 
his flat while Saeed performs his machismo masculinity, and takes drugs, lifts 
weights, and dances (a perfect verisimilitude of performing masculinity evident in 
parts of the underground rave or techno subculture which abound both in California 
and Tehran). In this scene the roles become reversed in which the predator (the 
pimp/dealer) becomes prey, and the predator is the vampire Girl. Before getting ready 
to have sex with her, he places his finger in her mouth, and she begins to suck his 
figure slowly, clearly evoking the act of fellatio. Suddenly her fangs protrude 
outwards and she bites off his finger – effectively castrating and emasculating him. 
This is the first scene in which we are introduced to the powers of the female 
vampire, where she is staged as the horrifying figure of the femme castratrice. The 
Girl stands as the castrating woman par excellence, the figure of feminine vengeance, 
she enacts what Atti and Arash were incapable of doing (for instance, Atti is forced to 
prostitute herself and was just forced to give the pimp fellatio; and the pimp castrated 
Arash by taking his 1950s thunderbird – a phallic symbol of male potency). In this 




Figure 5.4 The Girl about to suck Saeed’s finger and bite it off. 
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In another scene, the Girl like a specter follows the boy with the skateboard, 
recalling Marx’s famous opening line in the Communist Manifesto, “A specter is 
haunting Europe”; here another specter is haunting Iran or Bad City as its obscene 
double, the specter of female sexuality. All of a sudden the Girl appears near him, 
and as the boy turns, the Girl asks him, “are you a good boy?” Here the questioning 
stages the riddle of the sphinx, the riddle of feminine mystery. Then she insists: 
answer me, are you a good boy or not? The tariffed boy answers: yes. Then the Girl 
bends down and gazes at him with a probing look, and says: “don’t lie.” Then she 
interrogates him with the same question a third time: “Are you a good boy?” And he 
says, evermore frightened, “yes.” Then she says, “I’ll ask you again, are you a good 
boy?” Then she growls at him displaying her vampire fangs, and with an obscenely 
distorted or anamorphic voice that no longer sounds feminine says: “I can take your 
eyeballs out of your skull and give them to the dogs.” The eyeballs here symbolize 
the boy’s testicles, and the threat is again a castrating threat. Then she says, “I’ll be 
watching you till the end of your life, understand?” The boy trembling says, “yes.” 
She then tells him for the last time be a good boy, i.e., don’t masturbate, forbidding 
masturbatory jouissance with the threat of castration. In this sense, the vampire Girl 
here functions as the castrating mother. The image of blinding the boy by taking his 
eyeballs, recalls the image of Oedipus Rex who blinds himself in the end once he 
discovers the horror of incest with his mother. In his famous text, The Uncanny 
(1919), Freud states:  
 
We know from psycho-analytic experience, however, that the fear of 
damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible one in children…. A study of 
dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that anxiety about one’s eyes, the 
fear of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being 
castrated. The self-blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a 
mitigated form of the punishment of castration — the only punishment that 
was adequate for him by the lex talionis.525 
 
                                                        
525 Freud, S. (1919). The ‘Uncanny’. The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917-1919): An Infantile 
Neurosis and Other Works, 230. 
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In this sense, Oedipus’ act of blinding himself can be read in light of the Freudian 
logic of castration or self-castration in this instance, wherein the revelation of the 
horror of incest results in Oedipus blinding himself (i.e., blinding = castration). 
The boy may also stand in as a symbolic representation of all Iranian boys in 
the Islamic Republic as potential future men, the female vampire’s superego-like 
injunction to be a good boy is the threat to treat women with dignity and equality; in 
this sense the threat is on the side of the Lacanian Real and all the more radical, since 
it emerges from the feminine position against the (patriarchal) symbolic order 
structured by the Law (sharia). As a last act, the vampire Girl takes the boys 
skateboard, which is another allusion to castration, since the skateboard stands for the 
boy’s phallus – the image of a chador-clad female vampire riding around a 
skateboard signals that she is a phallic woman or mother, not to be trifled with.526  
Another logic of castration in the film is related to Arash’s father who 
functions as the castrated father. In the film, Arash’s mother has left his father and he 
is left to care for his junky father. Arash wishes to be unburdened of this 
responsibility and fantasmatically wishes for the father’s death, but cannot really kill 
him. In the film, the paternal figure is staged as “castrated” and “impotent”, whose 
impotence is signaled by being a lifeless junky, incapacitated by his addiction. The 
father has lost all paternal authority and is later banished from the house by Arash, 
which is rendered verbally by Arash’s violent outburst, “what kind of a father are 
you? You are supposed to be my father?” This moment stages the full collapse of 
paternal authority. The death of the father later by the vampire Girl effectively 
functions as Arash’s fantasmatic wish fulfillment, the materialization of his fantasy of 
patricide, since he was too “impotent” to kill the father himself. As Žižek states, “We 
don’t want our fathers alive. We want them dead. The ultimate object of anxiety is a 
living father.”527 In this sense, the vampire Girl stands for the figure of the absent 
mother or substitute mother whom Arash possesses at the end, once the paternal 
figure as obstacle is removed and no longer functions as a barrier to sexual union.  
Arash’s incestuous desire for the (absent) mother is staged in one particular 
scene in the film. Before going to the underground masquerade party, Arash 
longingly looks at his mother’s photos, and then takes her lipstick and uses it as 
                                                        
526 Creed, Monstrous-Feminine, 157. 
527 Žižek, The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema. 
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makeup, and makes a Dracula costume from her clothing items. This dressing and 
assuming the identity of Dracula through the makeup and clothing of the mother, 
renders visible Arash’s unconscious desire to sexually possess the mother. The 
erotics of dressing and assuming the identity of Dracula stages the libidinal desire to 
possess the mother in all its erotic ambiguity, but it also functions as a desperate 
attempt for potency and phallic authority – Dracula is, after all, the figure of 
masculine phallic potency par excellence. This desire is staged in a scene where there 
is a comedic encounter between Arash masquerading as Dracula and the Girl 
vampire. The first comedic dimension at work here is the evocation of the 
iconography of Western films, namely the famous standoff between the hero and the 
villain. The other comedic moment here is not simply that one is the real vampire and 
the other is a fake masquerading one (Dracula), but that phallic potency is on the side 
of the feminine (female vampire), rather than the masculine (Arash as Dracula). Here 
the Girl is the ‘Real’ Dracula in its full Lacanian sense, the Girl as the Thing and the 
objet petit a, the embodiment of the traumatic Real. It is here that the Girl as vampire 
acts as the very realization or materialization of Arash’s fantasy, his wish fulfillment, 
namely to kill the father and possess the mother–in this instance the substitute 
mother, the vampire Girl herself. This is one of the elementary lessons of 
psychoanalysis: the more horrifying thing then not getting what you desire, is to get 
what you desire. As Oscar Wild puts it, “In this world there are only two tragedies. 
One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.”528 
 The scene or shot in which the Girl and Arash in the Dracula costume 
encounter each other in the street, cinematically stages the encounter between the 
new type of vampire represented by the Girl (who listens to punk music, etc.) and the 
old traditional vampire, namely Dracula – which is of course represented by Arash 
who embodies the traditional masculine role in his views towards women, 
representative of old traditional Iranian masculinity or male chivalry called 
jawanmardi (lit. young-manliness). This comes to the fore in one emblematic scene 
where a girl for whom Arash works doing gardening and other menial work asks him 
to fix her television set. When Arash is in her bedroom fixing her television and she 
continues to stay in the room scantly clad talking on the phone he states, “what will 
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your parents think of you being alone with me” – here the logic of na-mahram in 
Shi‘i culture is strictly operative, where non-relative males should not be alone with 
girls who are either not their close relatives or spouse.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Arash dressed as Count Dracula meets the Real ‘Dracula,’ the Girl. The 
scene also gestures towards the iconography of the stand off in the Western genre. 
 
5.8 The Vampire Thing, the Death Drive and Obscene Immortality 
 
The properly feminist psychoanalytic procedure here would be to ask, why does the 
Girl attack mainly the ‘men’ in Bad City? It is here that we can read her attacks as the 
Freudian ‘return of the repressed,’ namely the return of repressed sexual desires, the 
female libidinal energy, which had not found a proper outlet in life, so it continued 
after death, as a kind of ‘undead’ life force (vampire), persisting beyond life and 
death. Indeed, this is the Freudian death drive par excellence. The Freudian death 
drive (Todestrieb) is not simply the derive towards death or self-destruction, nor 
some kind of “transcendental” immortality, such as the nirvana principle, but rather 
the obscene life energy of the libido, which insists beyond life and death. As Žižek 
puts it: 
 
This is why we should not confuse the death drive with the so-called “nirvana 
principle,” the thrust toward destruction or self-obliteration: the Freudian 
death drive has nothing whatsoever to do with the craving for self-
annihilation, for the return to the inorganic absence of any life-tension; it is, 
on the contrary, the very opposite of dying—a name for the “undead” eternal 
life itself, for the horrible fate of being caught in the endless repetitive cycle 
of wandering around in guilt and pain.529  
                                                        
529 Žižek, The Parallax View, 62. 
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The last part of this quote by Žižek can to be read via a significant scene in the film, 
where the prostitute Atti asks the vampire Girl, “what are you?” and she replies: “I 
am bad.” The phrase “I am bad” is not a reference to Michael Jackson’s song in the 
mid 1980s (albeit it could be, in light of the 1980s iconography in the vampire Girl’s 
bedroom), but functions like the description of the figure of the depressive provided 
by Julia Kristeva: 
 
According to classical psychoanalytic theory (Abraham, Freud, Klein), 
depression, like mourning, hides an aggressivity against the lost object and 
thereby reveals the ambivalence on the part of the mourner with respect to the 
object of his mourning. ‘I love him/her’, the depressive seems to say about a 
lost being or object, ‘but, even more, I hate him/her; because I love him/her, 
in order not to lose him/her, I install him/her in myself; but because I hate 
him/her, this other in myself is a bad ego, I am bad, worthless, I am 
destroying myself’ [emphasis added].530 
 
In this sense, the female vampire is the figure of the depressive par excellence, and 
the lost object is the ‘I’ of the subject of enunciation, namely the Girl before 
becoming a vampire. The Girl’s eternal thirst for blood, its aggressivity and killing, is 
in reality the vampire’s perpetual desire to kill herself: to erase herself out of 
existence, to be annihilated – in effect, the desire to die and escape this obscene 
immortality. But, since the vampire has become immortal – in a perpetually living 
death – she can never truly die, no matter how much she kills; in a sort of Freudian 
repetition compulsion, the outward lust for death/blood is ultimately aggressivity 
turned towards itself – no matter how much she kills her victims, her own death is 
never realized. The endless cycle of killing and feeding is the eternal desire to die 
once and for all, but paradoxically, the very act of killing and feeding perpetuates her 
immortality. The vampire’s immortality is thus an obscene immortality, a curse, from 
which she seeks release.  
 Apropos the vampire Girl, who remains nameless throughout the film, and is 
named only ‘The Girl’ in the credits; beyond the obvious gesture towards the 
nameless Samurai rōnin (masterless Samurai), originally played by Toshiro Mifune 
in Akira Kurosawa’s two masterpieces Yojimbo (1961) and Sanjuro (1962), from 
                                                        
530 Julia Kristeva, “On the Melancholic Imaginary”, new formations, Number 3, 
Winter (1987): 6-7. 
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which Sergio Leone stole the idea for A Fist Full of Dollars (1967), with Clint 
Eastwood as the nameless drifter; there is a twist to this standard figure of 
namelessness in Iranian Sufism that is worth recalling here. In Sufism having no 
name or being nameless (bi nam-o neshani) is the station of mystical death or fana; 
here in this instance, we have a strange reverberation of this motif in which the next 
mystical station after fana (death) is baqa or subsistence or persistence after death 
(fana),531 literally subsistence after death, or immortality – the horror name for this 
immortality is obscene immortality, which is exemplified in the figure of the 
vampire.532  
 The vampire Girl’s lack of a name, functions as the non-symbolization of the 
figure of the vampire, the missing signifier of the name means that the vampire does 
not belong to the Symbolic order, the socio-symbolic universe of language, laws, 
customs, etc. which precisely mortifies and castrates the subject into being (through 
entry into the world of language). Human subjectivity is constituted by the symbolic 
but the figure of the vampire is beyond both imaginarization or specularization, since 
the Lacanian imaginary is typified by the mirror phase and the vampire has no mirror 
image, and as well as symbolization, which is precisely why the vampire is on the 
side of the (Lacanian) Real. This is what Žižek also states apropos the vampire’s lack 
of mirror image in his own characteristic fashion, “It is therefore clear why vampires 
are invisible in the mirror: because they have read Lacan and, consequently, know 
how to behave-they materialize objet a which, by definition, cannot be mirrored.”533 
In this sense, we can say the horror of the female vampire is that she is a non-
castrated being. Such a figure is what was evoked by Freud’s myth of the primordial 
father, who was the non-castrated figure of total jouissance, a kind of monstrous 
figure who had to be murdered by his brothers, and from whose death the twin 
Oedipal laws at the origins of civilization were constituted.  
                                                        
531 See, G. Böwering, 'BAQĀʾ WA FANĀʾ,' Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. III, Fasc. 7, 
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532 Žižek has various formulations of obscene immortality in his work related to the 
figure of the undead in horror fiction, and to the Lacanian concept of lamella, but for 
a general view see Slavoj Žižek, “The Obscene Immortality and its Discontents,” The 
International Journal of Žižek Studies, Vol 11, No 2 (2017), pp. 1-14. 
533 Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom, 126. 
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In an interview Amirpour was asked what fascinated her about vampires, and 
she replied: “If a vampire showed up, I’d be like: “Do it: I want to live forever.” 
That’s my feeling about vampires.”534 The search for the fountain of youth or 
immortality, which today is staged through bio-computer technology and the 
possibility to merge with computers and to download ourselves digitally into ever 
new software ad infinitum, is the dream and promise of immortality held out by 
techno-capitalism. This dream has a name in psychoanalysis: a nightmare. This 
nightmare is realized in The Girl, in the figure of the female vampire (the Girl) who 
provides a version of this fetishized longing for immortality (since the vampire is 
immortal), and the flight from mortality and inevitability of death. In the face of 
existential aloneness, alienation and the abyss of death, the fantasmatic figure of the 
vampire holds out the alluring promise of love and immortality for Arash, and by 
extension every subject who longs for love and immortality. This perverse longing 
for physical immortality, is what is called obscene immortality. As Žižek states: “It’s 
not as classical metaphysics thinks, we are too terrified to think we are mortal beings, 
we would like to be immortal. No. The truly horrible thing is to be immortal. 
Immortality is the true nightmare, not death.”535 Today’s version of immortality then 
is an undead immortality or the immortality of the undead. Which is why the figure 
of the vampire holds a certain power of fascination and functions as a perfect fetish, a 
stand in for the promise of immortality offered up by digital neoliberal capitalism. 
In the very final scene of the film, where Arash and the Girl vampire drive off 
in his car, the Freudian death drive is literally enacted, the dissolution of the subject 
through the love-object or das Ding, the Thing–the vampiric Girl. It is the final 
masochistic act of love in which Arash as subject accepts his own being-towards-
death, as Heidegger calls it.536 Here the love-couple itself has the structure of 
vampirism in which in order to be properly installed into the symbolic universe of 
love, the lover (Arash) must accept its own death as subject, to mortify himself – to 
be in-love is to die for and through, the loved Thing, the beloved Other (the vampire). 
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As Byung Chul-han puts it, “Love means dying in the Other.”537 It is only through 
the acceptance of death, that immortality becomes possible, albeit in this instance, an 
obscene immortality.  
 
5.9 Chion with Lacan, Take Two: Athorybos and the Inscription of Desire 
 
In his recent text, Words on Screen (l'écrit au cinéma), Michel Chion provides 
some of the most fascinating theoretical analysis of writing in the diegetic space of 
the film world. One of the formal features of writing that appears in the profilmic 
universe, Chion baptizes with the Greek name: athorybos. Chion states: 
 
I have given the name athorybos (Greetk privative a- + thorybos, noise) to 
any object or movement in the image that could–either in reality or in the 
imagination–produce sound but which is not accompanied by any sound. It is 
my contention all the writing we read in a film image that is not accompanied 
by an utterance, or is not the source or “launchpad” for an utterance, merits 
this term.”538  
In this formulation, athorbyos is a writing “without noise” or writing without voice, 
that is a writing in the film image that would normally produce sound or can be 
imagined to produce sound but remains silent. In this sense, Claudia Gorbman rightly 
points out that, “This idea is the analogue to Chion’s term acousmatic… describing 
sound whose visual source is not seen.”539 For Chion there are two forms of 
athorybos operative in the cinema that he calls: private athorybos and public 
athorybos, a few of which I will be concerned with here, namely tattoos (private 
athorbyos), posters and graffiti (public athorybos).540  
Though Chion does not address the question of desire that may be evoked in 
relation to the concept of athorybos, Lacan’s concept of desire as an inscription at the 
level of language provides an important supplement to Chion’s concept. Lacan states, 
“Desire is always what is inscribed as a repercussion of the articulation of language at 
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539 Chion, Words on Screen, 203. 
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the level of the Other [i.e., the social Other].”541 According to Lacan, the articulation 
of language at the level of the (social) Other is what always writes/inscribes desire in 
the subject – in other words desire is never self-inscribed (self-induced, self-
generated), but always appears/emerges through the big Other, the Symbolic order 
(i.e., language and society). This perfectly tallies with the forms of athorybal writing 
in the cinema that Chion mentions, such as tattoos, posters and graffiti which 
function as an address or the articulation of language in the (social) Other, wherein 
the subject’s desire is aroused. In this sense, Lacan’s notion of desire as an inscription 
of language at the level of the Other, brings to the fore the logic of desire operative in 
any athorybal inscription in the cinema. 
The diegetic writing as athorybos that appears in Persian in the profilmic 
universe of A Girl, (which only native Persian speakers can read since it does not 
form part of the subtitling of the film), has the function of evoking the spectator’s 
desire, since the writing arouses the spectator’s desire to know the meaning behind 
the mysterious writing that appears in the diegetic space of the film, through tattoos, 
signs, posters, and graffiti. The spectators may ask themselves, “What does all this 
writing mean?” In this way, the (non Persian-speaking) spectator is the subject of the 
athorybal address, but is unable to decipher its cryptic message. Indeed, since the film 
was shot in Tufts California, it is clear that all the athorybal writing in the film is not 
a found image, functioning as part of the natural setting and location of the film, but 
rather was deliberately constructed in the mise-en-scène of the relevant shots. 
Therefore, the athorybal writing in the diegetic reality of the film-world plays an 
important role in the filmic universe, which functions as a supplementary form of 
meaning-making at the level of form and as the dialectic counterpart of the narrative. 
In this sense, the film form itself through its athorybal inscriptions conveys a message 
that is consonant with the narrative: the athorbyal writing is the return of the 
repressed, as Lacan states, “my idea of the written – to situate it, to start from there… 
Well let’s say it, colon, is the return of the repressed” [my emphasis].542 In this sense, 
the athorybal writing in the film itself functions as the return of the repressed since 
some of the writing on the wall includes words such as ‘sex’, ‘fear’, ‘boss,’ etc.  
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One of the scenes where athorybal writing appears in the form of a poster is 
when the vampire Girl comes out of a grocery store, and through a long shot we see 
on the wall to the left a large poster of a black veiled female figure and on the right 
hand side of the window of the grocery store is an poster that says, “Boss/Leader” (in 
Persian ra’is). The image of the black-chador female has a face that is blanked out or 
emptied out in white, a blank image where the face should be – a perfect instantiation 
of the Lacanian void subject – and on which it is written in Persian, “who is it”? 
(shoma?) The question in the poster is not only addressed to the people of Bad City in 
the filmic universe, but the question is also addressed to the spectator, asking us “who 
is it?” (shoma?) Who is the vampire Girl, and what does she want? To put it in the 
(in)famous terms that Freud put it, “what does a woman [vampire] want?”543 This 
again is the question of desire, recalling Lacan’s formulation Che vuoi? What do you 
want? What does the Other want? The spectator’s desire is thereby aroused and 
implicated here, since the spectator wants to know what the Other/vampire wants.  
At the bottom of the poster we read the words, “is this you? (in to’ee) – call 
now (zang bezan),” with a number given below. It is as if the film, in an obverse form 
of the Althusserian interpellation – where you are addressed by the figure of authority 
in the dominant ideology – the viewer is interpolated to revolt, recalling Julia 
Kristeva’s formulation, “Revolt, She Said”.544 It is an athorybal address to the 
(female) spectator to call and join the revolt. Indeed, it seems the film text is directly 
interpolating the female spectator telling them that they are all the embodiments of 
the vampire Girl. The empty face like mask stands as the empty container that can be 
the face of every feminine/female subject in Iran. The athorybal address, “call now” 
is calling all women in Iran to revolutionary action. The emptied out face of the 
veiled woman on the poster, recalls the mask of Guy Fawkes in the film V for 
Vendetta (2005), (based on Allen Moore’s eponymous graphic novel) in which every 
citizen subject wears the same Guy Fawkes mask at the end of the film representing 
the revolutionary subject and as a gesture of revolutionary solidarity, while 
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occupying the square in London; similarly the figure of the Girl in the poster and in 
the universe of the film seems to call all women in Iran to take revolutionary and 
insurrectionary action against the State (the Islamic Republic), against the figure of 
the Boss/Leader (ra’is), and against all figures of paternal authority.545 In this sense, 
the Girl like V in V for Vendetta stands for the figure of the female revolutionary 
subject par excellence. It is no wonder that the Iranian authorities banned this film, 
and in their reviews of the film noted that this film is “against Iran” and “against the 




In this chapter I theorized that contrary to the previous chapter where the 
people were caught in the nightmare of the State, in A Girl Walks Home Alone At 
Night the nightmare of the Islamic Republic appeared in the figure of the chador-clad 
female vampire, the paradoxical embodiment of uncontrolled feminine sexuality. I 
argued that the vampire Girl, symbolized the return of the repressed of female desire 
and sexuality. I demonstrated that the film stages the Freudian return of the repressed, 
specifically the repression of feminine desire through an analysis of the concept of 
the return of the repressed in psychoanalysis and its articulation in psychoanalytic 
horror film theory, but with a Lacanian twist to the standard formulation, where the 
return of the repressed is, paradoxically not from the past but from the future.  
 It was seen that female sexuality according to Shi‘ite legal theory is 
possessed of a traumatic Real, in the Lacanian sense, that is the source of horror to 
the ideology of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, in the Islamic Republic the repression 
of female sexuality is enacted through the logic of veil, since according to an Islamic 
theory of feminine sexuality women are possessed of an active sexuality, a surplus of 
sexual desire and enjoyment (jouissance) that must be covered over and controlled 
lest it be a cause of social chaos (fetna). The logic of the veil (hejab) is thereby meant 
to cover over this surplus enjoyment (plus-de-jouir), this excess of jouissance 
(enjoyment) inhering in women that is a threat to the patriarchal symbolic order. This 
was also seen in the way the film was received by official sources in Iran as an “anti-
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Iranian” and an “anti-hejab” film. The film was contextualized in light of post-
revolutionary Iranian horror cinema and as theorized as an example of the two modes 
of the weird and the eerie discussed in the previous chapter. It was also demonstrated 
that the film’s aesthetics was in line with Naficy’s theory of accented cinema, and its 
status as an Iranian diasporic film functioned to critique the state more freely, since it 
would have been impossible to make such a film in Iran.  
In this way, the chador-clad female vampire, the Girl, stands for the Freudian 
return of the repressed, where the weird juxtaposition of an eroticized female vampire 
with a chador destabilizes the logic of the veil, which is meant to cover over the 
threat of uncontrolled female sexual desire. The return of the repressed is then the 
eruption of feminine libidinal energy, typified by the vampiric Girl, who haunts and 
kills the male inhabitants of Bad City. In the final analysis, all the various elements, 
such as the vampire Girl as castrator, the logic of obscene immortality and the death 
drive, Chion’s notion of athorybos and Lacan’s inscription of desire, all circulated 
around the motif of the return of the repressed, the repressed Real of feminine 





I would like to return again to the question with which I began this thesis, namely 
what is at stake, today, in coupling psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema? If we accept, 
as I have argued, that psychoanalytic theory is, at its core, concerned with the 
structure of desire and its interpretation, than we can discern that it is in Iranian 
cinema, perhaps more than any other cinematic universe, that the logic of desire is 
operative both at the level of form and content. It is through the encounter between 
Iranian cinema and Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that the interpretation of 
these desires can be brought to light, desires that often undermine the explicit 
ideology of the Islamic Republic and uncover its hidden libidinal economy. 
It is a little puzzling that it has taken this long for psychoanalytic film theory 
to be systematically coupled with Iranian cinema, since as this thesis has 
demonstrated, the short-circuiting of (Lacanian) psychoanalysis and Iranian cinema is 
capable of bringing out theoretical insights that shatter our common perceptions and 
conceptions of the two in novel ways. Walter Benjamin once used a profoundly 
counter-intuitive metaphor that is relevant here, he indicated that we must “act as if 
the classic work is a film for which the appropriate chemical liquid to develop it was 
invented only later, so that it is only today that we can get the full picture.”546 In this 
sense, it is perhaps only today that we can get the full picture of the structure of 
desire in Iranian cinema by applying the chemical liquid that is psychoanalytic theory 
to Iranian films.  
In his magnum opus, Less Than Nothing, Žižek strangely claims 
psychoanalysis only for the western Judeo-Christian tradition against Islam, by 
theorizing that it is only the former that endorses the full reality of the objects of 
desire, whereas for the latter all objects of desire are merely illusory. He states, “This 
is why psychoanalysis is firmly entrenched in the Western Judeo-Christian tradition, 
not only against Oriental spirituality but also against Islam, which, like Oriental 
spirituality, endorses the thesis on the ultimate vanity and illusory nature of every 
object of desire [emphasis added].”547 Indeed, it is apparent that Žižek is woefully ill-
                                                        
546 Slavoj Žižek, Antigone (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), introduction, 
iBooks. See Walter Bejamin, “the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2007), 220-221. 
547 Žižek, Less Than Nothing, 132. 
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equipped in dealing with the nuances, intricacies, and complexities of the study of 
Islamic thought in relation to desire and sexuality. This thesis has variously 
demonstrated that (both Sunni and Shi‘i) Islam acknowledges everywhere the reality 
and efficacity of (sexual) desire and the erotic, as Bouhdiba states, “In Islam, then, 
sexuality enjoys a privileged status. Whether in the texts that regulate the exercise of 
sexuality in social life or in those that allow the dream its full oneiric density, the 
right to the pleasures of sex is stated forcefully.”548 The reading that claims 
psychoanalysis only for the western Judeo-Christian tradition is a disavowal of the 
profoundly shared cultural and intellectual heritage of these monotheistic religions of 
the book throughout history, a disavowal that is symptomatic of our contemporary 
era. One of the achievements of this thesis is to have put to rest such reductive 
readings, by staging a productive encounter between (Lacanian) psychoanalytic film 
theory and post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, where the logic of desire inscribed in 
the formal and narrative structure of this cinema is brought to the fore. 
This thesis demonstrated that desire and sexuality, like a spectral presence 
haunts the cinematic landscape of post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. In the thesis I 
explored the nexus between desire and sexuality, or Eros and eroticism in the New 
Iranian Cinema, as well as in the shift away from the New Iranian Cinema of the past 
with a new genre bending Iranian film movement that I categorized as the uncanny 
between the weird and the eerie (as theorized by Mark Fisher). The issues involving 
the theme of the representation of the desire and sexuality and its consequences, had 
remained untheorized in the study of Iranian cinema, except indirectly through the 
study of women and gender. This is why I theorized the structure of desire and 
sexuality operative in Iranian cinema, as it provided a new angle, a new analytic lens, 
through which to view and interrogate post-revolutionary cinematic practice. 
Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory was foregrounded as the privileged method in 
uncovering the logic of desire operative in post-revolutionary cinema, as it in enabled 
the foregrounding of desire as an important and neglected object of study in Iranian 
films, especially due to the unique spectatorial relations that this cinema produces 
between the film text and the spectator. 
Therefore one of the significant contributions of this thesis is the opening up 
of a new theoretical and discursive space, in which the study of desire and sexuality 
                                                        
548 Bouhdiba, Sexuality in Islam, 88. 
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can be seen as an important object of theoretical enquiry in post-revolutionary Iranian 
cinema. To this end, this work has contributed in shedding a new light on already 
existing debates such as the representation of women and gender in Iranian films, and 
more broadly in film studies and film theory. Indeed, one of the key contributions of 
the thesis to the study of Iranian cinema is to have deployed the methodologies of 
film studies and film theory –particularly second wave (Lacanian) psychoanalytic 
film theory–as a method of formal analysis, whilst much of the scholarly literature on 
Iranian cinema has largely come from fields outside film studies such as literature, 
history, sociology, and anthropology. In this way, this thesis has not only firmly 
situated the study of Iranian cinema within the discipline of film studies and film 
theory, but has demonstrated that film studies and film theory itself has to take stock 
of the unique formal structure of Iranian cinema that has contributed, and continues 
to contribute, to the formal language and art of the cinema.  
 In Part I, we saw that the dialectical tension that is the principle axis in New 
Iranian Cinema is the one between gaze and voice – the two forms of the Lacanian 
object-cause of desire or objet petit a. In Chapter 1, it was seen that the object-gaze 
appears in Iranian cinema as the result of the system of modesty imposed on the 
cinema, which is meant to veil over (sexual) desire through the Islamic logic of the 
averted gaze. Paradoxically, the averted gaze is co-incident with the logic of looking 
awry, which renders this cinema a particularly rich potential as the site of the object-
gaze instead of the apotheosis of feminist gaze theory (as formulated by Mottahedeh). 
The object-gaze often structures the formal logic of New Iranian Cinema, since desire 
is related to what cannot be seen or what remains hidden from the visual field. This is 
why I theorized that the New Iranian Cinema – with the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami 
as its locus classicus – exemplifies the cinema of desire at its purest. Both 
Kiarostami’s Shirin and Majidi’s Baran, are two emblematic instances where the 
object-gaze appears in the formal structure of these films, and where the desire of the 
spectator is accounted for in the cinematic image. The uncanny experience of the 
gaze in such films raises the sensation in the viewing subject that the object looked 
upon (the cinematic screen), is returning the gaze. The chapter made several 
theoretical interventions that contributes to film studies and film theory more 
broadly: first by delineating first and second wave psychoanalytic film theory in light 
of their respective conceptions of the gaze, and how New Iranian Cinema is one of 
the permier sites of the object-gaze rather than feminist gaze theory. Second, Lacan’s 
 230 
interpretation of Las Meninas in Seminar XIII was deployed in the analysis of the 
gaze in Shirin (a film never hitherto considered in light of the object-gaze), instead of 
the usual reference to the Ambassdors in discussions of the gaze in second wave 
psychoanalytic film theory. Finally, I located New Iranian Cinema as one of the film 
movements that represents the cinema of desire, along with Italian neorealism and the 
French Nouvelle Vague. 
 In the next chapter I provided a new theorization of the structure of the voice 
in the New Iranian Cinema, through the film and sound theorist Michel Chion’s 
concept of acousmêtre (acousmatic voice) and Lacan’s concept of the voice as objet 
petit a. The theoretical orientation of the chapter was grounded on coupling Chion 
with Lacan, inflected through feminist psychoanalytic film theory, especially through 
an engagement with the concept of the voice-off in the work of Mary Ann Doane and 
Kaja Silverman. The core argument of the chapter theorized that the two films under 
analysis, namely Makhmalbaf’s Gabbeh and Banietemad’s The May Lady, use the 
acousmatic voice as a way to subvert the logic of veiling the female voice in Iranian 
cinema by the acousmatization of the male voice rather than the female voice. 
Through these two filmic examples, it was seen that since male or female bodies 
cannot be displayed erotically on the screen, the voice acted as a signifier of desire 
and became a love-object. In this way, the acousmatic voice is often deployed in the 
New Iranian Cinema as way to fill in the erotic absence created by the modesty 
system. Like the previous chapter on the gaze, the chapter on the voice makes an 
original contribution to the field of New Iranian Cinema by foregrounding the voice 
as an important theoretical lens through which to read previously neglected aspects of 
this cinema. Both chapters deployed the methodology of film studies and film theory 
in the analysis of the films, which is another novel contribution to the study of the 
auditory regime of the New Iranian Cinema. In this respect, the theoretical 
intervention in the chapter contributed to an encounter between second wave 
psychoanalytic film theory and feminist film theory, by showing how the New 
Iranian Cinema, due to the Shi‘ite system of modesty, reverse engineers the logic of 
the female voice in classical Hollywood cinema, where the female voice is usually 
synched to her body, while the acousmatic voice or voice-off is often a male voice 
who is granted powers of discursivity. 
In the final chapter of Part I, through a detailed analysis of 
Shahriar’s Daughters of the Sun, I theorized the film as an enactment of the Lacanian 
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logic of the feminine ‘No’ and feminine jouissance through its female protagonist 
Amangol, where she became the embodiment of the motto of Lacanian ethics: “do 
not cede with respect to your desire.” Through an analysis of Amangol’s forced 
gender re-signification from feminine to masculine where her father shaved her hair 
and cross-dressed her as a boy, I looked at various motifs that were staged in the film 
such as transgender, gender and sexual ambiguity, female and male homoeroticism, 
and cross-dressing or transvestism, many of which were/are subversive of the gender 
and sexual imaginary of the Islamic Republic. The scholarly examination of non-
normative genders, bodies, and queer sexualities in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema 
is in its infancy, and one of the contributions of this chapter was to foreground this 
neglected area and to open up a discursive space for further theoretical and critical 
work. Indeed, there is ample room for theoretical analysis of films that contain either 
subtle or overt representations of these motifs in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema, 
many of which have been virtually neglected. Finally, one of the important 
theoretical contributions of this chapter is to have staged a critical but productive 
encounter between Lacanain theory and transgender studies, as well as gender and 
queer theory. 
 In Part II of the thesis I explored the logic of desire and sexuality in the shift 
away from the New Iranian Cinema of the past with a new genre bending Iranian film 
movement that I theorized as the uncanny avant-garde between the weird and the 
eerie. I situated Ahmadzadeh’s film Atomic Heart, as one of the films that exemplify 
the logic of unhimelich between the weird and the eerie. The film is split into a two 
part structure that I theorized as positing the Lacanian logic of fantasy and desire side 
by side, where the first half formed the fantasy scenario and the second half as the 
Real of desire – desire in all its traumatic dimension. The two female protagonists of 
the film represented young Iranians in Tehran who after a night of partying were 
caught in the dream of a mysterious figure called Toofan, who although was equated 
with the devil, in reality represented the Islamic Republic and the totalitarian and 
dictatorial logic of the State (or Ahmadinejad). The first fantasy half of the film 
represented the way ideology functions as a fantasy or dream that obfuscates the 
antagonism or deadlock in reality, in the social order, and the second part represented 
the collapse of this fantasy frame. What we were confronted in the second part of the 
film was a nightmarish Real too traumatic to confront directly. The film’s end has a 
cynical, even a hopeless message: Nobahar and Arineh wake up from the nightmarish 
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Real of their really existing reality in Tehran, back into the safety of reality – a reality 
supported by ideological fantasy. To put it in Lacanain terms: they wake up in order 
to continue to dream (fantasize). Atomic Heart is one of the emblematic films of the 
new film movement theorized in this chapter, since it depicts the current nightmarish 
atmosphere in Iran that is filled with fear, paranoia and anxiety. 
In the final chapter, I located the diasporic or accented Iranian vampire film A 
Girl Walks Home Alone At Night directed by Ana Lily Amirpour, among the new 
cycle of films that represents the uncanny avant-garde between the weird and the 
eerie. I theorized that the film stages the return of the repressed Real of feminine 
sexuality, where the figure of the black chador-clad female vampire, stands for the 
(Lacanian) Real of feminine sexuality, which in Islamic and Shi‘ite legal theory 
(figh) is imagined to possess an inherent surplus enjoyment (jouissance) that can 
cause chaos and destabilize the social-symbolic order – hence the logic of the veil is 
meant to cover over this excess in feminine desire as a way to contain and control it. 
In this sense, female sexuality unimpeded functions as a source of terror to the 
ideology of the Islamic Republic. The film therefore stages the return of the repressed 
desire embodied in the female vampire, the Girl, who hunts the male inhabitants of 
Bad City, representative of the dark underbelly of Tehran. There is a revolutionary 
core at the heart of the film where the vampire Girl stands for the call to all women to 
revolt against the patriarchal symbolic order, exemplified in the State and all its 
super-ego injunctions that seeks to control and delimit female autonomy and agency. 
In this way, although the film was made outside Iran, it is a veritable commentary on 
the oppressive and repressive atmosphere that is prevalent in contemporary Iran. One 
of the theoretical contributions of this chapter was to cross wires between 
psychoanalytic horror film theory and second wave psychoanalytic film theory, 
through a Lacanian intervention apropos the standard Freudian theory of ‘the return 
of the repressed.’ The other theoretical intervention was to couple Lacan with Chion 
yet again, this time by supplementing Chion’s concept of athorbyos in relation to the 
diegetic writing in the film, with Lacan’s concept of ‘the inscription of desire’ at the 
level of the Other (language).  
 Finally, I would like to end this thesis with a poignant moment that stages the 
continuity between the New Iranian Cinema in Part I, and the post-New Iranian 
Cinema theorized in Part II, a genre bending film movement that I called: Unheimlich 
between the weird and the eerie. In Abbas Kiarostami’s last film 24 Frames (2017), 
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there is a fleeting moment where the director places a note written in Persian 
underneath a tree. It is perhaps the director’s last testament as a tribute to the person 
whose name it contains. The name on the note reads: “Shahram Mokri”, the young 
director of Fish & Cat (2013), a film that Kiarostami greatly admired, and who, as 
previously noted, inaugurated with this film a new genre-bending film movement in 
Iran. Today, there is a subtle but visible shift away from the formal and narrative 
strategies of the New Iranian Cinema. I have categorized the formal logic and 
aesthetics of this new iteration of Iranian cinema as the uncanny suspended between 
the weird and the eerie, and if the New Iranian Cinema was recognizable under the 
sign of its master practitioner Abbas Kiarostami, the new trend in Iranian cinema is 
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